On Xtensa SoCs built with CONFIGXTENSAMPU and CONFIGUSERSPACE, archbuffervalidate() in arch/xtensa/core/mpu.c — the architecture hook that verifies a user-mode-supplied buffer is accessible to the calling user thread with the requested permission — defaulted its return value to 0 (access permitted) and only set a denial result inside its per-MPU-region probe loop. When the rounded extent of the buffer wraps the 32-bit address space (size + alignment offset near SIZEMAX, or ROUNDUP(size + offset) overflowing to 0), the loop executes zero iterations and the function returns 0 = permitted without probing any MPU region.

The syscall-layer pre-checks (KSYSCALLMEMORYSIZECHECK / ZDETECTPOINTEROVERFLOW) only catch a raw addr+size wrap and do not cover the ROUNDUP-induced wrap, and the string path (archuserstringnlen -> archbuffervalidate) has no syscall-layer guard at all.

An unprivileged user-mode thread can therefore pass a crafted (addr, size) to any syscall that validates user buffers via kusermodefromcopy/tocopy or kusermodestringcopy and have validation succeed for memory it must not access; the kernel then reads from (disclosure) or, with write=1, writes to (corruption) attacker-chosen kernel or other-partition memory on the thread's behalf, enabling information disclosure, memory corruption, privilege escalation, and denial of service.

Affected from v3.7.0 (when Xtensa MPU userspace support was added) through v4.4.0. The fix changes the default to -EINVAL (deny by default), adds an explicit sizeaddoverflow check, and sets the success value only after the full range has been validated.