Sebastian Krahmer of the SUSE Security Team reported that systemd-logind, a part of the systemd service and system manager, did not create certain special files in a secure way. systemd-logind is responsible for managing and tracking user login sessions, and if a user were to log into the X11 desktop, it creates entries in /run/user/[username]/X11, where /run/user/[username] is a user-owned directory. Because systemd-logind does not create the entries in a secure fashion, a malicious user could replace /run/user/[username]/X11 with a symlink to another root-owned directory, such as /etc/pam.d or /etc/cron.d. This would cause a symlink named "display" to be created in the target directory, which is a symlink to a user-owned file (/tmp/.X11-unix/X0). Using further attack vectors and this symlink, the malicious user could obtain a root shell, if he could beat two separate race conditions.

Acknowledgements:

Red Hat would like to thank Sebastian Krahmer of the SUSE Security Team for reporting this issue.

A vulnerability was found in systemd-resolved. This issue may allow systemd-resolved to accept records of DNSSEC-signed domains even when they have no signature, allowing man-in-the-middles (or the upstream DNS resolver) to manipulate records.