Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
5.3
EPSS
0.05%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Summary

A user enumeration vulnerability has been discovered in Zitadel's login interfaces. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this flaw to confirm the existence of valid user accounts by iterating through usernames and userIDs.

Impact

The login UIs (in version 1 and 2) provide the possibility to request a password reset, where an email will be sent to the user with a link to a verification endpoint. By submitting arbitrary userIDs to these endpoints, an attacker can differentiate between valid and invalid accounts based on the system's response.

For an effective exploit the attacker needs to iterate through the potential set of userIDs. The impact can be limited by implementing rate limiting or similar measures to limit enumeration of userIDs.

Additionally, Zitadel includes a security feature "Ignoring unknown usernames", designed to prevent username enumeration attacks by presenting a generic response for both valid and invalid usernames on the login page. The login UI V2 did not handle the setting correctly and would allow attackers to enumerate through usernames to check their existence.

Affected Versions

All versions within the following ranges, including release candidates (RCs), are affected: - v4.x: 4.0.0 through 4.9.0 - 3.x: 3.0.0 through 3.4.5 - 2.x: 2.0.0 through 2.71.19

Patches

The vulnerability has been addressed in the latest releases. The patch resolves the issue by returning a generic error message, which does not indicate it the user exists.

4.x: Upgrade to >=4.9.1 3.x: Update to >=3.4.6 2.x: Update to >=3.4.6

Workarounds

The recommended solution is to update ZITADEL to a patched version. You can limit the impact by implementing rate limiting or similar measures to limit enumeration of userIDs.

There is no workaround for the "Ignoring unknown usernames" issue in login V2. Please upgrade to a patched version, if you rely on this feature.

Questions

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at security@zitadel.com

Credits

Thanks to Niklas Kunz from Seamly for reporting this vulnerability from their pentest.

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
EPSS
0.07%
Command Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Impact

A potential vulnerability exists in ZITADEL's password reset mechanism. ZITADEL utilizes the Forwarded or X-Forwarded-Host header from incoming requests to construct the URL for the password reset confirmation link. This link, containing a secret code, is then emailed to the user.

If an attacker can manipulate these headers (e.g., via host header injection), they could cause ZITADEL to generate a password reset link pointing to a malicious domain controlled by the attacker. If the user clicks this manipulated link in the email, the secret reset code embedded in the URL can be captured by the attacker. This captured code could then be used to reset the user's password and gain unauthorized access to their account.

It's important to note that this specific attack vector is mitigated for accounts that have Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) or Passwordless authentication enabled.

Patches

Patched version ensure proper validation of the headers and do not allow downgrading from https to http.

3.x versions are fixed on >=3.2.2 2.71.x versions are fixed on >=2.71.11 2.x versions are fixed on >=2.70.12

Workarounds

The recommended solution is to update ZITADEL to a patched version.

A ZITADEL fronting proxy can be configured to delete all Forwarded and X-Forwarded-Host header values before sending requests to ZITADEL self-hosted environments.

Questions

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at security@zitadel.com

Credits

Thanks to Amit Laish – GE Vernova for finding and reporting the vulnerability.

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
5.9
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

ZITADEL is a combination of Auth0 and Keycloak. RefreshTokens is an OAuth 2.0 feature that allows applications to retrieve new access tokens and refresh the user's session without the need for interacting with a UI. RefreshTokens were not invalidated when a user was locked or deactivated. The deactivated or locked user was able to obtain a valid access token only through a refresh token grant. When the locked or deactivated user’s session was already terminated (“logged out”) then it was not possible to create a new session. Renewal of access token through a refresh token grant is limited to the configured amount of time (RefreshTokenExpiration). As a workaround, ensure the RefreshTokenExpiration in the OIDC settings of your instance is set according to your security requirements. This issue has been patched in versions 2.17.3 and 2.16.4.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

ZITADEL combines the ease of Auth0 and the versatility of Keycloak.Actions, introduced in ZITADEL 1.42.0 on the API and 1.56.0 for Console, is a feature, where users with role.ORGOWNER are able to create Javascript Code, which is invoked by the system at certain points during the login. Actions, for example, allow creating authorizations (user grants) on newly created users programmatically. Due to a missing authorization check, Actions were able to grant authorizations for projects that belong to other organizations inside the same Instance. Granting authorizations via API and Console is not affected by this vulnerability. There is currently no known workaround, users should update.

First published (updated )

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