sngrep through 1.8.4 contains stack buffer overflow vulnerabilities in SIP attribute formatting routines when header values exceed the 255-byte buffer limit. Attackers can craft malicious SIP packets with oversized Call-ID, X-Call-ID, or other header fields to overflow stack buffers and cause crashes or execute arbitrary code during packet parsing and rendering.

Irontec Sngrep v1.8.1 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via the function rtpcheckpacket at /sngrep/src/rtp.c. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted SIP packet.

A stack-buffer overflow vulnerability exists in all versions of sngrep since v1.4.1. The flaw is due to inadequate bounds checking when copying 'Content-Length' and 'Warning' headers into fixed-size buffers in the sipvalidatepacket and sipparseextraheaders functions within src/sip.c. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (DoS) via crafted SIP messages.

A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in all versions of sngrep since v0.4.2, due to improper handling of 'Call-ID' and 'X-Call-ID' SIP headers. The functions sipgetcallid and sipgetxcallid in sip.c use the strncpy function to copy header contents into fixed-size buffers without checking the data length. This flaw allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (DoS) through specially crafted SIP messages.

Sngrep v1.6.0 was discovered to contain a stack buffer overflow via the function packetsetpayload at /src/packet.c.

Sngrep v1.6.0 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via the function capturepacketreasmip at /src/capture.c.