MatchTrustedPeer ignores the public key used, leading to forged CA clones passing verification. Affected builds are any that enable the macro WOLFSSLTRUSTPEERCERT and load CA certificates with wolfSSLCTXtrustpeercert() or wolfSSLtrustpeercert(). The peer must know the certificates being loaded to either of those APIs to take advantage of the issue. When OPENSSLCOMPATIBLEDEFAULTS is also defined this widens the affected API to include all CA certificate loading. Both macros are defined when using autoconf builds such as (nginx, haproxy, stunnel, wpas, apache httpd, hitch, bind, rsyslog, ffmpeg, all, distro). When the certificate is listed as a trusted peer certificate the issue previously allowed for a malicious (D)TLS server to bypass authentication once knowing which CA’s the client would accept. This also affects mutual authentication cases where the client knows which CA’s the server has loaded. If building with any of these configurations and using (D)TLS where the loaded CA’s could be known and authentication of the peer is desired, users should either: update to the latest wolfSSL version, apply the fix patch, or use the configure flag --disable-openssl-compatible-defaults and not load CA’s with wolfSSLCTXtrustpeercert() or wolfSSLtrustpeercert() to mitigate the issue.

Client session cache reference poisoning allows resumption with wrong server