Lemonldap::NG::Portal versions from 2.0.0 before 2.16.9, from 2.17.0 before 2.21.5, from 2.22.0 before 2.23.3 for Perl allow authentication bypass via an OAuth2 state parameter stored as an SSO session in the GitHub and LinkedIn backends.

Before redirecting to the identity provider, extractFormInfo() creates the state session with the positional call getApacheSession( undef, 1, 0, 'GitHubState' ). getApacheSession() takes a session id followed by a named argument hash, so the trailing arguments become that hash, kind defaults to SSO, and the state is written to the global session storage as a regular SSO session. Its identifier is handed to the unauthenticated visitor as the state parameter of the redirection URL.

Any visitor who reaches the GitHub or LinkedIn endpoint can replay that identifier as a session cookie and obtain a valid SSO session without authenticating. The session holds neither user nor authenticationLevel, which the shipped bootstrap configuration accepts because it grants virtual hosts a "default => accept" access rule; deployments whose rules test the user or require an authentication level are less exposed. Only configurations with the GitHub or LinkedIn authentication module enabled are affected.

Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible versions through 0.713 for Perl allow password reset link poisoning via the request Host header in defaultemailpasswordreset and defaultwelcomesend.

Both default emails emit a link of the form $base/login/$code, whose authority comes from the request Host header, or from X-Forwarded-Host under behindproxy (obtained from Dancer2's request->base function). A POST to /login carrying submitreset and a username needs no authentication: it stores a fresh reset code against that account and mails the account holder a link to a host of the sender's choosing. The welcome mail takes the same path when the application calls createuser with emailwelcome set.

Through 0.711 the handlers read request->uribase and request->base directly; Versions 0.712 and later provide an uribase configuration key that defaults to the untrusted request->uribase when unset.

The default configuration with resetpasswordhandler enabled and the default message text, a recipient who follows the link hands a working reset code to the sender's host, which is enough to take over the account.

DBI versions before 1.652 for Perl allow a heap out-of-bounds write via an unvalidated numeric placeholder that sets the binder counter in preparse.

preparse reserves seven output bytes per input byte, the width of the longest ':p99999' expansion. The ':N' branch parses the number with atoi(src) and assigns it to the binder counter with no range check, so a statement containing ':2147483648' leaves the counter negative (-2147483648 with glibc, where atoi wraps). Each following '?' then expands through sprintf(start, ":p%d", idx++) to ':p-2147483648', 14 bytes with the terminating NUL where the buffer budgets 7. The placeholder limit added in 1.650 tests the counter against 99,999, which a negative counter passes.

Any caller that preparses an untrusted statement into ':pN' style placeholders gets a heap out-of-bounds write that grows with the number of '?' marks following the poisoned placeholder. The '?' and '%s' return styles compare the parsed number against the expected sequence and error out, and are unaffected.

DBI versions before 1.652 for Perl allow a heap out-of-bounds write on 32-bit perl via an integer wraparound in the output buffer size computed by preparse.

preparse reserves its output buffer with newSV(strlen(statement) 7 + 16), budgeting seven output bytes per input byte for the longest ':p99999' expansion. The product is computed in STRLEN, which is 32 bits wide on a 32-bit perl build, so a statement of 613,566,757 bytes multiplies to 4,294,967,299, wraps modulo 2^32 to 3, and reserves 19 bytes. The parser then copies the statement out through a raw pointer with no capacity check, writing the whole 585 MB input past the end of the allocation. The 99,999 placeholder limit does not bound this path, which is reached by ordinary non-placeholder content.

Any caller that passes an untrusted statement of that length to preparse on a 32-bit perl gets a heap out-of-bounds write of attacker controlled bytes. Builds with a 64-bit STRLEN are not affected, since the wrap there needs a statement of about 2.3 exabytes.

Form::Processor::Field::HtmlArea versions from 0.06 through 1.162360 for Perl allow attacker selected method dispatch and resource exhaustion via an HTML::Tidy diagnostic that validate passes to adderror as a Locale::Maketext template.

validate runs HTML::Tidy over the submitted markup and passes each resulting message to adderror as its first argument, which adderror hands to the language handle as the Locale::Maketext message key. The default handle's lexicon sets AUTO, so a message that is not a lexicon entry is compiled as a bracket notation template instead of being looked up. Tidy diagnostics quote the offending attribute name or value, so a bracket group in the submitted markup reaches the template position, where the first token of the group names a method called on the language handle and the remaining tokens are its arguments. A group such as [0] makes the compile croak, and neither the field nor the handle catches it, so the exception leaves validate. [sprintf,%2000000000d,7] reaches CORE::sprintf with an attacker chosen field width.

One submission of crafted markup to an HtmlArea field throws an unhandled exception out of form validation or allocates an arbitrary amount of memory, and an application whose language handle subclass defines side effecting public methods makes those callable with attacker chosen arguments. The other field types pass fixed templates with the submitted value in an argument slot, where it stays inert, and are unaffected.

HTML::FormHandler versions through 0.40068 for Perl allow attacker selected method dispatch and resource exhaustion because applyactions and adderror use error message text built from request data as a Locale::Maketext bracket notation template.

adderror hands its first argument to the language handle as the Locale::Maketext message key, and the default handle's lexicon sets AUTO, so a string that is not a lexicon entry is compiled as a bracket notation template instead of being looked up. In a bracket group the first token names a method called on the language handle and the remaining tokens are its arguments.

Three kinds of text the library did not author reach that position. applyactions installs a $SIG{WARN} handler that stores the warning text in $errormessage, and a captured warning survives a successful action, so a field carrying a numeric transform turns Argument "[sprintf,%50000000d,0]" isn't numeric into the template; a warning quotes the submitted value verbatim, so the group is well formed and dispatches. $errormessage ||= $tobj->validate($newvalue) takes a type constraint's own failure message, which renders the rejected value through a partial dumper in bracket and comma form (Devel::PartialDump when Moose can load it, Type::Tiny's own dumper always), so a field with apply => [ Str ] given a parameter sent more than once, which arrives as an array, gets Reference ["a","b"] did not pass type constraint "Str" as its template, from a request that carries no bracket character of its own. A coercion or transform exception reaches it the same way. Beyond those, a validator whose message contains the field value puts that value in the template directly, and adderror replaces the message list with the contents of an arrayref first argument (@message = @{$message[0]} if ref $message[0] eq 'ARRAY'), so a value arriving as an array fills the argument slots from the same request as well.

A malformed group such as [0] makes the compile croak, and HTML::FormHandler::I18N::maketext and adderror each re-raise that as a die, so process() throws. A well formed group naming sprintf reaches CORE::sprintf with an attacker chosen field width. Any caller that applies a type constraint or a transform to an untrusted field, or whose validator passes an untrusted field value to adderror, can be made to throw an unhandled exception out of process(), or to allocate an arbitrary amount of memory in one request, and an application whose language handle subclass defines side effecting public methods makes those callable with attacker chosen arguments. The dumped type constraint message is bounded to the exception, because both dumpers quote non-numeric elements so the method slot is never an attacker chosen name. The built-in messages pass fixed templates with the value in an argument slot, where it stays inert, and the built-in field types attach explicit message callbacks, so neither is affected.

PDF::WebKit versions through 1.2 for Perl allow argument injection into wkhtmltopdf via meta tags in the source document.

For an HTML string or file source, the constructor collects every <meta name="pdf-webkit-KEY" content="VALUE"> element in the document head through pdfwebkitmetatags and turns each one into a wkhtmltopdf command line option. KEY is normalized to an option name matching --[a-z0-9-]+ but is not checked against an allow list, VALUE is passed through unchanged as the argument that follows it, and a VALUE of "yes" emits the option as a bare flag. BUILD merges the meta derived options last, so they also override the module defaults and the options passed to new. Switches such as --enable-local-file-access and --cookie-jar are reachable this way. The renderer is executed with an argument list rather than a shell command, so this is argument injection and not shell injection.

Any caller that renders untrusted HTML lets the document choose the renderer's options and override those set by the application, including options that read local files into the resulting PDF or write to a chosen path. A URL source is not scanned, and the scan is skipped when XML::LibXML, a recommended dependency, is not installed.

Improper TLS hostname verification vulnerability in Apache HttpComponents Client 5.4 or newer. HostnameVerificationPolicy#BUILTIN setting has no effect when used with the async version of HttpClient. An attacker that can intercept and modify traffic between the client and the server can impersonate the server by presenting a valid certificate for a different domain.

Please note the classic version of HttpClient is not affected by this vulnerability.

Affected users are recommended to upgrade to at least version 5.6.4, which fixes the issue.

Use after free in Windows Deployment Services allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.

SAP Commerce Cloud allows an unauthenticated attacker to abuse a default authentication client and submit specially crafted input to certain functions lacking sufficient validation. Successful exploitation could enable arbitrary code execution and compromise internal components, resulting in high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the application.