Strapi before 3.6.10 and 4.x before 4.1.10 mishandles hidden attributes within admin API responses.

System Details | Name | Value | |----------|------------------------| | OS | Windows 11 | | Version | 4.11.1 (node v16.14.2) | | Database | mysql |

Description I marked some fields as private fields in user content-type, and tried to register as a new user via api, at the same time I added content to fill the private fields and sent a post request, and as you can see from the images below, I can write to the private fields.

!register

!user

!privatefield

!table

To prevent this, I went to the extension area and tried to extend the register method, for this I wanted to do it using the sanitizeInput function that I know in the source codes of the strap. But the sanitizeInput function did not filter out private fields.

js const { auth } = ctx.state; const data = ctx.request.body; const userSchema = strapi.getModel("plugin::users-permissions.user");

sanitize.contentAPI.input(data, userSchema, { auth });

here's the solution I've temporarily kept to myself, code snippet

js const body = ctx.request.body;

const { attributes } = strapi.getModel("plugin::users-permissions.user");

const sanitizedData = .omitBy(body, (data, key) => { const attribute = attributes[key];

if (.isNil(attribute)) { return false; }

//? If you want, you can throw an error for fields that we did not expect.

// if (.isNil(attribute)) // throw new ApplicationError(Unexpected value ${key});

// if private value is true, we do not want to send it to the database. return attribute.private; });

return sanitizedData;

Storing passwords in a recoverable format in the DOCUMENTATION plugin component of Strapi before 3.6.9 and 4.x before 4.1.5 allows an attacker to access a victim's HTTP request, get the victim's cookie, perform a base64 decode on the victim's cookie, and obtain a cleartext password, leading to getting API documentation for further API attacks.

An authenticated user with access to the Strapi admin panel can view private and sensitive data, such as email and password reset tokens, for API users if content types accessible to the authenticated user contain relationships to API users (from:users-permissions). There are many scenarios in which such details from API users can leak in the JSON response within the admin panel, either through a direct or indirect relationship. Access to this information enables a user to compromise these users’ accounts if the password reset API endpoints have been enabled. In a worst-case scenario, a low-privileged user could get access to a high-privileged API account, and could read and modify any data as well as block access to both the admin panel and API by revoking privileges for all other users.