ToolJet is the open-source foundation am AI-native platform for building and deploying internal tools, workflows and AI agents. Prior to 3.20.207, the ToolJet Database HTTP API in server/src/modules/tooljet-db/controller.ts authorizes operations against the :organizationId URL path value without verifying that the caller belongs to that organization. JwtAuthGuard validates the tj-workspace-id header against the caller's memberships, while server/src/modules/tooljet-db/ability/index.ts grants VIEWTABLES, VIEWTABLE, and JOINTABLES without binding them to the path organization. An authenticated user can set tj-workspace-id to the user's own workspace and target another workspace through GET /api/tooljet-db/organizations/:organizationId/tables, GET /api/tooljet-db/organizations/:organizationId/table/:tableName, POST /api/tooljet-db/organizations/:organizationId/join, and the related table-management routes, allowing disclosure of table names, schemas, and rows and allowing tables to be created, altered, bulk populated, or dropped across tenant boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 3.20.207-lts.

Account Takeover :: when see the info i can see the hash pass i can creaked it ............... Account Takeover :: when see the info i can see the forgotpasswordtoken the hacker can send the request and changed the pass

Just like in the previous report, an attacker could steal the account of different users. But in this case, it's a little bit more specific, because it is needed to be an editor in the same app as the victim.

The forgot password token basically just makes us capable of taking over the account of whoever comment in an app that we can see (bruteforcing comment id's might also be an option but I wouldn't count on it, since it would take a long time to find a valid one).

Improper Access Control in GitHub repository tooljet/tooljet prior to v1.19.0.

Excessive Attack Surface in GitHub repository tooljet/tooljet prior to v1.16.0.