Missing authorization check in the uploadazure, uploadsftp, and uploadsmb VQL plugins allows an authenticated analyst-role user can initiate attacker-controlled outbound network connections from the Velociraptor server, bypassing the NETWORK ACL permission boundary. This enables internal network reconnaissance via port oracle and potential data exfiltration to external endpoints.

Velociraptor's NTFS parsing library mishandles several out of bound and memory exhaustion bugs which may be triggered by maliciously crafted NTFS images.

Typically Velociraptor's NTFS parser is used on live NTFS filesystems, limiting the opportunity of attackers corrupting the filesystem. However, in some applications (e.g.  dead disk forensics https://docs.velociraptor.app/docs/forensic/deaddisk/ ) Velociraptor may be used on untrusted NTFS image files.

If an attacker is able to inject maliciously corrupted NTFS Volumes they can cause a crash and a Denial of Service.

The NewNotebook API does not sufficiently sanitize its parameters allowing an authenticated user with NOTEBOOKEDIT permission to write the notebook record outside the org's data store directory. The file written must have an extension of ".json.db" but can otherwise overwrite other metadata files (such as ACL records, hunts etc). This can corrupt these files and cause data corruption.

The huntdelete() VQL function allows deleting hunts.

Velociraptor misapplied the permission check requiring only COLLECTCLIENT (usually assigned to the "investigator" role) instead of the "DELETERESULTS" permission (usually only assigned to "administrators").

Velociraptor allows reading Stacked result sets from the GUI.  Velociraptor's multi-tenant design stores sub orgs within the datastore directory. The path requested by the GUI is not correctly checked against the prefix deny list, allowing result sets to read from denied prefixes.

In particular, a user with read access to the root org can access result sets from child orgs.

When Microsoft Excel imports a CSV file, it executes cells beginning with certain characters as formulas, giving such CSV files arbitrary execution.

Velociraptor fails to sanitize such cells when exporting to CSV from various places such as the GUI, offline collector or data exports.

It is not clear if the vulnerability is actually in Microsoft Excel treating a CSV data file as executable content, or if Velociraptor should be sanitizing the data to prevent Excel from executing it. However, since this is such a common use case for Velociraptor we decided to highlight it in an advisory.

The Velociraptor verify() VQL function allows a user to verify an artifact for syntatic and other issues. Due to an implementation fault in this VQL function, the global artifact repository is used which allows callers to overwrite existing artifacts without the required permissions.  The attacker need only have the NOTEBOOKEDIT permission (e.g. an analyst role) to be able to call this function.

Rapid7 Velociraptor allows users to be created with different privileges on the server. Administrators are generally allowed to run any command on the server including writing arbitrary files. However, lower privilege users are generally forbidden from writing or modifying files on the server.

The VQL copy() function applies permission checks for reading files but does not check for permission to write files. This allows a low privilege user (usually, users with the Velociraptor "investigator" role) to overwrite files on the server, including Velociraptor configuration files.

To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must already have a Velociraptor user account at a low privilege level (at least "analyst") and be able to log into the GUI and create a notebook where they can run the VQL query invoking the copy() VQL function. Typically, most users deploy Velociraptor with limited access to a trusted group (most users will be administrators within the GUI). This vulnerability is associated with program files https://github.Com/Velocidex/velociraptor/blob/master/vql/filesystem/copy.go https://github.Com/Velocidex/velociraptor/blob/master/vql/filesystem/copy.go and program routines copy().

This issue affects Velociraptor versions before 0.6.7-5. Version 0.6.7-5, released January 16, 2023, fixes the issue.

Rapid7 Velociraptor did not properly sanitize the client ID parameter to the CreateCollection API, allowing a directory traversal in where the collection task could be written. It was possible to provide a client id of "../clients/server" to schedule the collection for the server (as a server artifact), but only require privileges to schedule collections on the client.

Normally, to schedule an artifact on the server, the COLLECTSERVER permission is required. This permission is normally only granted to "administrator" role. Due to this issue, it is sufficient to have the COLLECTCLIENT privilege, which is normally granted to the "investigator" role. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must already have a Velociraptor user account at least "investigator" level, and be able to authenticate to the GUI and issue an API call to the backend. Typically, most users deploy Velociraptor with limited access to a trusted group, and most users will already be administrators within the GUI.

This issue affects Velociraptor versions before 0.6.7-5. Version 0.6.7-5, released January 16, 2023, fixes the issue.

An improper access control issue in the VQL shell feature in Velociraptor Versions < 0.73.4 allowed authenticated users to execute the execve() plugin in deployments where this was explicitly forbidden by configuring the preventexecve flag in the configuration file. This setting is not usually recommended and is uncommonly used, so this issue will only affect users who do set it. This issue is fixed in release 0.73.4.

Due to insufficient validation in the PE and OLE parsers in Rapid7's Velociraptor versions earlier than 0.6.8 allows attacker to crash Velociraptor during parsing of maliciously malformed files.

For this attack to succeed, the attacker needs to be able to introduce malicious files to the system at the same time that Velociraptor attempts to collect any artifacts that attempt to parse PE files, Authenticode signatures, or OLE files. After crashing, the Velociraptor service will restart and it will still be possible to collect other artifacts.

Rapid7 Velociraptor versions prior to 0.7.0-4 suffer from a reflected cross site scripting vulnerability. This vulnerability allows attackers to inject JS into the error path, potentially leading to unauthorized execution of scripts within a user's web browser. This vulnerability is fixed in version 0.7.0-04 and a patch is available to download. Patches are also available for version 0.6.9 (0.6.9-1).

Rapid7 Velociraptor MSI Installer versions below 0.73.3 suffer from a vulnerability whereby it creates the installation directory with WRITEDACL permission to the BUILTIN\\Users group. This allows local users who are not administrators to grant themselves the Full Control permission on Velociraptor's files. By modifying Velociraptor's files, local users can subvert the binary and cause the Velociraptor service to execute arbitrary code as the SYSTEM user, or to replace the Velociraptor binary completely.  This issue is fixed in version 0.73.3.

A cross-site scripting (XSS) issue in generating a collection report made it possible for malicious clients to inject JavaScript code into the static HTML file. This issue was resolved in Velociraptor 0.6.5-2.

The Velociraptor GUI contains an editor suggestion feature that can display the description field of a VQL function, plugin or artifact. This field was not properly sanitized and can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS). This issue was resolved in Velociraptor 0.6.5-2.

On MacOS and Linux, it may be possible to perform a symlink attack by replacing this predictable file name with a symlink to another file and have the Velociraptor client overwrite the other file. This issue was resolved in Velociraptor 0.6.5-2.