Impact On instances where Extension Repository Application is installed, any user can execute any code requiring programming rights on the server. In order to reproduce on an instance, as a normal user without script nor programming rights, go to your profile and add an object of type ExtensionCode.ExtensionClass. Set the description to {{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from Description"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} and press Save and View. If the description displays as Hello from Description without any error, then the instance is vulnerable.
Patches This vulnerability has been fixed in XWiki 15.10.9 and 16.3.0.
Workarounds Since Extension Repository Application is not mandatory, it can be safely disabled on instances that do not use it. It is also possible to manually apply this patch to the page ExtensionCode.ExtensionSheet, as well as this patch to the page ExtensionCode.ExtensionAuthorsDisplayer.
References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21890 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/8659f17d500522bf33595e402391592a35a162e8
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List
Impact Any user with an account can perform arbitrary remote code execution by adding instances of XWiki.WikiMacroClass to any page. This compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation.
To reproduce on a instance, as a connected user without script nor programming rights, go to your user profile and add an object of type XWiki.WikiMacroClass. Set "Macro Id", "Macro Name" and "Macro Code" to any value, "Macro Visibility" to Current User and "Macro Description" to {{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from User macro!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}. Save the page, then go to <host>/xwiki/bin/view/XWiki/XWikiSyntaxMacrosList. If the description of your new macro reads "Hello from User macro!", then your instance is vulnerable.
Patches This vulnerability has been fixed in XWiki 15.10.11, 16.4.1 and 16.5.0.
Workarounds It is possible to manually apply this patch to the page XWiki.XWikiSyntaxMacrosList.
References
https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-22030 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/40e1afe001d61eafdf13f3621b4b597a0e58a3e3
Impact
It is possible for a remote unauthenticated user to escape from the HQL execution context and perform a blind SQL injection to execute arbitrary SQL statements on the database backend, including when "Prevent unregistered users from viewing pages, regardless of the page rights" and "Prevent unregistered users from editing pages, regardless of the page rights" options are enabled.
Depending on the used database backend, the attacker may be able to not only obtain confidential information such as password hashes from the database, but also execute UPDATE/INSERT/DELETE queries.
The vulnerability may be tested in a default installation of XWIki Standard Flavor, including using the official Docker containers.
An example query, which leads to SQL injection with MySQL/MariaDB backend is shown below:
time curl "http://127.0.0.1:8080/rest/wikis/xwiki/query?q=where%20doc.name=length('a')org.apache.logging.log4j.util.Chars.SPACE%20or%201%3C%3E%271%5C%27%27%20union%20select%201,2,3,sleep(10)%20%23%27&type=hql&distinct=0"
When executed, the response from the server will come after a delay of 10 extra seconds, indicating successful execution of the injected SQL statement.
An example of a query for the PostgreSQL database backend is shown below:
curl "https://127.0.0.1:8080/rest/wikis/xwiki/query?q=where%20%24%24='%24%24=concat(%20chr(%2061%20),(chr(%2039%20))%20)%20;select%201%20--%20comment'&type=hql&distinct=0"
Both requests employ database backend dependent techniques of breaking out of HQL query context, described, for example, here: https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/exploiting-hibernate-injections.
Patches
This has been patched in 16.10.1, 16.4.6 and 15.10.16.
Workarounds
There is no known workaround, other than upgrading XWiki.
References
https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-22691
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List
Attribution
Sergey Anufrienko from Kaspersky ICS-CERT vulnerability research team reported this vulnerability.
Impact Any user with script rights can perform arbitrary remote code execution by adding instances of XWiki.ConfigurableClass to any page. This compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation.
To reproduce on a instance, as a user with script rights, edit your user profile and add an object of type XWiki.ConfigurableClass ("Custom configurable sections"). Set "Display in section" and "Display in category" to other, "Scope" to Wiki and all spaces and "Heading" to: #set($codeToExecute = 'Test') #set($codeToExecuteResult = '{{async}}{{groovy}}services.logging.getLogger("attacker").error("Attack from Heading succeeded!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}') Save the page and view it, then add ?sheet=XWiki.AdminSheet&viewer=content§ion=other to the URL. If the logs contain "attacker - Attack from Heading succeeded!", then the instance is vulnerable.
Patches This has been patched in XWiki 15.10.9 and 16.3.0.
Workarounds We're not aware of any workaround except upgrading.
References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21207 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/8493435ff9606905a2d913607d6c79862d0c168d
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List
Impact
NOTE: The Realtime WYSIWYG Editor extension was experimental, and thus not recommended, in the versions affected by this vulnerability. It has become enabled by default, and thus recommended, starting with XWiki 16.9.0.
A user with only edit right can join a realtime editing session where others, that where already there or that may join later, have script or programming access rights. This user can then insert script rendering macros that are executed for those users in the realtime session that have script or programming rights. The inserted scripts can be used to gain more access rights.
Here's an example that works with XWiki 15.10.9+ and 16.2.0+:
the attacker starts editing a wiki page in realtime (for which they have edit right) another user, with script or programming access right joins the editing session (e.g. by clicking on a link / URL provided by the attacker) the attacker inserts a script rendering macro, say {{velocity}}I can run scripts{{/velocity}}, in the edited content, using the WYSIWYG editor UI the edited content is reloaded for both the attacker and the other user, in order to render the inserted macro the attacker gets a rendering error message the other user sees "I can run scripts"
The attacker can obviously use more advanced scripts to gain access rights.
Before XWiki 15.10.9 and 16.2.0 the edited content was not re-rendered for all the users in the editing sesesion, but only for the user that inserted the macro. This means that in order to reproduce the problem the other user had to insert or update a macro or save and view the content.
Patches
This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 15.10.12, 16.4.1 and 16.6.0-rc-1.
Workarounds
To avoid this vulnerability you can:
either disable the realtime WYSIWYG editing by disabling the xwiki-realtime CKEditor plugin from the WYSIWYG editor administration section or uninstall the Realtime WYSIWYG Editor extension (org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-realtime-wysiwyg-ui)
References
https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21949
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List
Impact
It is possible for a user with SCRIPT right to escape from the HQL execution context and perform a blind SQL injection to execute arbitrary SQL statements on the database backend.
Depending on the used database backend, the attacker may be able to not only obtain confidential information such as password hashes from the database, but also execute UPDATE/INSERT/DELETE queries.
The vulnerability may be tested in a default installation of XWIki Standard Flavor, including using the official Docker containers.
For example, with a MySQL or MariaDB database, you can use the following script (which a user having SCRIPT right but not PROGRAMMING right) to get the content of the xwikistrings table (which contain all the short string fields stored in objects, including passwords):
{{velocity}} $services.query.hql("where 1<>'1\'' union select concat(XWSNAME, XWSVALUE) from xwikistrings #'").execute() {{/velocity}}
Patches
This has been patched in 16.10.1, 16.4.6 and 15.10.16.
Workarounds
There is no known workaround, other than upgrading XWiki.
The protection added to this REST API is the same as the one used to validate complete select queries, making it more consistent. However, while the script API always had this protection for complete queries, it's important to note that it's a very strict protection and some valid, but complex, queries might suddenly require the author to have programming right.
References
https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-22718
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List
Impact Any user with an account on the main wiki could run scheduling operations on subwikis. To reproduce, as a user on the main wiki without any special right, view the document Scheduler.WebHome in a subwiki. Then, click on any operation (e.g., Trigger) on any job. If the operation is successful, then the instance is vulnerable.
Patches This has been patched in XWiki 15.10.9 and 16.3.0.
Workarounds If you have subwikis where the Job Scheduler is enabled, you can edit the objects on Scheduler.WebPreferences to match https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/54bcc5a7a2e440cc591b91eece9c13dc0c487331#diff-8e274bd0065e319a34090339de6dfe56193144d15fd71c52c1be7272254728b4.
References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21663 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/54bcc5a7a2e440cc591b91eece9c13dc0c487331
For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List
Impact The REST API exposes the history of any page in XWiki of which the attacker knows the name. The exposed information includes for each modification of the page the time of the modification, the version number, the author of the modification (both username and displayed name) and the version comment. This information is exposed regardless of the rights setup, and even when the wiki is configured to be fully private.
On a private wiki, this can be tested by accessing /xwiki/rest/wikis/xwiki/spaces/Main/pages/WebHome/history, if this shows the history of the main page then the installation is vulnerable.
Patches This has been patched in XWiki 15.10.9 and XWiki 16.3.0RC1.
Workarounds There aren't any known workarounds apart from upgrading to a fixed version.
References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-22052 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/9cbca9808300797c67779bb9a665d85cf9e3d4b8