The hawkBit device management client in subsys/mgmt/hawkbit accumulates the body of an HTTP response from the update server into a heap buffer in responsejsoncb() (subsys/mgmt/hawkbit/hawkbit.c). The buffer is sized to hold the received body bytes but reserves no space for a terminating NUL. When the full response has arrived, the code writes responsedata[downloadedsize] = '\0' — and whenever the accumulated body length equals the allocation, that terminator lands one byte past the end of the heap object (a heap-based out-of-bounds write, CWE-122 / CWE-787).

The body length and fragmentation are taken directly from the parsed HTTP response (rsp->bodyfragstart / rsp->bodyfraglen) and are fully controlled by the remote hawkBit server, which chooses its own response length. The precise trigger depends on how the buffer grows, and both forms are remotely reachable. Since v4.0.0 the reallocation is sized to exactly downloadedsize + bodylen, so any response body larger than the 1100-byte initial buffer makes the out-of-bounds write deterministic; such response sizes are normal for hawkBit deployment metadata. Before v4.0.0 the buffer grew by doubling and the growth check ((downloadedsize + bodylen) > responsebuffersize) is false at equality, so a response body whose length is exactly the current allocation — 1100 bytes with the default initial buffer — skips the reallocation entirely and writes the terminator at responsedata[1100] of an 1100-byte object. The HTTP length-mismatch check does not catch this, because the declared and received lengths genuinely agree. Either form is reachable by a malicious, compromised, or man-in-the-middle update server (TLS is optional and, when enabled, does not protect against a hostile server), with no authentication of response content and no client-side length cap protecting the write.

The out-of-bounds write is a fixed single NUL byte immediately following the allocation, corrupting adjacent allocator metadata or the next allocation. The practical impact is heap corruption leading to denial of service (fault on a subsequent allocation or free), with the bounded, allocator-dependent possibility of further corruption. The fix sizes the buffer to the body length plus one and copies with memcpy, ensuring the terminator always lands within the allocation.

The Zephyr Bluetooth GATT client CCC-write response handler gattwritecccrsp() in subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c invoked the application's params->subscribe() callback after it had already called params->notify(conn, params, NULL, 0).

Per the public GATT API, a notify callback with NULL data is the documented signal that the subscription has terminated and the btgattsubscribeparams struct may be freed or reused by the application; calling subscribe() on the struct afterwards is a use-after-free, including an indirect call through the freed params->subscribe function pointer.

The error branch is remotely (adjacent) reachable: a Zephyr device acting as a GATT client that calls btgattsubscribe() can be driven into this ordering when a connected GATT server peer answers the CCC write with an ATT Error Response (the peer-supplied error code flows through atterrorrsp -> atthandlersp into gattwritecccrsp).

For applications that free or recycle subscription parameters in their notification-termination handler, this results in memory corruption, a crash (denial of service), or potentially attacker-influenced control flow. The fix reorders the handler so the subscribe() callback runs before the terminating notify(NULL) in both the error and unsubscribe paths.

BT: Possible to overwrite an existing bond during keys distribution phase when the identity address of the bond is known. Zephyr versions >= 1.14.2, >= 2.4.0, >= 2.5.0 contain Use of Multiple Resources with Duplicate Identifier (CWE-694). For more information, see https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-j76f-35mc-4h63

RCE/DOS: Linked-list corruption leading to large out-of-bounds write while sorting for forged fragment list in Zephyr. Zephyr versions >= >=2.4.0 contain Out-of-bounds Write (CWE-787). For more information, see https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-fj4r-373f-9456

Unexpected Pointer Aliasing in IEEE 802154 Fragment Reassembly in Zephyr. Zephyr versions >= >=2.4.0 contain NULL Pointer Dereference (CWE-476). For more information, see https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-p86r-gc4r-4mq3

Integer Underflow in 6LoWPAN IPHC Header Uncompression in Zephyr. Zephyr versions >= >=2.4.0 contain Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound) (CWE-191). For more information, see https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-89j6-qpxf-pfpc

Integer Underflow in Zephyr in IEEE 802154 Fragment Reassembly Header Removal. Zephyr versions >= >=2.4.0 contain Integer Overflow to Buffer Overflow (CWE-680). For more information, see https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-w44j-66g7-xw99

DOS: Incorrect 802154 Frame Validation for Omitted Source / Dest Addresses. Zephyr versions >= > v2.4.0 contain NULL Pointer Dereference (CWE-476), Attempt to Access Child of a Non-structure Pointer (CWE-588). For more information, see https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-94jg-2p6q-5364

Type Confusion in 802154 ACK Frames Handling. Zephyr versions >= v2.4.0 contain NULL Pointer Dereference (CWE-476). For more information, see https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-27r3-rxch-2hm7

Information leakage in leecredconnreq(). Zephyr versions >= v2.4.0 Use of Uninitialized Resource (CWE-908). For more information, see https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-xhg3-gvj6-4rqh