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A security vulnerability has been identified in the Planet9 desktop application where a hardcoded read-only API key permitted unauthorized access to internal repositories. An attacker could exploit this access to extract embedded administrative keys and secrets, potentially allowing them to gain administrative access to repository infrastructure and modify software source code. To mitigate this security risk, Acer has released an update to resolve the issue.
PredatorSense version 3.00.3136 to 3.00.3196 contain Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) vulnerability.The program exposes a Windows Named Pipe that uses a custom protocol to invoke internal functions. However, this Named Pipe is misconfigured, allowing any authenticated local user to execute arbitrary code with NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges and to delete arbitrary files with SYSTEM privileges. By leveraging this, an attacker can execute arbitrary code on the target system with elevated privileges.
NitroSense 3.x before 3.01.3052 contains Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) vulnerability.The program exposes a Windows Named Pipe that uses a custom protocol to invoke internal functions. However, this Named Pipe is misconfigured, allowing any authenticated local user to execute arbitrary code with NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges and to delete arbitrary files with SYSTEM privileges. By leveraging this, an attacker can execute arbitrary code on the target system with elevated privileges.
A security vulnerability has been identified in Acer Care Center where the ACCSvc service creates a Named Pipe with a weak Security Descriptor. This vulnerability allows an authenticated local user to connect and send a specially crafted message (message type 0x03) to the pipe, causing the service to crash with exit code 1067 (ERRORPROCESSABORTED). To mitigate this potential local service disruption, Acer requires users to update the software to the latest version.
The FieldX MDM adb messaging topic passes unverified payloads directly into Runtime.exec(), allowing command/instruction injection.
The local MQTT broker does not enforce topic-level Access Control Lists (ACLs). This allows any client to subscribe using wildcard characters (# or +) to enumerate hidden network devices or publish rogue control commands.
The hard-coded APK resource files never expire, and the shared scepter leads to information leaks and potential misuse.
Unchecked public access permissions on a core Broadcast Receiver allow unauthorized local software components to invoke administrative operations.
The aicmd utility executes with full root permissions. It pipes socket inputs directly to popen(), paving the way for unauthenticated users to execute arbitrary root commands.
System log files output unencrypted SMTP server authentication passwords alongside sensitive employee corporate identification data.
Internal multimedia session archives are accessible without authentication, exacerbated by loose Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) rules that allow cross-site theft.
The debugging routine SCREENCLICK(5053) enables a connection to skip the standard device login prompt entirely and directly enter an interactive shell interface.
Leftover debug modules contain fixed credentials for internal AWS Cognito test sandboxes, risking asset exploitation.
The production build of the M3WebServer hard-codes its backend API keys, which can be easily intercepted through verbose error handling pages.
The summary service endpoint suffers from an IDOR vulnerability where it fails to verify user ownership of hardware serial numbers, exposing device data to scraping.
Overly permissive configuration settings on cloud storage containers expose active telemetry information publicly to the internet.
Crucial management API endpoints for cellular eSIM allocation do not validate caller authorization, allowing remote profiles to be rewritten or deleted.
Incoming VPN network profile settings fail to process special characters safely, enabling command injection via malicious config files.
The system fails to evaluate instructional permissions over multiple internal operation codes (opcodes), permitting unauthorized application installations or command executions.
The device encrypts data using AES-CBC with static zero-filled Initialization Vectors (IVs), making it susceptible to replay attacks and known-plaintext decryption.
The system Binder boundary accepts unverified pass-through AT commands, giving local applications the power to read baseband files or disable cellular connectivity.
The account validation endpoint /v1/User/validate returns comprehensive user profile data sheets, which can be crawled by iterating predictable identification strings.
Weak validation logic within device dissociation API routines allows a remote entity to forcefully unbind unrelated user endpoints, causing severe denial of service.
Broadcast events allow malicious software to rewrite the device's default Mobile Device Management (MDM) endpoint address, shifting administrative ownership to an external attacker.
Leftover engineering diagnostics and factory-level diagnostic software remain exposed on retail builds, giving malicious apps write privileges to internal NVRAM registers.
High-risk TrustAllCerts routines disable standard TLS certificate validation. Combined with hard-coded DES symmetric encryption keys, a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) actor could decrypt network traffic.
The web administration panel binds broadly to the public IPv6 address space on port [::]:8080 without default firewall limits, making internal API endpoints reachable over the WAN.
Fixed AES-128-CBC keys inside the AcerConnect OTA application let attackers forge authorization credentials for arbitrary IMEI numbers. This allows unauthorized actors to list catalog items and extract protected binaries from pre-signed cloud links.
The /v1/Plan service relies entirely on a shared global API token for full administrative management, allowing arbitrary creation of zero-cost network access plans.
The registration path /v1/account/register provides no bot mitigation mechanisms, allowing malicious automated systems to flood the database.