Unauthenticated reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) exists in Zarafa Webapp 2.0.1.47791 and earlier. NOTE: this is a discontinued product. The issue was fixed in later Zarafa Webapp versions; however, some former Zarafa Webapp customers use the related Kopano product instead.

Zarafa WebAccess 4.1 and WebApp uses world-readable permissions for the files in their tmp directory, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information by reading temporary session data.

Robert Scheck reported that Zarafa's WebAccess stored session information, including login credentials, on-disk in PHP session files. This session file would contain a user's username and password to the Zarafa IMAP server.

If Zarafa WebAccess was run on a shared hosting site (multiple web sites on the same server), and an administrator of another server, with the ability to upload arbitrary scripts to the server, they could use this to obtain these IMAP credentials due to both sites being run by the same Apache user, and the PHP session files being owned by the same.

In a non-shared hosting environment, or one using something like SuEXEC, where the PHP session files are owned by individual users on a per-site basis, this would not be an issue. In that case, only a local user able to read these files (either as root or as the user running the Apache web server) would be able to view the credentials.

Robert Scheck reported a number of issues with the default permissions in Zarafa[1]:

"" 1. In order to fix CVE-2014-0103, Zarafa introduced constants PASSWORDKEY and PASSWORDIV in /etc/zarafa/webaccess-ajax/config.php (Zarafa WebAccess) and /etc/zarafa/webapp/config.php (Zarafa WebApp), both are the upstream path names of a default installation, downstream names might be different. Both files have default permissions of root:root and 644, thus decryption of the symmetric encrypted passwords in the on-disk PHP session files is possible again (similar like initially described in CVE-2014-0103). Affects Zarafa WebAccess >= 7.1.10, Zarafa WebApp >= 1.6 beta.

2. The log directory /var/log/zarafa/ is shipped by default with root:root and 755 and all created log files by the Zarafa daemons have by default root:root and 644. This is leaking (depending on the log level of the given service) only e.g. subject, sender/recipient, message-id, SMTP queue id of in- and outbound e-mails but might be even a cleartext protocol dump of IMAP, POP3, CalDAV and iCal as well (including possible credentials) to any local system user. Affects Zarafa >= 5.00.

3. The directories /var/lib/zarafa-webaccess/tmp/ (Zarafa WebAccess) and /var/lib/zarafa-webapp/tmp/ (Zarafa WebApp) are read- and writable by the Apache system user by default - but also world readable for local system users (e.g. apache:apache and 755 on RHEL). Thus all the temporary session data such as uploaded e-mail attachments can be read-only accessed because all created files below previously mentioned directories have permissions 644, too. Upstream path names changed over the time and releases. Affects Zarafa WebAccess >= 4.1, Zarafa WebApp (any version).

4. The optional (but proprietary) license daemon /usr/bin/zarafa-licensed runs by default with root permissions, the subscription/license key is put into '/etc/zarafa/license/'. The license files are recommented (according upstream documentation) to be created using echo(1) which usually leads to root:root and 644. But the parent directory /etc/zarafa/license/ is shipped by default with root:root and 755. As result the key files can be accessed and copied by any local system user. Affects Zarafa >= 4.1. ""

[1] http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2014/q3/444