In Zephyr bluetooth mesh core stack, an out-of-bound write vulnerability can be triggered during provisioning.

The userspace verifier zvrfylogfilterset() for the logfilterset syscall in subsys/logging/logmgmt.c performed a signed comparison against the int16t srcid parameter: srcid < (int16t)logsrccntget(domainid). Any negative value for srcid (e.g. -1) trivially satisfied this check and was forwarded into zimpllogfilterset, where it propagated to filterset() and ultimately to getdynamicfilter(), which uses sourceid as an unsigned index into the linker-section array &TYPESECTIONSTART(logdynamic)[sourceid].filters.

After implicit conversion through uint32t, an int16t -1 becomes 0xFFFFFFFF, indexing logdynamic far out of bounds and causing the kernel to perform an OOB read and an OOB read-modify-write (LOGFILTERSLOTGET/SET) against memory adjacent to the logdynamic section.

The written value is a constrained 3-bit log level slot within the targeted 32-bit word, but the target address is attacker-chosen (a small negative offset from logdynamic) and the write occurs in supervisor mode following a syscall from an unprivileged user thread, providing a kernel memory-corruption / privilege-escalation primitive.

The defect is reachable on any build with CONFIGUSERSPACE=y and CONFIGLOGRUNTIMEFILTERING=y. Present from Zephyr v3.3.0 through v4.4.1. The fix replaces the signed bound check with an unsigned comparison: (uint32t)srcid < logsrccntget(domainid), which correctly rejects negative inputs.