Twenty is an open-source CRM (customer relationship management) platform. Prior to 2.22.0, field-level read permission is enforced on selected output fields but not on GraphQL or REST filter predicates. A workspace member or API key with permission to read an object but not a particular field can reference that denied field in direct filters, relation filters, or persisted view filters. The resulting totalCount and row presence reveal whether guesses match the real column, forming a boolean/count oracle that can reconstruct denied field values for records exposed by the principal's row-level policy. This issue is fixed in version 2.22.0.

Twenty is an open-source CRM (customer relationship management) platform. Prior to 2.9.0, Twenty was vulnerable to a cross-workspace insecure direct object reference (IDOR) in the AI agent monitor's AgentTurnResolver, in packages/twenty-server/src/engine/metadata-modules/ai/ai-agent-monitor/reso lvers/agent-turn.resolver.ts. The agentTurns(agentId) query and the evaluateAgentTurn(turnId) mutation looked up rows by agentId or id only; although AgentTurnEntity has a workspaceId column, it was not included in the WHERE clause, and the class-level guards only checked that the caller was authenticated in some workspace rather than that the requested object belonged to it, with the same flaw present in agent-turn-grader.service.ts. As a result, any authenticated user with the AI settings flag, a workspace owner by default, could target any other workspace on the same instance given the victim's agentId or turnId: agentTurns returned the victim's full chat history including message parts such as raw chat text, tool calls, and tool outputs, while evaluateAgentTurn inserted an agentTurnEvaluation row with the victim's workspaceId and fed the victim's turn into the default LLM. The agentId and turnId are non-guessable UUIDs but are exposed in the URL of the settings page. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0.

Twenty is an open source CRM. From 1.7.7 through 1.16.7, a critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in Twenty CRM via a chained SQL Injection and PostgreSQL COPY TO PROGRAM attack. If Postgres user is a super user then any authenticated user can execute arbitrary OS commands on the database server by injecting SQL through the unsanitized timeZone parameter in the REST API groupBy endpoint. The timeZone field within the groupby query parameter is directly interpolated into a raw SQL expression using JavaScript template literals without any parameterization, validation, or escaping. This affects engine/api/graphql/graphql-query-runner/group-by/resolvers/utils/get-group-by-expression.util.ts.

Twenty is an open source CRM. In 1.18.0 and earlier, the file serving endpoints in Twenty CRM at /files/ and /file/:fileFolder/:id serve uploaded files using fileStream.pipe(res) without setting any Content-Type, Content-Disposition, or X-Content-Type-Options response headers. This allows an authenticated attacker to upload an HTML file containing JavaScript, which will be rendered by the victim's browser in the context of the Twenty CRM domain when accessed — enabling session hijacking, account takeover, and data theft.

Twenty is an open source CRM. Prior to version 1.18, the SSRF protection in SecureHttpClientService validated request URLs at the request level but did not validate redirect targets. An authenticated user who could control outbound request URLs (e.g., webhook endpoints, image URLs) could bypass private IP blocking by redirecting through an attacker-controlled server. This issue has been patched in version 1.18.

An issue in Twenty CRM v1.15.0 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the local.driver.ts module.