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The Bit integrations – Form Integration, Webhook, Spreadsheets, CRM, LMS & Email Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Log Re-execution in all versions up to, and including, 2.10.6 The vulnerability exists because IntegrationHandler::executeWithCapture() stores raw, attacker-controlled field values — including userpass and useremail — verbatim into wpbtcbilog.fielddata on anonymous front-end requests with no capability check, and LogHandler::reexecute() feeds that stored payload back through Flow::execute() inside the replaying administrator's session without validating the identity that originally produced the data, causing RegistrationController::updateUser() to resolve the target user ID to the administrator and write the attacker-supplied password via wpupdateuser(). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite the administrator's password and fully take over the administrator account. Exploitation requires that an administrator has configured a flow mapping a user-supplied form field to the userpass parameter of the WP User Registration "Update User" action, and that the administrator subsequently clicks "Re-execute" on the failure log row produced by the anonymous submission from the plugin's log screen.
The Bit integrations – Form Integration, Webhook, Spreadsheets, CRM, LMS & Email Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'field mapped to notificationcontent (attacker-chosen key, e.g. payloadtext)' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 2.10.6 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. Exploitation requires a site administrator to have preconfigured a Bit Integrations flow that binds the public Bit Assist webhook to a BuddyBoss "Send Notification" action with a form field mapped to notificationcontent, and the attacker to know the flow's UUID callback URL.