A "stack overwrite" vulnerability in GnuPG (gpg) 1.x before 1.4.6, 2.x before 2.0.2, and 1.9.0 through 1.9.95 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted OpenPGP packets that cause GnuPG to dereference a function pointer from deallocated stack memory.

Format string vulnerability in Inkscape before 0.45.1 allows user-assisted remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in a URI, which is not properly handled by certain dialogs.

From Ludwid Nussel:

nm-applet.conf contains the following rules:

<policy context="default"> <allow senddestination="org.freedesktop.NetworkManagerUserSettings"/> <allow sendinterface="org.freedesktop.NetworkManagerSettings"/> <!-- Only root can get secrets --> <deny sendinterface="org.freedesktop.NetworkManagerSettings.Secrets"/>

Ie anyone can call methods on destination org.freedesktop.NetworkManagerUserSettings. There is a line that is supposed to block users from calling the GetSecrets method on the separate interface for secrets. Unfortunately that interface is not called "org.freedesktop.NetworkManagerSettings.Secrets" but "org.freedesktop.NetworkManagerSettings.Connection.Secrets". So the deny statement is useless and any user on the system can fetch the connection secrets. The same problem can be found in nm-system-settings.

Acknowledgements:

Red Hat would like to thank Ludwig Nussel for reporting this flaw responsibly.