Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.4, Vvveb backend comment operations allow a low-privileged Author to manage comments under another Author's posts. The admin/controller/content/comment.php and admin/controller/content/comments.php controllers and the admin/sql/sqlite/comment.sql queries accept a caller-controlled commentid without verifying comment.postid against post.adminid for the current adminid. An attacker can read pending comment content and commenter email addresses, change moderation status, edit comment content, or delete comments, breaking author and moderation boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.4.
Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.3, there is an authenticated SQL injection issue in the frontend user order history page in Vvveb CMS. A normal frontend user can log in and access /user/orders. The orderby and direction request parameters are accepted from the URL, propagated through the Orders component, and directly concatenated into the SQL ORDER BY clause in OrderSQL::getAll(). Because of this, attacker-controlled input reaches SQL structure without a whitelist or safe query construction step. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.8.3.
Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.3, there is an unauthenticated reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) issue in the public product return form in Vvveb CMS. The customerorderid POST parameter is inserted into the Order %s not found! error message when the order lookup fails, and that message is rendered in the frontend template without HTML escaping. As a result, attacker-controlled HTML/JavaScript executes in the submitting user's browser. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.8.3.
Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.3, This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.8.3.
Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.2, Vvveb CMS does not validate the sign of the quantity parameter on the cart-add endpoint. Submitting a negative integer is accepted by the server and treated as a normal positive line-item, but with the sign carried through into every downstream computation: line total, sub-total, taxes, and grand total all become negative numbers. The customer-facing cart UI then displays a negative grand total to the user, the checkout flow accepts the negative cart, and the resulting order is persisted in the merchant's database with a negative total column. From the merchant's order management dashboard, this surfaces as a real order with a negative total — an "the merchant owes the customer money" record that no legitimate workflow ever creates. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.8.2.
Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.1, a Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the Vvveb CMS comment submission flow. The author field is submitted by an unauthenticated user on any public post page, stored without sanitization, and later rendered unsanitized in two distinct sinks: This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.8.1.
Vvveb CMS 1.0.8.2 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in its media upload handler that allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary operating system commands by uploading a PHP webshell with a .phtml extension. Attackers can bypass the extension deny-list and upload malicious files to the publicly accessible media directory, then request the file over HTTP to achieve full server compromise.
Vvveb CMS v1.0.8.2 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in its media management functionality where a missing return statement in the file rename handler allows authenticated attackers to rename files to blocked extensions .php or .htaccess. Attackers can exploit this logic flaw by first uploading a text file and renaming it to .htaccess to inject Apache directives that register PHP-executable MIME types, then uploading another file and renaming it to .php to execute arbitrary operating system commands as the www-data user.