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Vendor Risk Score

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Severity
9.4
Path Traversal
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.6.3-beta.11, the /api/subtitles/subtitles-info handler uses SubtitleNameContents.get() in subtitlescontents.py and reads the caller-supplied subtitlePath after checking only its subtitle extension; because the resolved path is not confined to files indexed by Bazarr, traversal can read files outside the media library. The /api/subtitles/subtitles handler in subtitles.py passes caller-supplied path and reference to sync and translation without per-path authorization, allowing an out-of-library reference file to be read and output to overwrite a file outside the media library. The authenticate decorator gates both endpoints when API authentication is enabled, while auth = None allows access without credentials. Both paths can affect only files that the Bazarr process can read or write. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.3-beta.11.

First published (updated )
Severity
10
CSRF
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the apinsplex namespace in bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py omits @authenticate on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke POST /api/plex/oauth/logout to clear credentials and disable the integration, or POST /api/plex/apikey to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. POST /api/plex/oauth/pin and GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/<pinid>/check additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account's token to the instance. PlexPinCheck skips state validation when stateparam is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. POST /api/plex/select-server, POST /api/plex/oauth/servers, POST /api/plex/webhook/create, POST /api/plex/webhook/delete and POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey expose further writeconfig() operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in X-Plex-Token, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review.

First published (updated )
Severity
10
CSRF
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the apinsplex namespace in bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py omits @authenticate on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke POST /api/plex/oauth/logout to clear credentials and disable the integration, or POST /api/plex/apikey to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. POST /api/plex/oauth/pin and GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/<pinid>/check additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account's token to the instance. PlexPinCheck skips state validation when stateparam is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. POST /api/plex/select-server, POST /api/plex/oauth/servers, POST /api/plex/webhook/create, POST /api/plex/webhook/delete and POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey expose further writeconfig() operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in X-Plex-Token, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.2
Path Traversal
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L

An issue in the component /api/swaggerui/static of Bazaar v1.4.3 allows unauthenticated attackers to execute a directory traversal.

First published (updated )
SSRF

Bazarr is vulnerable to unauthenticated arbitrary file reads in two endpoints and a blind server-side request forgery (SSRF).

First published (updated )
SSRF

Bazarr is vulnerable to unauthenticated arbitrary file reads in two endpoints and a blind server-side request forgery (SSRF).

First published (updated )
Severity
7.5
Path Traversal, SSRF
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Bazarr is vulnerable to unauthenticated arbitrary file reads in two endpoints and a blind server-side request forgery (SSRF).

1 / 2
Source: GitHub Security Lab
First published (updated )
Severity
7.5
Path Traversal, SSRF
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Bazarr is vulnerable to unauthenticated arbitrary file reads in two endpoints and a blind server-side request forgery (SSRF).

1 / 2
Source: GitHub Security Lab
First published (updated )
Severity
5.3
SSRF
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Bazarr is vulnerable to unauthenticated arbitrary file reads in two endpoints and a blind server-side request forgery (SSRF).

1 / 2
Source: GitHub Security Lab
First published (updated )

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