Impact A vulnerability was identified in which users with update privileges on a namespace, can move that namespace into a project they don't have access to. After the namespace transfer is completed, their previous permissions are still preserved, which enables them to gain access to project-specific resources (such as project secrets). In addition, resources in the namespace will now count toward the quota limit of the new project, potentially causing availability issues.

User with roles Project Owner and Project Member on the source project can exploit this vulnerability; however, this would also apply to custom roles with similar privileges.

The patched version include an improved RBAC mechanism, which checks if the user has the correct permissions before the namespace move takes place.

Patches Patched versions include releases 2.6.13, 2.7.4 and later versions.

Workarounds There is no direct mitigation besides updating Rancher to a patched version.

For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

- Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries. - Open an issue in the Rancher repository. - Verify with our support matrix and product support lifecycle.

In Rancher 2.0.0 through 2.1.5, project members have continued access to create, update, read, and delete namespaces in a project after they have been removed from it.

An issue was discovered in Rancher 2 through 2.1.5. Any project member with access to the default namespace can mount the netes-default service account in a pod, and then use that pod to execute administrative privileged commands against the k8s cluster. This could be mitigated by isolating the default namespace in a separate project, where only cluster admins can be given permissions to access. As of 2018-12-20, this bug affected ALL clusters created or imported by Rancher.

Rancher 2 through 2.2.4 is vulnerable to a Cross-Site Websocket Hijacking attack that allows an exploiter to gain access to clusters managed by Rancher. The attack requires a victim to be logged into a Rancher server, and then to access a third-party site hosted by the exploiter. Once that is accomplished, the exploiter is able to execute commands against the cluster's Kubernetes API with the permissions and identity of the victim.

In Rancher 2 through 2.2.3, Project owners can inject additional fluentd configuration to read files or execute arbitrary commands inside the fluentd container.

In Rancher 1 and 2 through 2.2.3, unprivileged users (if allowed to deploy nodes) can gain admin access to the Rancher management plane because node driver options intentionally allow posting certain data to the cloud. The problem is that a user could choose to post a sensitive file such as /root/.kube/config or /var/lib/rancher/management-state/cred/kubeconfig-system.yaml.

An issue was discovered that affects the following versions of Rancher: v2.0.0 through v2.0.13, v2.1.0 through v2.1.8, and v2.2.0 through 2.2.1. When Rancher starts for the first time, it creates a default admin user with a well-known password. After initial setup, the Rancher administrator may choose to delete this default admin user. If Rancher is restarted, the default admin user will be recreated with the well-known default password. An attacker could exploit this by logging in with the default admin credentials. This can be mitigated by deactivating the default admin user rather than completing deleting them.