Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value, Allocation of Resources Without Limits, and Uncontrolled Recursion in the Java implementation of Apache PLC4X (PLC4J) allow a malicious or impersonated device to exhaust the memory or stack of the client application, causing a denial of service.

In the OPC UA driver these defects are reachable before authentication: the offending data is parsed while the secure channel and session are being established, before the server's identity has been bound to it. Configuring a trusted server therefore does not prevent exploitation by an attacker who can impersonate it.

The individual defects are: - Length-prefixed byte strings are allocated at the size claimed on the wire before the length is checked against the data actually received (0.10.0 through 0.13.1). - Array fields in generated protocol parsers pre-allocate a list with the element count claimed on the wire, allowing a single count field to trigger a multi-gigabyte allocation. This parser is shared by all PLC4J drivers; the OPC UA driver is the verified pre-authentication path (0.10.0 through 0.13.1). - The OPC UA driver accumulates message chunks without enforcing the negotiated maximum chunk count and message size (0.12.0 through 0.13.1). - The OPC UA driver pre-allocates collections using element counts received from the server (0.10.0 through 0.13.1). - Recursive protocol types are parsed without a nesting-depth limit. The same defect in the Go implementation is covered by CVE-2026-102510 https://cveprocess.apache.org/cve5/CVE-2026-102510 .

This issue affects Apache PLC4X: from 0.10.0 before 1.0.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.0.0, which fixes the issue.