Spring Batch's FlatFileItemReader supports files where a single logical record spans multiple physical lines — for example, a CSV field that contains embedded newlines wrapped in quotes. A specially crafted input file could exploit the way the reader assembles those multi-line records to consume excessive CPU time and memory, causing the batch job to stall or run out of memory. Spring Batch 6.0.0 - 6.0.4 Spring Batch 5.2.0 - 5.2.6 Spring Batch 4.3.0 - 4.3.13

DefaultExecutionContextSerializer, used by default in Spring Batch's JDBC job repository, passes Base64-decoded bytes directly to ObjectInputStream.readObject() without an ObjectInputFilter that restricts types to a trusted class allowlist. Spring Batch 6.0.0 - 6.0.4 Spring Batch 5.2.6 and earlier

Applications that deserialize execution contexts with Jackson2ExecutionContextStringSerializer are vulnerable to a deserialization attack if they use an untrusted data source for the job repository. The JobParameterDeserializer does not properly enforce the trusted-types allowlist, allowing an attacker to craft malicious input that can lead to arbitrary code execution, including known Jackson RCE gadgets. Spring Batch 6.0.0 - 6.0.4 Spring Batch 5.2.0 - 5.2.6