Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. Versions 4.0.0 through 4.14.2 have a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability due to Deserialization of Untrusted Data). All Wazuh deployments using cluster mode (master/worker architecture) and any organization with a compromised worker node (e.g., through initial access, insider threat, or supply chain attack) are impacted. An attacker who gains access to a worker node (through any means) can achieve full RCE on the master node with root privileges. Version 4.14.3 fixes the issue.

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. Prior to version 4.14.5, issues in the Cluster Distributed API (DAPI) handling allow a cluster peer, or any actor able to authenticate to the cluster channel using the shared cluster key, to make the master node deserialize an attacker-controlled callable and execute it under an attacker-controlled RBAC context. The cluster code in framework/wazuh/core/cluster/common.py deserializes JSON with aswazuhobject(), which resolves any callable whose top-level package is wazuh or api (an overly broad allowlist controlled only by ALLOWEDCALLABLESPACKAGES), and DAPI requests handled in framework/wazuh/core/cluster/dapi/dapi.py accept a client-supplied rbacpermissions value that runlocal() applies as the global RBAC context, so supplying an rbacmode of black causes authorization checks for exposeresources-protected functions to pass without any legitimate permission assignment. Combined, these allow privileged administrative actions on the master node such as arbitrary file writes under WAZUHPATH, creation of new API users, and tampering with security.yaml, and can be chained into full manager compromise. This issue has been fixed in version 4.14.5.

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From 4.0.0 until 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta3, cluster.unmergeinfo() in framework/wazuh/core/cluster/cluster.py constructs paths from peer-controlled mergetype and name values in a merged synchronization archive. processfilesfromworker() in framework/wazuh/core/cluster/master.py does not adequately confine the resulting path to the declared cluster item directory. A cluster peer holding the shared Fernet key can use traversal in filesmetadata.json or a merged-file header to write files such as /var/ossec/etc/ossec.conf. Replacing ossec.conf can configure root-executed commands and lead to code execution when Wazuh services reload. This issue is fixed in versions 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta3.

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From 4.0.0 until 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta3, DistributedAPI.sendtmpfile() in framework/wazuh/core/cluster/dapi/dapi.py joins an attacker-controlled tmpfile value to WAZUHPATH without canonicalization or confinement. A cluster peer holding the shared Fernet key can use traversal or an absolute path to make the master return any readable file over the cluster channel. Reading /var/ossec/api/configuration/security/privatekey.pem allows the peer to forge administrator REST API tokens offline and then exercise administrative privileges without creating an account. This issue is fixed in versions 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta3.

Wazuh v3.6.1 - v3.13.5, v4.0.0 - v4.2.7, and v4.3.0 - v4.3.7 were discovered to contain an authenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability via the Active Response endpoint.

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From 4.0.0 until 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2, AffectedItemsWazuhResult.merge() in framework/wazuh/core/results.py trusts the sortcasting field in a cluster worker's JSON response. During a distributed API merge, attacker-controlled type names are resolved through Python builtins without an allowlist. A compromised worker can set sortcasting to exec and place Python source in affecteditems, causing the master to execute the payload as root when responses from multiple nodes are merged. This issue is fixed in versions 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2.

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From 4.0.0 until 4.14.5, Wazuh Manager allows a low-privilege read-only API user with manager:read permission to retrieve the cluster key from the element in ossec.conf through GET /manager/configuration?raw=true. An attacker with network access to TCP port 1516 can use the disclosed Fernet key to impersonate a cluster worker and submit distributed API requests containing attacker-controlled rbacpermissions with rbacmode set to black. Because the master trusts the worker-supplied authorization context, the attacker can create users, assign administrator roles, access credentials and API tokens, modify configuration, and execute actions across agents. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.5.

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. In versions 4.0.0 through 4.10.3 and 4.11.0 through 4.14.4, a logic flaw affects the Wazuh Manager's enrollment daemon (authd) and synchronization daemon (remoted). The authd process allows agents to select a group during enrollment but does not filter path traversal sequences such as "..." While the manager checks for the group directory using wopendir(), the ".." sequence references the parent directory (/var/ossec/etc), allowing it to pass validation. After the malicious group is accepted and stored in the manager's global database, the remoted process uses this unchecked value to build paths for agent configuration synchronization. As a result, sensitive files from /var/ossec/etc, such as client.keys, ossec.conf, and internal certificates, are included in the agent's shared configuration stream and exposed to the attacker. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.10.4 and 4.14.5.

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From 4.0.0 until 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2, WazuhCommon.endreceivingfile() in framework/wazuh/core/cluster/common.py allows a cluster-authenticated node to delete files outside WAZUHPATH. A syniwme request with an unknown taskid reaches the cleanup branch, where an attacker-controlled filename is passed to os.path.join without canonicalization or confinement. Absolute paths and traversal sequences can therefore target files such as ossec.conf, jwtsecret.json, TLS certificates, and ruleset files that are accessible to the Wazuh manager process. Deletion can disable the manager, invalidate API tokens, or disrupt cluster and API connectivity. This issue is fixed in versions 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2.

Wazuh 4.0.0 before 4.14.7 and 5.0.0-beta2 contain a denial of service vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers with allowrunas enabled to exhaust CPU resources by submitting arbitrarily deeply nested JSON structures to the POST /security/user/authenticate/runas endpoint. Attackers can repeatedly submit malformed authcontext bodies with unlimited nesting depth to cause the API framework to consume excessive CPU, denying service to all other API consumers.

Wazuh 4.0.0 before 4.14.6 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to cause denial of service by enrolling an agent with a dot-sequence name such as ".." through the enrollment port. Attackers exploit insufficient validation in OSIsValidName() and unsafe path concatenation in deletediff() to resolve the traversal to the parent queue directory, causing its subdirectories to be removed and stopping all Wazuh services requiring manual recovery.

Wazuh 4.0.0 before 4.14.6 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows authenticated cluster peers to delete arbitrary directory contents by supplying a traversal-shaped node name in the cluster hello payload without validation. Attackers holding a valid cluster Fernet key can craft a malicious node name and disconnect, triggering the master's peer cleanup routine to remove the contents of arbitrary directories within the Wazuh installation path writable by the wazuh user.

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From version 4.0.0 to before version 4.14.4, multiple heap-based out-of-bounds WRITE vulnerabilities exist in parseunamestring() (remotedop.c). This function processes OS identification data from agents and contains a dangerous code pattern that appears in 4 locations within the same function: writing to strlen(ptr) - 1 without checking for empty strings. When the string is empty, strlen() returns 0, and 0 - 1 wraps to SIZEMAX due to unsigned integer underflow. Due to pointer arithmetic wrapping, SIZEMAX effectively becomes -1, causing a write exactly 1 byte before the allocated buffer. This corrupts heap metadata (e.g., the chunk size field in glibc malloc), leading to heap corruption. This issue has been patched in version 4.14.4.

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From version 4.0.0 to before version 4.14.4, Wazuh's server API brute-force protection for POST /security/user/authenticate can be bypassed by sending concurrent authentication requests. Although the configured threshold (maxloginattempts, default 50) is enforced correctly for sequential requests, a parallel burst allows significantly more failed login attempts to be processed before the IP block is applied. This enables an attacker to perform more password guesses than the configured policy intends (e.g., 100 attempts processed where 50 should be allowed). This issue has been patched in version 4.14.4.

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From 4.0.0 until 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2, AuthenticationManager.checkuser() in framework/wazuh/rbac/orm.py performs checkpasswordhash() only when the supplied username exists. A nonexistent username returns immediately, while a valid username causes an expensive bcrypt calculation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can compare authentication response times to enumerate valid Wazuh usernames and use that information in subsequent credential attacks. This issue is fixed in versions 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta2.

Wazuh is an open-source security platform providing unified XDR and SIEM protection for endpoints and cloud workloads. In versions 4.0.0 through 4.14.6, a malicious or man-in-the-middle enrollment manager can crash a Wazuh agent during enrollment by returning a malformed key response with fewer than four fields, causing a NULL pointer dereference. The  wenrollmentprocessagentkey()  routine splits the manager-provided key into four space-separated fields but does not verify that all fields are present before passing them to validators. Because OSStrBreak() leaves missing trailing entries as NULL and OSIsValidName() calls strlen() on its argument without a NULL check, a response such as  OSSEC K:'1'  reaches OSIsValidName(NULL) and terminates the agent process. Since Wazuh permits enrollment against an unverified manager when no CA certificate is configured, an attacker operating a rogue manager or intercepting the enrollment flow can deterministically crash agents, resulting in denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.7.