Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
9
Use After Free
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CommonMakeCurrent() in the GLX dispatch layer captures a pointer into the per-client cl->contextTags array by calling GlxLookupContextTag(). This returns a direct pointer into an array later realloced. If realloc() moves the buffer to a new location, the previously captured oldTag pointer becomes dangling. The subsequent GlxFreeContextTag(oldTag) then writes zeros into freed heap memory (use-after-free). Five fields are zeroed at fixed offsets (16, 24, 32, 36, 40 bytes) within the stale slot. A malicious client can force the realloc by creating 16 GLX contexts with MakeCurrent(oldContextTag=0) to fill all tag slots to capacity, then issuing a 17th MakeCurrent with a non-zero oldContextTag. This triggers the realloc while oldTag points into the old buffer. The attack requires only 34 X11 requests (17 CreateContext + 17 MakeCurrent) from a single client.

1 / 3
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203