Impact By creating a document with a specially crafted title, it is possible to trigger remote code execution in the (Solr-based) search in XWiki. This allows any user who can edit the title of a space (all users by default) to execute any Groovy code in the XWiki installation which compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation.

To reproduce, as a user without script nor programming rights, create a document with title {{/html}}{{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from Groovy Title!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} and content Test Document. Using the search UI, search for "Test Document", then deploy the Location facet on the right of the screen, next to the search results. The installation is vulnerable if you see an item such as: Hello from Groovy Title! </a> <div class="itemCount">1</div> </li> </ul> {{/html}}

Patches This has been patched in XWiki 14.10.20, 15.5.4 and 15.10 RC1.

Workarounds Modify the Main.SolrSpaceFacet page following this patch.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21471 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/acba74c149a041345b24dcca52c586f872ba97fb https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/74e301c481e69eeea674dac7fed6af3614cf08c5

In XWiki Platform 7.2 through 11.10.2, registered users without scripting/programming permissions are able to execute python/groovy scripts while editing personal dashboards. This has been fixed 11.3.7 , 11.10.3 and 12.0.

Impact It is possible in XWiki to execute Velocity code without having script right by creating an XClass with a property of type "TextArea" and content type "VelocityCode" or "VelocityWiki". For the former, the syntax of the document needs to be set the xwiki/1.0 (this syntax doesn't need to be installed). In both cases, when adding the property to an object, the Velocity code is executed regardless of the rights of the author of the property (edit right is still required, though). In both cases, the code is executed with the correct context author so no privileged APIs can be accessed. However, Velocity still grants access to otherwise inaccessible data and APIs that could allow further privilege escalation.

At least for "VelocityCode", this behavior is most likely very old but only since XWiki 7.2, script right is a separate right, before that version all users were allowed to execute Velocity and thus this was expected and not a security issue.

Patches This has been patched in XWiki 14.10.10 and 15.4 RC1.

Workarounds There are no known workarounds.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20847 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20848 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/edc52579eeaab1b4514785c134044671a1ecd839