A rogue Velociraptor client can upload a malformed sparse file such that if the GUI attempts to expand the file, a panic occurs which may crash the server process.

The problem is a Divide by Zero bug in the ShouldPadFile() function.

Velociraptor allows scheduling new collections via VQL queries in notebooks. For a user to schedule a new collection, they require the COLLECTCLIENT permission. However, this is not enforced when the user can run a VQL query which resets the authorization provider.

This allows a user who can run arbitrary VQL (usually with the "analyst" role) to launch new collections (usually requires the "investigator" role). This vulnerability is an escalation from an analyst to investigator role.

When Velociraptor is configured to use an OIDC IdP for authentication, it uses the email claim as a username. However, some IdP allow users to change the email claim without verification. Some IdPs do not set the "emailverified" claim and do not actually verify the email.

This allows a user to impersonate another user by setting their email address within the IdP, allowing account takeover.

Velociraptor's VQL has a query() plugin which allows running a VQL query in a different org or user context. To be able to run as a different user, the calling user needs to have the IMPERSONATE permission (usually only given to administrators). Velociraptor versions prior to 0.77.2 evaluate this permission against the caller's org instead of against the target org.

This allows an administrator in one org to impersonate another user in another org, in which they may not have the IMPERSONATE permission.

An authenticated attacker can spoof another GUI user's identity by sending their request with the custom header \"Grpc-Metadata-USER\". This can lead to an account takeover attack from a user with low privileges to administrator.