Out-of-bounds heap read during SM2/SM3 certificate signature verification. When parsing a certificate with an SM3wSM2 signature, the Subject Key Identifier computation reads the trailing 65 bytes of the public key without checking that the key is at least that long. A public key shorter than 65 bytes results in an out-of-bounds heap read, leading to a potential crash (denial of service); there is no out-of-bounds write. Note this only affects builds with SM2 support (--enable-sm2 or --enable-all).

Un-negotiated Raw Public Key (RFC 7250) accepted in place of an X.509 certificate, bypassing chain validation. A raw public key has no chain, so ParseCertRelative() accepts it without performing any trust verification; it must therefore only be accepted when RPK was actually negotiated for that peer. The check now defaults the expected type to X.509 (per RFC 7250/8446) when no type was negotiated, comparing against the received server certificate type on the client and the selected client certificate type on the server, and rejects any mismatch, including an un-negotiated raw public key, with UNSUPPORTEDCERTIFICATE. Only affects builds with Raw Public Key support (HAVERPK) enabled - disabled by default in a standalone build, but included in --enable-all.

The X25519 x8664 assembly implementation fails to clear the most significant bit during the final modular reduction, so the computed result may not be fully reduced modulo the field prime 2^255 - 19. This can leave the field element in a non-canonical form, producing an incorrect result from the scalar multiplication and potentially a wrong shared secret. The final carry-propagation chains in the x64 and AVX2 reduction routines could overflow into the top bit, and the high limb was not masked afterward, so the 255-bit field element was left non-canonical.