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BIND may accept incorrect child-zone NSEC3 records as valid, allowing forged authenticated NXDOMAIN responses for sibling zones. AC:H (high complexity) keeps severity at Medium despite S:C.

A flaw was found in rpcbind's rpcinfo utility. In rpcbdump() short mode, used by rpcinfo -s, version values returned by a remote RPCBPROCDUMP reply are appended via unbounded sprintf() calls into a fixed 256-byte stack buffer without tracking remaining space:

c char buf[256]; char p = buf; for (vl = rs->vlist; vl; vl = vl->next) { sprintf (p, "%d", vl->vers); p = p + strlen (p); if (vl->next) sprintf (p++, ","); }

A malicious or compromised rpcbind endpoint that returns enough distinct version numbers for a single program (roughly 24 maximum-width decimal values plus separators) can overflow this buffer. A user or administrator must run rpcinfo -s <host> against the hostile endpoint; no privileges on the victim are required, but user interaction is needed. Current evidence supports client-side stack memory corruption leading to a crash/denial of service of the rpcinfo client process; disclosure or reliable code execution are not established.

This bug was originally reported bundled together with a related, since-fixed overflow in rpcbaddrlist() (now tracked separately as CVE-2026-16277). Confirmed via direct inspection of upstream commit bb9bb7286a4c345442946dc2ce3c9e7f67e96d4d (rpcbind 1.2.9) that this rpcbdump() short-mode overflow is NOT fixed by that commit and remains present in the latest upstream release.

Steps to reproduce: 1. Build rpcbind with AddressSanitizer: CFLAGS="-O1 -g -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer" ./configure && make -j 2. Run a malicious rpcbind-compatible endpoint, or an instrumented test responder. 3. Return an RPCBPROCDUMP list for one program with enough distinct versions (~24+ max-width decimal values) to exceed 256 bytes. 4. Run ./src/rpcinfo -s <attacker-host>. 5. Observe an ASan stack-buffer-overflow report or client crash.

Proposed fix (not yet applied upstream): convert the version-list formatter to bounded snprintf() calls that track remaining buffer space. diff char p = buf; +char p = buf; +sizet rem = sizeof(buf); +int n; +buf[0] = '\0'; for (vl = rs->vlist; vl; vl = vl->next) { - sprintf (p, "%d", vl->vers); - p = p + strlen (p); - if (vl->next) - sprintf (p++, ","); + n = snprintf(p, rem, "%d%s", vl->vers, vl->next ? "," : ""); + if (n < 0) + break; + if ((sizet)n >= rem) { + p = buf + sizeof(buf) - 1; + break; + } + p += n; + rem -= (sizet)n; }

A stack-based buffer overflow was found in rpcbind's rpcinfo utility. When querying a remote rpcbind service with rpcinfo -l, address information returned by the server is copied into a fixed-size buffer without sufficient bounds checking. A malicious or compromised rpcbind server could use this flaw to crash the rpcinfo client, resulting in a denial of service. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to system availability.