Impact
There is a denial of service vulnerability in React Server Components.
React recommends updating immediately.
The vulnerability exists in versions 19.0.0, 19.0.1 19.1.0, 19.1.1, 19.1.2, 19.2.0 and 19.2.1 of:
- react-server-dom-webpack - react-server-dom-parcel - react-server-dom-turbopack
These issues are present in the patches published last week.
Patches
Fixes were back ported to versions 19.0.2, 19.1.3, and 19.2.2.
If you are using any of the above packages please upgrade to any of the fixed versions immediately.
If your app’s React code does not use a server, your app is not affected by this vulnerability. If your app does not use a framework, bundler, or bundler plugin that supports React Server Components, your app is not affected by this vulnerability.
References
See the blog post for more information and upgrade instructions.
Impact
It was found that the fix addressing CVE-2026-44575 did not apply to middleware.ts with Turbopack. Refer to CVE-2026-44575 for further details.
References
- CVE CVE-2026-44575
Impact
Applications using Partial Prerendering through the Cache Components feature can be vulnerable to connection exhaustion through crafted POST requests to a server action. In affected configurations, a malicious request can trigger a request-body handling deadlock that leaves connections open for an extended period, consuming file descriptors and server capacity until legitimate users are denied service.
Fix
We now treat the header used for resuming Partial Prerendered requests as an internal-only header and strip it from untrusted incoming requests. This header should never be accepted directly from external clients.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, block requests that would be handled by Next.js if they contain the Next-Resume header at the edge.
Impact
Self-hosted applications using the built-in Node.js server can be vulnerable to server-side request forgery through crafted WebSocket upgrade requests. An attacker can cause the server to proxy requests to arbitrary internal or external destinations, which may expose internal services or cloud metadata endpoints. Vercel-hosted deployments are not affected.
Fix
We now apply the same safety checks to WebSocket upgrade handling that already existed for normal HTTP requests, so upgrade requests are only proxied when routing has explicitly marked them as safe external rewrites.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not expose the origin server directly to untrusted networks. If WebSocket upgrades are not required, block them at your reverse proxy or load balancer, and restrict origin egress to internal networks and metadata services where possible.
Impact
When self-hosting Next.js with the default image loader, the Image Optimization API fetches local images entirely into memory without enforcing a maximum size limit. An attacker could cause out-of-memory conditions by requesting large local assets from the /next/image endpoint that match the images.localPatterns configuration (by default, all patterns are allowed).
- If you are using images.localPatterns, only the patterns in that array are impacted. - If you are using images.unoptimized: true, you are NOT impacted. - If you are using images.loader: 'custom', you are NOT impacted. - If you are using Vercel, you are NOT impacted.
Fix
We now apply response size limits consistently to internal image fetches, not just external ones, and fail oversized responses before they can exhaust process memory.
This can be adjusted using the images.maximumResponseBody configuration.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, avoid routing large local assets through /next/image, disable image optimization for large or untrusted local files, or block image optimization access to those assets at the edge.
You can disable using the images.localPatterns: [] configuration. This will still allow fetching remote images (which is not impacted).
Impact
Applications that rely on middleware to protect dynamic routes can be vulnerable to authorization bypass. In affected deployments, specially crafted query parameters can alter the dynamic route value seen by the page while leaving the visible path unchanged, which can allow protected content to be rendered without passing the expected middleware check.
Fix
We now only honor internal route-parameter normalization in trusted routing flows and ignore externally supplied parameter encodings that should never have been accepted from ordinary requests.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, enforce authorization in route or page logic instead of relying solely on middleware path matching.
Impact
App Router applications that rely on middleware or proxy-based checks for authorization can allow unauthorized access through transport-specific route variants used for segment prefetching. In affected configurations, specially crafted .rsc and segment-prefetch URLs can resolve to the same page without being matched by the intended middleware rule, which can allow protected content to be reached without the expected authorization check.
Fix
We now include App Router transport variants when generating middleware matchers, so middleware protections are applied consistently to those requests as well as to the normal page URL.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, enforce authorization in the underlying route or page logic instead of relying solely on middleware.
Impact
Applications using the Pages Router with i18n configured and middleware/proxy-based authorization can allow unauthorized access to protected page data through locale-less /next/data/<buildId>/<page>.json requests. In affected configurations, middleware does not run for the unprefixed data route, allowing an attacker to retrieve SSR JSON for protected pages without passing the intended authorization checks.
Fix The matcher logic was updated to perform the same match as it would on a non-i18n data route.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, enforce authorization in the page's server-side data path instead of relying solely on middleware.
Impact
There is an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in React Server Components.
We recommend upgrading immediately.
The vulnerability is present in versions 19.0.0, 19.1.0, 19.1.1, and 19.2.0 of: react-server-dom-webpack react-server-dom-parcel react-server-dom-turbopack
Patches
A fix was introduced in versions 19.0.1, 19.1.2, and 19.2.1. If you are using any of the above packages please upgrade to any of the fixed versions immediately.
If your app’s React code does not use a server, your app is not affected by this vulnerability. If your app does not use a framework, bundler, or bundler plugin that supports React Server Components, your app is not affected by this vulnerability.
References
See the blog post for more information and upgrade instructions.
Impact
When self-hosting Next.js with the default image loader, the Image Optimization API can optimize remotely hosted images if configured (not enabled by default). If those images contain malicious content, they can cause CPU exhaustion in /next/image endpoints.
- If you are using config.images.remotePatterns, only the patterns in that array are impacted. - If you are using config.images.unoptimized: true, you are NOT impacted. - If you are using config.images.loader: 'custom', you are NOT impacted. - If you are using Vercel, you are NOT impacted.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, you can avoid the expensive work by setting config.experimental.imgOptSkipMetadata : true.
Impact
A rewrites() or redirects() rule that builds its external destination hostname from request-controlled input can be pointed at an arbitrary hostname, regardless of the rule's hostname suffix. For a rewrite, Next.js proxies the request to that arbitrary host and serves the response from the application's origin, leading to Server-Side Request forgery. A redirects() rule configured this way is vulnerable to an Open Redirect.
This affects any destination that puts a dynamic segment in the hostname, whether from the path:
javascript // next.config.js module.exports = { async rewrites() { return [ { source: '/:tenant', destination: 'https://:tenant.api.example.com', }, ] }, }
or from a has capture:
javascript // next.config.js module.exports = { async rewrites() { return [ { source: '/', has: [{ type: 'query', key: 'region', value: '(?<region>.+)' }], destination: 'https://:region.api.example.com', }, ] }, }
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not build the hostname of an external rewrites() or redirects() destination from user-controlled input. If a dynamic subdomain is required, constrain the value to hostname-safe characters: value: '(?<region>[a-z0-9-]+)'.
Impact
Requests targeting Next.js applications using App Router with at least one Server Action can lead to excessive memory consumption if that Server Actions uses the Edge runtime
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, ensure your hosting provider limits the request's body size. 5 MiB should be allowed at max by your hosting provider.
Impact
A server-side fetch with a request body may return a cached response body from a different request to the same URL but different body. Confidential data in the POST's response body would then leak to unauthorized requests. Though the request itself will not be deduped.
This is only an issue when receiving request bodies with a content type charset other than UTF-8. For example, the UTF-16 byte sequences for 삃삃 and 섄섄 in the request body would share the same cache.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, consider only making fetch requests with UTF-8 bodies (default in Next.js). Applications using Pages Router are not vulnerable.
Impact
A server-side fetch with a request body may return a cached response body from a different request to the same URL but different body. Confidential data in the POST's response body would then leak to unauthorized requests. Though the request itself will not be deduped.
This only applies to fetch calls with a request that has a different init than the one passed to fetch. Safe: fetch(new Request(init), init) Unsafe: fetch(new Request(init), aDifferentInit)
Workarounds
No workaround exists besides upgrading. Applications using Pages Router are not vulnerable.
Impact
When a Server Action forwards or redirects a request, an attacker can cause the server to send that outbound request to a malicious host (Server-Side Request Forgery). This requires the attacker's request to control Host-associated headers. In some configurations, it's also possible to obtain internal values that weaken middleware/proxy authorization.
Applications that use Server Actions are affected when the incoming host header is not fixed to a trusted value. This typically occurs on custom servers, or on deployments not behind a proxy that pins the host. Managed hosting pins the host upstream and is not affected; next start and standalone output do the same from version 14.2 onward.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, ensure clients do not control the host header your application receives. Pin or validate Host and X-Forwarded-Host at your edge or proxy. On version 14.2.0 and later, you can additionally set the NEXTPRIVATEORIGIN environment variable to your deployment's real origin:
bash NEXTPRIVATEORIGIN=https://www.example.com node server.js
Impact
In Next.js applications using App Router, Server Actions (use server) or use cache endpoints can be disclosed bypassing any authentication on the pages where these endpoints are usually used.
Server Action IDs can be disclosed to unauthenticated users via publicly served client artifacts (for example, static chunks containing action references).
Affected users are applications using App Router + Server Actions.
By itself, this disclosure is typically a recon/enumeration primitive; however, it can increase risk when combined with other weaknesses. Workarounds
Never assume any authentication claims at the use cache or use server boundary. Always authenticate within the boundary.
Impact
Crafted requests targeting Next.js applications using App Router built with Turbopack and a single entry in config.i18n.locales can bypass middleware/proxy based authentication.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, enforce authorization in the page's server-side data path instead of relying solely on middleware.
Impact
Crafted requests targeting Next.js applications using App Router with at least one Server Action can lead to excessive CPU usage blocking processing of further requests in the same process.
Workarounds
No workaround exists besides upgrading. Applications using Pages Router or not using Server Actions are not vulnerable.
Impact
App Router applications that rely on CSP nonces can be vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting when deployed behind shared caches. In affected versions, malformed nonce values derived from request headers could be reflected into rendered HTML in an unsafe way, allowing an attacker to poison cached responses and cause script execution for later visitors.
Fix
We now reject or ignore malformed nonce values before they are embedded into HTML and apply stricter nonce sanitization so request-derived nonce data cannot break out of the intended attribute context.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, strip inbound Content-Security-Policy request headers from untrusted traffic.
Impact
Applications using React Server Components can be vulnerable to cache poisoning when shared caches do not correctly partition response variants. Under affected conditions, an attacker can cause an RSC response to be served from the original URL and poison shared cache entries so later visitors receive component payloads instead of the expected HTML.
Fix
We now validate and interpret RSC request headers consistently across request classification and rendering, and we enforce the intended cache-busting behavior so RSC payloads are not unexpectedly served from the original URL.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, ensure your CDN or reverse proxy keys on the relevant RSC request headers and honors Vary, or disable shared caching for affected App Router and RSC responses.
Impact
Next.js uses the x-nextjs-data request header for internal data requests. On affected versions, an external client could send this header on a normal request to a path handled by middleware that returns a redirect.
When that happened, the middleware/proxy could treat the request as a data request and replace the standard Location redirect header with the internal x-nextjs-redirect header. Browsers do not follow x-nextjs-redirect, so the response became an unusable redirect for normal clients.
If the application was deployed behind a CDN or reverse proxy that caches 3xx responses without varying on this header, a single attacker request could poison the cached redirect response for the affected path. Subsequent visitors could then receive a cached redirect response without a Location header, causing a denial of service for that redirect path until the cache entry expired or was purged.
Affected scenarios
This affects applications that: - use middleware or proxy redirects - are deployed behind a caching CDN or reverse proxy - allow 3xx responses on those paths to be cached without differentiating internal data requests from normal requests
Fix
The fix stops trusting x-nextjs-data by itself for middleware redirect handling. A request is now treated as an internal data request only when it is validated as such by internal routing state, preserving legitimate data-request redirect behavior while preventing external header injection from changing normal redirect responses.
Workarounds
Before upgrading, users can reduce risk by: - configuring the CDN or reverse proxy to vary its cache key on x-nextjs-data for affected responses
Impact
React Server Component responses can be vulnerable to cache poisoning in deployments that rely on shared caches with insufficient response partitioning. In affected conditions, collisions in the rsc cache-busting value can allow an attacker to poison cache entries so users receive the wrong response variant for a given URL.
Fix
We strengthened the rsc cache-busting mechanism to make practical collisions significantly harder and to better separate response variants that should not share cache entries.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, ensure intermediary caches correctly honor Vary for RSC-related request headers, or disable shared caching for affected RSC responses until you can deploy a patched release.
Impact
Applications that use beforeInteractive scripts together with untrusted content can be vulnerable to cross-site scripting. In affected versions, serialized script content was not escaped safely before being embedded into the document, which could allow attacker-controlled input to break out of the intended script context and execute arbitrary JavaScript in a visitor's browser.
Fix
We now HTML-escape serialized beforeInteractive script content before embedding it into the page, preventing attacker-controlled content from breaking out of the inline script boundary.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not pass untrusted data into beforeInteractive scripts. If that pattern is unavoidable, sanitize or escape the content before embedding it.
Summary When Next.js rewrites proxy traffic to an external backend, a crafted DELETE/OPTIONS request using Transfer-Encoding: chunked could trigger request boundary disagreement between the proxy and backend. This could allow request smuggling through rewritten routes.
Impact An attacker could smuggle a second request to unintended backend routes (for example, internal/admin endpoints), bypassing assumptions that only the configured rewrite destination/path is reachable. This does not impact applications hosted on providers that handle rewrites at the CDN level, such as Vercel.
Patches The vulnerability originated in an upstream library vendored by Next.js. It is fixed by updating that dependency’s behavior so content-length: 0 is added only when both content-length and transfer-encoding are absent, and transfer-encoding is no longer removed in that code path.
Workarounds If upgrade is not immediately possible: - Block chunked DELETE/OPTIONS requests on rewritten routes at your edge/proxy. - Enforce authentication/authorization on backend routes per our security guidance.
A denial of service vulnerability exists in Next.js versions with Partial Prerendering (PPR) enabled when running in minimal mode. The PPR resume endpoint accepts unauthenticated POST requests with the Next-Resume: 1 header and processes attacker-controlled postponed state data. Two closely related vulnerabilities allow an attacker to crash the server process through memory exhaustion:
1. Unbounded request body buffering: The server buffers the entire POST request body into memory using Buffer.concat() without enforcing any size limit, allowing arbitrarily large payloads to exhaust available memory.
2. Unbounded decompression (zipbomb): The resume data cache is decompressed using inflateSync() without limiting the decompressed output size. A small compressed payload can expand to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes, causing memory exhaustion.
Both attack vectors result in a fatal V8 out-of-memory error (FATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory) causing the Node.js process to terminate. The zipbomb variant is particularly dangerous as it can bypass reverse proxy request size limits while still causing large memory allocation on the server.
To be affected you must have an application running with experimental.ppr: true or cacheComponents: true configured along with the NEXTPRIVATEMINIMALMODE=1 environment variable.
Strongly consider upgrading to 15.6.0-canary.61 or 16.1.5 to reduce risk and prevent availability issues in Next applications.
A denial of service vulnerability exists in self-hosted Next.js applications that have remotePatterns configured for the Image Optimizer. The image optimization endpoint (/next/image) loads external images entirely into memory without enforcing a maximum size limit, allowing an attacker to cause out-of-memory conditions by requesting optimization of arbitrarily large images. This vulnerability requires that remotePatterns is configured to allow image optimization from external domains and that the attacker can serve or control a large image on an allowed domain. Strongly consider upgrading to 15.5.10 or 16.1.5 to reduce risk and prevent availability issues in Next applications.
Impact
There is a source code exposure vulnerability in React Server Components.
React recommends updating immediately.
The vulnerability exists in versions 19.0.0, 19.0.1 19.1.0, 19.1.1, 19.1.2, 19.2.0 and 19.2.1 of:
- react-server-dom-webpack - react-server-dom-parcel - react-server-dom-turbopack
These issues are present in the patches published last week.
Patches
Fixes were back ported to versions 19.0.2, 19.1.3, and 19.2.2.
If you are using any of the above packages please upgrade to any of the fixed versions immediately.
If your app’s React code does not use a server, your app is not affected by this vulnerability. If your app does not use a framework, bundler, or bundler plugin that supports React Server Components, your app is not affected by this vulnerability.
References
See the blog post for more information and upgrade instructions.
Impact
It was found that the fix to address CVE-2025-55184 in React Server Components was incomplete and does not prevent a denial of service attack in a specific case.
We recommend updating immediately.
The vulnerability exists in versions 19.0.2, 19.1.3, and 19.2.2 of:
- react-server-dom-webpack - react-server-dom-parcel - react-server-dom-turbopack
These issues are present in the patches published on December 11th, 2025.
Patches
Fixes were back ported to versions 19.0.3, 19.1.4, and 19.2.3.
If you are using any of the above packages please upgrade to any of the fixed versions immediately.
If your app’s React code does not use a server, your app is not affected by this vulnerability. If your app does not use a framework, bundler, or bundler plugin that supports React Server Components, your app is not affected by this vulnerability.
References
See the blog post for more information and upgrade instructions.