The affected product accepts user-supplied input within a URL parameter without enforcing expected sanitization or encoding before rendering it within the response. This condition allows for the injection of malicious JavaScript payloads.

An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to cause the user's browser to redirect to a malicious website, modify the user interface of the webpage, or retrieve sensitive information from the browser. However, the impact is mitigated for session hijacking as all session-related sensitive cookies are protected by the httpOnly flag.

Unused authorization codes issued to deleted users are not being properly invalidated or removed from the system. This allows for the persistence of these codes, enabling them to be potentially reused.

If an attacker possesses both the authorization code and the associated client credentials (client ID and client secret), they can leverage these unused codes to obtain access tokens on behalf of users who have already been deleted. This may lead to unauthorized access to sensitive resources and services, contingent on the scopes originally authorized for the compromised authorization code.

The Ajax processor within the Carbon console fails to adequately protect state-changing operations from Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks. Specifically, it utilizes the HTTP GET method for these operations, and while the SameSite=Lax cookie attribute is employed for mitigation, this mechanism is bypassed as it permits cookies to be sent with cross-origin top-level navigation requests, including GET requests. This allows an attacker to trick an authenticated user's browser into unknowingly executing unintended actions.

An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to perform unauthorized state-altering requests on behalf of authenticated users. This could lead to consequences such as data modification, account changes, or other actions that could result in data compromise or loss of user control over their account. However, this attack is only feasible if the Carbon console and related services are exposed to the public internet, which is not recommended according to WSO2's security guidelines.

When Multi-Attribute Login is enabled, the login interface fails to consistently mask the existence of user accounts. For valid users, the server resolves and displays their canonical username, while for non-existent users, it echoes the original input. This occurs regardless of the validateusername configuration.

The discovery of valid usernames can increase the risk of brute force attacks, social engineering attacks, and targeted information leakage. Attackers can leverage this information to craft more effective phishing campaigns or social engineering tactics to compromise user accounts or extract sensitive data.

The Conditional Authentication (Adaptive Authentication) script does not correctly enforce the completion of all required authentication steps when a specific multi-step pattern involving certain authenticators is configured. This allows an attacker to bypass intermediate authentication challenges by exploiting how the script handles callbacks and re-execution of authentication steps.

Successful exploitation allows a malicious actor to gain unauthorized access to a targeted user account. This vulnerability can only be exploited when all of the following conditions are met: the application login flow contains a specific secondary authenticator, the Conditional Authentication script is configured with particular event callbacks and re-executes an authentication step, the targeted user has one of the impacted authenticators enrolled, and the attacker successfully completes any preceding authentication steps.

When an Event Publisher output adapter is configured with irrelevant properties, the affected products log these properties. This logging occurs without sufficient validation or sanitization of the property values.

A malicious actor with access to the 'wso2carbon' log files could retrieve sensitive information, such as user credentials or other confidential data, that was inadvertently logged due to misconfiguration, potentially leading to unauthorized access.

The Secret Type Management REST API does not correctly isolate access controls when deleting a secret type. The on-delete cascade logic, when triggered, fails to enforce organizational boundaries, leading to the removal of secrets associated with that type across all organizations.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can result in the unintended deletion of secrets across the entire deployment, potentially causing configuration failures, service interruptions, and a denial-of-service condition. This vulnerability requires delete permissions for the Secret Type Management REST API, which are by default only granted to administrators.

The account locking mechanism fails to trigger when secondary user stores are inaccessible. The software does not maintain a consistent state for account locking if it cannot reach all configured user stores, allowing an attacker to repeatedly attempt authentication with invalid credentials without triggering the lockout mechanism for users within active stores.

When the account locking mechanism is bypassed due to the inaccessibility of secondary user stores, users in accessible user stores are left vulnerable to brute force attacks. A malicious actor can exploit this by attempting numerous invalid password combinations against a user account without the expected account lockout consequence.

The check user account lock states feature within the email OTP flow fails to validate user input, allowing an attacker to infer the existence of registered user accounts.

The discovery of valid usernames can increase the risk of brute-force and social engineering attacks. Attackers can leverage this information to craft targeted phishing campaigns or other malicious activities aimed at tricking users into divulging sensitive data, potentially damaging the organization's reputation and leading to regulatory non-compliance and financial consequences.

Due to a lack of user account state validation during authentication, locked user accounts can be successfully authenticated using Magic Link or Pass Key methods. This bypasses the intended security control that should prevent access to accounts that have been locked.

This vulnerability may allow unauthorized access to applications and sensitive data associated with accounts that should have been restricted via the account lock mechanism. It also undermines the effectiveness of the account lock mechanism intended to prevent further login attempts.

The XML parsers within multiple WSO2 products accept user-supplied XML data without properly configuring to prevent the resolution of external entities. This omission allows malicious actors to craft XML payloads that exploit the parser's behavior, leading to the inclusion of external resources.

By leveraging this vulnerability, an attacker can read confidential files from the file system and access limited HTTP resources reachable by the product. Additionally, the vulnerability can be exploited to perform denial of service attacks by exhausting server resources through recursive entity expansion or fetching large external resources.

When the "Silent Just-In-Time Provisioning" feature is enabled for a federated identity provider (IDP) there is a risk that a local user store user's information may be replaced during the account provisioning process in cases where federated users share the same username as local users.

There will be no impact on your deployment if any of the preconditions mentioned below are not met. Only when all the preconditions mentioned below are fulfilled could a malicious actor associate a targeted local user account with a federated IDP user account that they control.

The Deployment should have: -An IDP configured for federated authentication with Silent JIT provisioning enabled.

The malicious actor should have: -A fresh valid user account in the federated IDP that has not been used earlier. -Knowledge of the username of a valid user in the local IDP. -An account at the federated IDP matching the targeted local username.

An arbitrary file upload vulnerability exists in multiple WSO2 products due to improper validation of user-supplied filenames in the BPEL uploader SOAP service endpoint. A malicious actor with administrative privileges can upload arbitrary files to a user-controlled location on the server.

By leveraging this vulnerability, an attacker can upload a specially crafted payload and achieve remote code execution (RCE), potentially compromising the server and its data.

An arbitrary file upload vulnerability exists in multiple WSO2 products due to improper input validation in the CarbonAppUploader admin service endpoint. An authenticated attacker with appropriate privileges can upload a malicious file to a user-controlled location on the server, potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE).

This functionality is restricted by default to admin users; therefore, successful exploitation requires valid credentials with administrative permissions.

A missing authentication enforcement vulnerability exists in the mutual TLS (mTLS) implementation used by System REST APIs and SOAP services in multiple WSO2 products. Due to improper validation of client certificate–based authentication in certain default configurations, the affected components may permit unauthenticated requests even when mTLS is enabled. This condition occurs when relying on the default mTLS settings for System REST APIs or when the mTLS authenticator is enabled for SOAP services, causing these interfaces to accept requests without enforcing additional authentication.

Successful exploitation allows a malicious actor with network access to the affected endpoints to gain administrative privileges and perform unauthorized operations. The vulnerability is exploitable only when the impacted mTLS flows are enabled and accessible in a given deployment. Other certificate-based authentication mechanisms such as Mutual TLS OAuth client authentication and X.509 login flows are not affected, and APIs served through the API Gateway of WSO2 API Manager remain unaffected.

A Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability exists in multiple WSO2 products due to the use of the HTTP GET method for state-changing operations within admin services, specifically in the event processor of the Carbon console. Although the SameSite=Lax cookie attribute is used as a mitigation, it is ineffective in this context because it allows cookies to be sent with cross-origin top-level navigations using GET requests.

A malicious actor can exploit this vulnerability by tricking an authenticated user into visiting a crafted link, leading the browser to issue unintended state-changing requests. Successful exploitation could result in unauthorized operations such as data modification, account changes, or other administrative actions. According to WSO2 Secure Production Guidelines, exposure of Carbon console services to untrusted networks is discouraged, which may reduce the impact in properly secured deployments.

An improper access control vulnerability exists in multiple WSO2 products due to insufficient permission enforcement in certain internal SOAP Admin Services and System REST APIs. A low-privileged user may exploit this flaw to perform unauthorized operations, including accessing server-level information.

This vulnerability affects only internal administrative interfaces. APIs exposed through the WSO2 API Manager's API Gateway remain unaffected.