X.509 name constraint bypass via the Subject Common Name when treated as a DNS-type name. A certificate whose Subject CN violates an issuing CA's DNS name constraints could be accepted.

Certificate policy and RFC 8446 compliance concerns regarding the continued acceptance of SHA-1/MD5 in certificate processing.

Certificates with wildcard DNS SANs (e.g. .example.com) bypassed CA name-constraint checks. A certificate with a wildcard DNS SAN that should be rejected by the issuing CA's permitted/excluded DNS name constraints could be accepted.

Bleichenbacher padding oracle in PKCS#7 KTRI decryption. When decrypting PKCS#7 EnvelopedData using RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 key transport, wolfSSL returned distinguishable error codes depending on whether RSA padding validation failed versus whether the decrypted content was malformed. An attacker able to submit crafted EnvelopedData messages and observe error responses could use this as a padding oracle to incrementally recover the encrypted Content Encryption Key (CEK). The fix generates a deterministic pseudo-random fake CEK on padding failure (via HMAC-SHA256) and proceeds with decryption identically, using constant-time operations throughout, so that all failure paths produce the same error regardless of padding validity.