BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to 1.4.3, an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in bacnet-stack's ReadPropertyMultiple service property decoder allows unauthenticated remote attackers to read past allocated buffer boundaries by sending an RPM request with a truncated property list. The vulnerability stems from rpmdecodeobjectproperty() calling the deprecated decodetagnumberandvalue() function at src/bacnet/rpm.c:344, which accepts no buffer length parameter and reads blindly from whatever pointer it receives. A crafted BACnet/IP packet with a 1-byte property payload containing an extended tag marker (0xF9) causes the decoder to read 1 byte past the end of the buffer, leading to crashes on embedded BACnet devices. The vulnerability exists in src/bacnet/rpm.c and affects any deployment that enables the ReadPropertyMultiple confirmed service handler (enabled by default in the reference server). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.3.

BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to 1.4.3, an off-by-one out-of-bounds read vulnerability in bacnet-stack's ReadPropertyMultiple service decoder allows unauthenticated remote attackers to read one byte past an allocated buffer boundary by sending a crafted RPM request with a truncated object identifier. The vulnerability is in rpmdecodeobjectid(), which checks apdulen < 5 but then accesses all 6 byte positions (indices 0-5) — consuming 1 byte for the context tag, 4 bytes for the object ID, then reading apdu[5] for the opening tag check. A 5-byte input passes the length check but causes a 1-byte OOB read, leading to crashes on embedded BACnet devices. The vulnerability exists in src/bacnet/rpm.c and affects any deployment that enables the ReadPropertyMultiple confirmed service handler (enabled by default in the reference server). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.3.

BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to 1.4.3, an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in bacnet-stack's WritePropertyMultiple service decoder allows unauthenticated remote attackers to read past allocated buffer boundaries by sending a truncated WPM request. The vulnerability stems from wpmdecodeobjectproperty() calling the deprecated decodetagnumberandvalue() function, which performs no bounds checking on the input buffer. A crafted BACnet/IP packet with a truncated property payload causes the decoder to read 1-7 bytes past the end of the buffer, leading to crashes or information disclosure on embedded BACnet devices. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.3.

BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to 1.4.3, decodesigned32() in src/bacnet/bacint.c reconstructs a 32-bit signed integer from four APDU bytes using signed left shifts. When any of the four bytes has bit 7 set (value ≥ 0x80), the left-shift operation overflows a signed int32t, which is undefined behavior per the C standard. This is flagged thousands of times per minute by UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer on any BACnet input containing signed-integer property values with high-bit-set bytes. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.3.

BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to 1.5.0rc4 and 1.4.3rc2, a malformed WriteProperty request can trigger a length underflow in the BACnet stack, leading to an out‑of‑bounds read and a crash (DoS). The issue is in wp.c within wpdecodeservicerequest. When decoding the optional priority context tag, the code passes apdulen - apdusize to bacnetunsignedcontextdecode without validating that apdusize <= apdulen. If a truncated APDU reaches this path, apdulen - apdusize underflows, resulting in a large size being used for decoding and an out‑of‑bounds read. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.0rc4 and 1.4.3rc2.

BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to 1.5.0.rc3, a vulnerability has been discovered in BACnet Stack's file writing functionality where there is no validation of user-provided file paths, allowing attackers to write files to arbitrary directories. This affects apps/readfile/main.c and ports/posix/bacfile-posix.c. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.0.rc3.

BACnet Protocol Stack library provides a BACnet application layer, network layer and media access (MAC) layer communications services. In 1.4.2, 1.5.0.rc2, and earlier, an off-by-one stack-based buffer overflow in the ubasic interpreter causes a crash (SIGABRT) when processing string literals longer than the buffer limit. The tokenizerstring function in src/bacnet/basic/program/ubasic/tokenizer.c incorrectly handles null termination for maximum-length strings. It writes a null byte to dest[40] when the buffer size is only 40 (indices 0-39), triggering a stack overflow.

BACnet Protocol Stack library provides a BACnet application layer, network layer and media access (MAC) layer communications services. Prior to 1.5.0.rc2, The npduisexpectedreply function in src/bacnet/npdu.c indexes requestpdu[offset+2/3/5] and replypdu[offset+1/2/4] without verifying that those APDU bytes exist. bacnetnpdudecode() can return offset == 2 for a 2-byte NPDU, so tiny PDUs pass the version check and then get read out of bounds. On ASan/MPU/strict builds this is an immediate crash (DoS). On unprotected builds it is undefined behavior and can mis-route replies; RCE is unlikely because only reads occur, but DoS is reliable.

BACnet Stack before 1.3.2 has a decode function APDU buffer over-read in bacappdecodeapplicationdata in bacapp.c.