Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
9.3
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

Marc Schoenefeld found a flaw in the way OpenOffice.org 3.2.0 and earlier, enforced non-executable permission, when browsing macros, written in Python scripting language. If a local user was tricked into opening a specially-crafted OpenDocument Text (ODT) file, containing macros, and previewed the macro directories structure, it could lead to Python macro execution even when macros execution was disabled.

1 / 2
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
7
Null Pointer Dereference, Race Condition, Use After Free
AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P

Description of problem: Reported by Toshiyuki Okajima. With linux-2.6.34-rc5, findkeyringbyname() can gain the keyring which has been already freed. And then, its space (which is gained by findkeyringbyname()) is broken by accessing the freed keyring as the available keyring:

1) If the space of the freed keyring is reallocated for other purpose (ie. filp SLUB), the data of the filp object may be destroyed by the user of the freed keyring. (SLUB configuration can share the freed space with other same-size slabs.)

2) If the slab space of the freed keyring is released into the system, the system panic may happen because accessing the space of the freed keyring causes the page-fault.

Example: (we can easily confirm this problem if CONFIGSLUB is "y".) [1] with CONFIGSLUBDEBUGON While we are executing my reproducer (which is attached), we can notice that the user of the freed keyring breaks its space: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ./reproducer & ... dmesg ... ============================================================================= BUG keyjar: Poison overwritten -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

INFO: 0xffff880197a7e200-0xffff880197a7e200. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b INFO: Allocated in keyalloc+0x10b/0x35f age=25 cpu=1 pid=5086 INFO: Freed in keycleanup+0xd0/0xd5 age=12 cpu=1 pid=10 INFO: Slab 0xffffea000592cb90 objects=16 used=2 fp=0xffff880197a7e200 flags=0x200000000000c3 INFO: Object 0xffff880197a7e200 @offset=512 fp=0xffff880197a7e300

Bytes b4 0xffff880197a7e1f0: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ Object 0xffff880197a7e200: 6a 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b jkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object 0xffff880197a7e210: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object 0xffff880197a7e220: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object 0xffff880197a7e230: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object 0xffff880197a7e240: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object 0xffff880197a7e250: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object 0xffff880197a7e260: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object 0xffff880197a7e270: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object 0xffff880197a7e280: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object 0xffff880197a7e290: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkk� Redzone 0xffff880197a7e298: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb �������� Padding 0xffff880197a7e2d8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ Padding 0xffff880197a7e2e8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ Padding 0xffff880197a7e2f8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ Pid: 5090, comm: su Not tainted 2.6.34-rc5-nofixed #1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810e3e9c>] ? checkbytesandreport+0xb5/0xe6 [<ffffffff81152994>] ? keyalloc+0x10b/0x35f [<ffffffff810e3f8f>] ? checkobject+0xc2/0x1a4 [<ffffffff810e5c09>] ? slaballoc+0x2ff/0x3a6 [<ffffffff81152994>] ? keyalloc+0x10b/0x35f [<ffffffff81152780>] ? keyuserlookup+0x78/0x181 [<ffffffff81152994>] ? keyalloc+0x10b/0x35f [<ffffffff810e658a>] ? kmemcachealloc+0x75/0xe9 [<ffffffff81152994>] ? keyalloc+0x10b/0x35f [<ffffffff8115360a>] ? keyringalloc+0x29/0x61 [<ffffffff81155897>] ? installuserkeyrings+0x99/0x168 [<ffffffff81155ae6>] ? lookupuserkey+0x180/0x30a [<ffffffff81153eaf>] ? keyctlgetkeyringID+0x15/0x38 [<ffffffff81008a02>] ? systemcallfastpath+0x16/0x1b FIX keyjar: Restoring 0xffff880197a7e200-0xffff880197a7e200=0x6b

FIX keyjar: Marking all objects used ============================================================================= BUG keyjar: Poison overwritten ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

[2] without CONFIGSLUBDEBUGON While we are executing my reproducer (which is attached), we may find such the back-trace at the system panic: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ls -l /sys/kernel/slab total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Apr 21 00:45 :at-0000016 ... lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Apr 21 00:45 credjar -> :t-0000192 ... lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Apr 21 00:45 filp -> :t-0000192 ... lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Apr 21 00:45 keyjar -> :t-0000192 ... lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Apr 21 00:45 kmalloc-192 -> :t-0000192 ...

./reproducer.sh (PANIC) <1>BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001 <1>IP: [<ffffffff810e61a3>] kmemcachealloc+0x5b/0xe9 <4>PGD 6b2b4067 PUD 6a80d067 PMD 0 <0>Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP <0>last sysfs file: /sys/kernel/kexeccrashloaded <4>CPU 1 <4>Modules linked in: nfsd lockd nfsacl authrpcgss exportfs sunrpc autofs4 ipv6 ext4 jbd2 dmmirror dmregionhash dmlog dmmul tipath uinput shpchp i2ci801 ppdev parportpc e752xedac edaccore i2ccore tg3 iTCOwdt iTCOvendorsupport parport pcspkr ext3 jbd mbcache atageneric pataacpi megaraidmbox megaraidmm atapiix floppy dmmod [last unloaded: scsiwaitscan] <4>Pid: 31245, comm: su Not tainted 2.6.34-rc5-nofixed-nodebug #2 D2089/PRIMERGY <4>RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810e61a3>] [<ffffffff810e61a3>] kmemcachealloc+0x5b/0xe9 <4>RSP: 0018:ffff88006af3bd98 EFLAGS: 00010002 <4>RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff88007d19900b <4>RDX: 0000000100000000 RSI: 00000000000080d0 RDI: ffffffff81828430 <4>RBP: ffffffff81828430 R08: ffff88000a293750 R09: 0000000000000000 <4>R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000100000 R12: 00000000000080d0 <4>R13: 00000000000080d0 R14: 0000000000000296 R15: ffffffff810f20ce <4>FS: 00007f97116bc700(0000) GS:ffff88000a280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 <4>CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 <4>CR2: 0000000000000001 CR3: 000000006a91c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 <4>DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 <4>DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 <4>Process su (pid: 31245, threadinfo ffff88006af3a000, task ffff8800374414c0) <0>Stack: <4> 0000000512e0958e 0000000000008000 ffff880037f8d180 0000000000000001 <4><0> 0000000000000000 0000000000008001 ffff88007d199000 ffffffff810f20ce <4><0> 0000000000008000 ffff88006af3be48 0000000000000024 ffffffff810face3 <0>Call Trace: <4> [<ffffffff810f20ce>] ? getemptyfilp+0x70/0x12f <4> [<ffffffff810face3>] ? dofilpopen+0x145/0x590 <4> [<ffffffff810ce208>] ? tlbfinishmmu+0x2a/0x33 <4> [<ffffffff810ce43c>] ? unmapregion+0xd3/0xe2 <4> [<ffffffff810e4393>] ? virttoheadpage+0x9/0x2d <4> [<ffffffff81103916>] ? allocfd+0x69/0x10e <4> [<ffffffff810ef4ed>] ? dosysopen+0x56/0xfc <4> [<ffffffff81008a02>] ? systemcallfastpath+0x16/0x1b <0>Code: 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 c6 fa 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 65 4c 8b 04 25 60 e8 00 00 48 8b 45 00 49 01 c0 49 8b 18 48 85 db 74 0d 48 63 45 18 <48> 8b 04 03 49 89 00 eb 14 4c 89 f9 83 ca ff 44 89 e6 48 89 ef <1>RIP [<ffffffff810e61a3>] kmemcachealloc+0x5b/0xe9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

[reproducer.sh] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - #!/bin/sh

LOOP=100000 USER=dummyuser add /bin/su -c "exit;" $USER || { /usr/sbin/adduser -m $USER; add=1; }

for ((i=0; i<LOOP; i++)) do /bin/su -c "echo '$i' > /dev/null" $USER done

del (( add == 1 )) && /usr/sbin/userdel -r $USER exit - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

I created the patch which fixes this problem. (I attach it into the following mail. And I couldn't see the "Poison" lines of dmesg with the fixed kernel while I was executing my reproducer. So, this problem seems to be fixed by this patch.) This problem is serious because it may trigger the user data destructions.

1 / 2
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
4.9
Null Pointer Dereference
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C

Description of problem: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000004 IP: [<f7f06dca>] hashbindelete+0x14/0xad [irda] pdpt = 0000000000a57001 pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP last sysfs file: /sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/sysvendor Modules linked in: irda crcccitt fuse ip6tREJECT nfconntrackipv6 ip6tablefilter ip6tables ipv6 vmblock vsock vmmemctl vmhgfs uinput pcnet32 ppdev vmxnet microcode parportpc parport mii vmci i2cpiix4 i2ccore mptspi mptscsih mptbase scsitransportspi [last unloaded: scsiwaitscan]

Pid: 2403, comm: a.out Not tainted 2.6.33.6-147.2.4.fc13.i686.PAE #1 440BX Desktop Reference Platform/VMware Virtual Platform EIP: 0060:[<f7f06dca>] EFLAGS: 00010282 CPU: 0 EIP is at hashbindelete+0x14/0xad [irda] EAX: 00000000 EBX: 00000000 ECX: f2f97f4c EDX: f7f084aa ESI: df1b8800 EDI: f7f084aa EBP: eb19bd78 ESP: eb19bd64 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 Process a.out (pid: 2403, ti=eb19a000 task=f2ed9980 task.ti=eb19a000) Stack: 00000000 00000202 eb0df2c0 df1b8800 df1a6770 eb19bd84 f7f085f5 eb0df2c0 <0> eb19bd90 f7f0861f eb20c400 eb19bda4 f7f0a958 df1b8800 f7f0ebe4 df1a6770 <0> eb19bdb4 c06ef16e f2e21100 00000008 eb19bdbc c06ef1cf eb19bde0 c04d183a Call Trace: [<f7f085f5>] ? iriasdeleteobject+0x1b/0x2c [irda] [<f7f0861f>] ? iriasdeleteobject+0x19/0x1e [irda] [<f7f0a958>] ? irdarelease+0x65/0x127 [irda] [<c06ef16e>] ? sockrelease+0x14/0x59 [<c06ef1cf>] ? sockclose+0x1c/0x20 [<c04d183a>] ? fput+0xea/0x181 [<c04d18e4>] ? fput+0x13/0x15 [<c04cef5f>] ? filpclose+0x51/0x5b [<c043f260>] ? putfilesstruct+0x5f/0xb3 [<c043f2e8>] ? exitfiles+0x34/0x38 [<c0440a1b>] ? doexit+0x200/0x615 [<c044c4c0>] ? dequeuesignal+0xb1/0x120 [<c0440e9b>] ? dogroupexit+0x6b/0x94 [<c044c89d>] ? getsignaltodeliver+0x36e/0x389 [<c0407cd4>] ? dosignal+0x5a/0x6f4 [<c078359d>] ? apictimerinterrupt+0x31/0x38 [<c0455f57>] ? hrtimernanosleep+0x94/0xdc [<c04d7376>] ? pathput+0x15/0x18 [<c047c6a6>] ? auditsyscallexit+0xfa/0x10f [<c040838d>] ? donotifyresume+0x1f/0x79 [<c07831e4>] ? worknotifysig+0x13/0x1b Code: 04 01 74 0b 8b 55 f0 8d 43 0c e8 b8 bf 87 c8 83 c4 0c 5b 5e 5f 5d c3 55 89 e5 57 89 d7 56 53 89 c3 83 ec 08 c7 45 ec 00 00 00 00 <f6> 40 04 01 74 0b 8d 40 0c e8 40 bf 87 c8 89 45 ec 89 de c7 45 EIP: [<f7f06dca>] hashbindelete+0x14/0xad [irda] SS:ESP 0068:eb19bd64 CR2: 0000000000000004 ---[ end trace 8c5fb89ec896b3a8 ]--- Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed!

Acknowledgements:

Red Hat would like to thank Tavis Ormandy for reporting this issue.

1 / 3
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
2.1
Infoleak
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N

Description of problem: This problem was originally tracked down by Brad Spengler.

When calling wireless ioctls, if a driver does not correctly validate/shrink iwp->length, the resulting copytouser can leak up to 64K of kernel heap contents.

It seems that this is triggerable[1] in 2.6.32 at least on ath5k, but I was not able to track down how. The twisty maze of ioctl handlers stumped me. :) Other drivers I checked did not appear to have any problems, but the potential remains. I'm not sure if this patch is the right approach; it was fixed differently[2] in grsecurity.

[1] http://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=2290&start=0 [2] http://grsecurity.net/~spender/wireless-infoleak-fix2.patch

Discussion: http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/8/27/413

1 / 3
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
2.1
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N

Description of problem: http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/9/11/168 The EQLGETMASTRCFG device ioctl allows unprivileged users to read 16 bytes of uninitialized stack memory, because the "mastername" member of the masterconfigt struct declared on the stack in eqlgmastercfg() is not altered or zeroed before being copied back to the user.

Acknowledgements:

Red Hat would like to thank Dan Rosenberg for reporting this issue.

1 / 3
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
2.1
Infoleak
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N

Description of problem: http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/9/11/170 The CHELSIOGETQSETNUM device ioctl allows unprivileged users to read 4 bytes of uninitialized stack memory, because the "addr" member of the chreg struct declared on the stack in cxgbextensionioctl() is not altered or zeroed before being copied back to the user.

Acknowledgements:

Red Hat would like to thank Dan Rosenberg for reporting this issue.

1 / 3
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
5.5
Null Pointer Dereference
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Description of problem: It requires debugfs to be mounted on a local system

$ mount | grep debugfs none on /sys/kernel/debug type debugfs (rw) none on /var/lib/ureadahead/debugfs type debugfs (rw,relatime)

Tested with Ubuntu Maverick 10.04.1 with kernel 2.6.32-24-generic-pae. It's probably not exploitable in any meaningful way, although it produces page fault in kernel mode, and makes subsequent processes opening /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/setftracefilter (or setftracenotrace) unkillable, so it's a little bit of a DoS (or at least, annoyance).

Found via one of Tavis Ormandy's tools, I just quickly analyzed it and provided a testcase.

Acknowledgements:

Red Hat would like to thank Robert Swiecki of Google Security Team for reporting this issue.

1 / 3
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
7.1
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:C/A:C

The pollmodeio file for the megaraidsas driver in the Linux kernel 2.6.31.6 and earlier has world-writable permissions, which allows local users to change the I/O mode of the driver by modifying this file.

1 / 3
First published (updated )
Severity
4.3
XSS
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N

Mozilla Firefox before 3.0.12 does not always use XPCCrossOriginWrapper when required during object construction, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy and conduct cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks via a crafted document, related to a "cross origin wrapper bypass."

First published (updated )
Severity
4.7
Race Condition
AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P

The inode double locking code in fs/ocfs2/file.c in the Linux kernel 2.6.30 before 2.6.30-rc3, 2.6.27 before 2.6.27.24, 2.6.29 before 2.6.29.4, and possibly other versions down to 2.6.19 allows local users to cause a denial of service (prevention of file creation and removal) via a series of splice system calls that trigger a deadlock between the genericfilesplicewrite, splicefrompipe, and ocfs2filesplicewrite functions.

First published (updated )
Severity
2.1
Buffer Overflow
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P

Buffer overflow in the utilpathencode function in udev/lib/libudev-util.c in udev before 1.4.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (service outage) via vectors that trigger a call with crafted arguments.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.2
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

A privilege escalation flaw was found in the way udev used to check for the origin of messages sent from the NETLINK service. An attacker could use this flaw to escalate his privileges by sending the NETLINK message from userspace process, instead of from the kernel.

Acknowledgements:

Red Hat would like to thank Sebastian Krahmer of the SUSE Security Team for responsibly reporting this flaw.

1 / 2
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
9.3
Integer Overflow, Use After Free
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

Integer overflow in Mozilla Firefox 3.5.x before 3.5.11 and 3.6.x before 3.6.7, Thunderbird 3.0.x before 3.0.6 and 3.1.x before 3.1.1, and SeaMonkey before 2.0.6 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a large selection attribute in a XUL tree element, which triggers a use-after-free.

First published (updated )

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