RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.19, 4.0.24, 4.1.15, 4.2.10, and 4.3.5, RabbitMQ OAuth credential refresh retains revoked runtime tags. when an existing AMQP connection refreshes from an OAuth token that grants the impersonator tag to a valid same-username token that no longer grants that tag, RabbitMQ updates the OAuth backend implementation (token/scopes/expiry) but leaves the connection's runtime #user.tags unchanged. rabbitaccesscontrol:checkuserid/2 then still honors the stale impersonator tag, so the connection (including newly opened channels) can continue publishing messages with a foreign AMQP userid after that privilege should have been revoked. A fresh connection using the downgraded token correctly refuses the same publish, proving the defect is stale session state rather than the token Limited to connections that once held impersonator and successfully refresh to a downgraded same-username rabbitauthbackendoauth2 (or an equivalent refresh-capable backend that returns tags) is enabled for This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.19, 4.0.24, 4.1.15, 4.2.10, and 4.3.5.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to 4.3.5, an authenticated user who can bind a queue to a topic exchange and publish to it can use consecutive # segments in a binding key to make both topic matchers revisit the same trie-node and routing-key-suffix states without memoization. The matcher materializes duplicate destinations before deduplication, causing combinatorial CPU work and memory pressure that can disrupt routing for all tenants. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.3.5.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.19, 4.0.24, 4.1.15, 4.2.10, and 4.3.5, RabbitMQ Management rendered an AMQP authorization-error reason containing an attacker-controlled queue name as HTML when the OAuth management UI was enabled. Exploitation requires an attacker with queue configure permission, a management administrator who can see but cannot read that queue, and the administrator clicking Get Message(s). A queue name containing a base element can then retarget the automatic relative refresh because the Content Security Policy omits base-uri and connect-src, and an attacker endpoint that permits the management origin through CORS can receive the victim's Authorization header. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.19, 4.0.24, 4.1.15, 4.2.10, and 4.3.5.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.1.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9, and 4.1.11, Stream Management Super-Stream Binding Keys Allocation Allows Low-Privilege Node Denial of Service. rabbitMQ 4.3.1 with rabbitmqstreammanagement enabled accepts PUT /api/stream/super-streams/{vhost}/{name} requests from an authenticated management user that can access the target vhost. When the request body contains the binding-keys field, the handler parses the attacker-controlled comma-separated string and builds the full stream-name list before checking whether the user has permission to configure the resulting streams. A low-privileged management user with vhost access but no configure, write, or read permission can therefore force large transient allocations before the resource permission check. In a 768 MB memory-limited container, one HTTP PUT with about 4.5 MB of JSON body killed the RabbitMQ container with Docker state exited true An authenticated low-privileged management user can kill a memory-limited RabbitMQ node with one HTTP This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3, 4.2.9, and 4.1.11.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.2.0 until 4.3.3 and 4.2.9, OAuth2 Client Secret Exposed via Unauthenticated JavaScript Endpoint (CWE-200). when OAuth2 authentication is enabled for the RabbitMQ Management UI and the configured flow, IDP use a client secret, the oauthclientsecret configuration value is included in the JavaScript served by the unauthenticated endpoint /js/oidc-oauth/bootstrap.js. Any user who can reach the management UI port can retrieve the OAuth2 client secret without Files: deps/rabbitmqmanagement/src/rabbitmgmtwmauth.erl, line 186 deps/rabbitmqmanagement/src/rabbitmgmtoauthbootstrap.erl, lines 35-50 deps/rabbitmqmanagement/src/rabbitmgmtdispatcher.erl, lines 45-49 (route registration) Code Path: 1. The route /js/oidc-oauth/bootstrap.js is registered as a plain Cowboy handler (rabbitmgmtdispatcher.erl:46): Credential exposure for the affected configuration: OAuth2 client secret is accessible without any authentication Token theft: Attacker can complete the authorization code flow using stolen authorization codes Client impersonation: Attacker can make requests. Any RabbitMQ deployment with: This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3 and 4.2.9.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.0.0 until 4.0.22 and 4.1.14 and 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, Atom exhaustion: toatom on global-parameter :name. resourceexists/2 (and the PUT/DELETE handlers) call rabbitdatacoercion:toatom/1 on the :name URL path segment. toatom/1 uses binarytoatom/2 (unsafe). The endpoint requires policymaker (not management, but below A user with the policymaker tag can crash the node by exhausting the atom table via repeated requests to /api/global-parameters/:name with unique :name Management plugin enabled policymaker tag ~1M HTTP. This issue is fixed in versions 4.0.22 and 4.1.14 and 4.2.7 and 4.3.1.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.0.0 until 4.0.22 and 4.1.14 and 4.2.7, Admin-only atom exhaustion: PUT /api/users tags list. settags/2 maps rabbitdatacoercion:toatom/1 over the user's tags list. The 20 MB management body limit fits ~3-4M short tag strings. An administrator can crash the node in a single request by creating a user (or importing definitions) with ~1M unique tag administrator. This issue is fixed in versions 4.0.22 and 4.1.14 and 4.2.7.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.18, 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3, native MQTT and MQTT over WebSocket behind a trusted PROXY Protocol frontend could lose the proxy-derived client address before the MQTT authentication path checked loopbackusers, causing the frontend-to-broker address to be treated as loopback. An attacker who can reach the trusted frontend and has valid credentials for a loopback-restricted account can therefore bypass the source-address restriction; the issue does not bypass password authentication. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.18, 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.0.0 until 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3, the optional rabbitmqjmstopicexchange plugin's x-jms-topic exchange accepted a client-controlled rjmserlangselector binding expression whose LIKE evaluator expanded percent and underscore wildcards into overlapping PCRE fragments. It executed those fragments with raw re:run/3 without match or recursion limits, allowing an authenticated tenant that can bind and publish to consume broker scheduler CPU and deny service with pathological selectors. This issue is fixed in versions 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9 , 4.1.14, 4.0.24, and 3.13.18, Federation upstream in RabbitMQ skips vhost authorization allowing cross-vhost message access. what the bug lets you do. A policymaker on one vhost reads and drains messages out of another vhost it has no permission on. With the default ack-mode the source messages are consumed (deleted), not copied. Why that should not 1. Federation validates the upstream URI without any vhost-access Cross-vhost message read/drain from a per-vhost policymaker, breaking vhost tenancy This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3, 4.2.9 , 4.1.14, 4.0.24, and 3.13.18.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18, JWKS Fetch Ignores HTTP Response Status Code - Signing Key Destruction Causes Authentication DoS (CWE-252). the JWKS key fetching mechanism in uaajwt.erl does not validate the HTTP response status code when downloading signing keys from the OAuth2 provider's JWKS endpoint. Non-200 responses (including 4xx and 5xx errors) are processed identically to successful responses. When the JWKS endpoint returns an error response with a valid-JSON body that lacks a keys field, all previously cached signing keys are destroyed, causing a persistent authentication denial of Files: deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwt.erl, lines 50-63 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwks.erl, lines 5-7 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/rabbitoauth2provider.erl, lines 98-107 Bug 1: HTTP status code ignored (uaajwt.erl:50-63): The Erlang httpc module returns {ok, {{HttpVersion, StatusCode, ReasonPhrase}, Headers, Body}}. The pattern {ok, {, , JwksBody}} matches ANY successful HTTP transaction Persistent authentication DoS: Once keys are destroyed, ALL OAuth2/JWT authentication fails for all users until a new successful JWKS refresh occurs Amplification: A single attacker can deny access to all legitimate OAuth2 users across the entire RabbitMQ. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. The advisory establishes affected 3.13, 4.0, 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 maintenance lines but contains conflicting first-fixed versions for the 3.13, 4.0, and 4.1 lines. fill/2 substitutes ${username} into userdnpattern without RFC 4514 DN escaping, allowing a crafted username to alter the LDAP bind DN and potentially select a different directory entry. Exploitation requires rabbitmqauthbackendldap with a userdnpattern containing ${username}, a directory layout in which the injected suffix resolves usefully, and a password valid for the resulting DN. The advisory body identifies 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3 as fixed, while structured metadata identifies 3.13.18, 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3. No fixed-version assertion is certifiable until a curator resolves this conflict.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.18 and 4.0.23 and 4.1.14 and 4.2.9 and 4.3.3, Stored XSS via TLS peer-certificate DN in stream-management UI (sibling of V-11). lines 102/106/110 render peercertsubject / peercertissuer with raw <%= %> and no fmtstring(). RFC4514 backslash-escaping of </> is HTML-inert and bypassable (<img ... //>). Requires non-default config: a stream TLS listener with verifypeer and an attacker-obtainable trusted cert with a malicious Same as the connection.ejs finding, against operators viewing the stream-connection detail rabbitmqstream + rabbitmqstreammanagement enabled with a TLS listener using verifypeer Attacker can obtain a certificate signed by a CA the listener trusts, with attacker-chosen DN An operator views the. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.18 and 4.0.23 and 4.1.14 and 4.2.9 and 4.3.3.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15 and 4.0.22 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6 and 4.3.1, Atom exhaustion: OAuth2 JWT tag: scope values. extractscopes/1 parses scopes of the form .tag: and calls rabbitdatacoercion:toatom() to convert to a tag atom. The token signature is verified first, so the attacker cannot forge scopes , but in IdP configurations where scope content is user-influenced, each login with a novel tag value leaks one In deployments where users can influence the scopes included in their IdP-issued JWT rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2 enabled IdP permits attacker-influenced scope values in signed tokens. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15 and 4.0.22 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6 and 4.3.1.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6, Atom table exhaustion via management API node field. pUT /api/queues/:vhost/:name (and the exchanges and bindings endpoints) accepts a node JSON field. The value goes through rabbitnodes:make → listtoatom with no cluster membership check first. Each unique value permanently leaks one atom. A March 2026 refactoring (ea61ce2563) introduced safe helpers in rabbitmgmtnodes.erl (parsenodename, safeatom, and requirenodename, using binarytoexistingatom) and fixed several callers (QQ replica ops, wmauthattempts, wmnodememoryets, getsortreverse, and rabbitfederationmgmt), but getnode/1 in rabbitmgmtutil.erl:880-885, the primary vector used by directrequest/6, was not Roughly 900K requests crash the VM via systemlimit, and all tenants lose Any user with the management tag and one vhost, the lowest privilege This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, the stream protocol stored the FrameMax value negotiated during the Tune handshake but did not compare it with an inbound frame's declared length before buffering the frame. With the stream plugin enabled, a remote client could therefore cause excessive memory pressure and denial of service by declaring an oversized frame. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, the Web STOMP WebSocket handler enforced neither maxframesize nor logintimeout before authentication, allowing an unauthenticated client to keep a connection alive with a slow stream of small frames and accumulate unbounded pre-authentication state. The rabbitmqwebstomp plugin must be enabled, and no authentication is required to reach the vulnerable path. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, mechanisms/1 applied listtoatom/1 to every colon-delimited token in an attacker-controlled authmechanism value, permanently consuming Erlang VM atoms and allowing the node to be crashed with a large request. Exploitation requires the Shovel or Federation plugin to be in use, and setting authmechanism requires the policymaker tag. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1, The shovel management resource's isauthorized/2 delegates to rabbitmgmtutil:isauthorizedmonitor/2, which accepts the monitoring tag. But allowedmethods includes DELETE, and deleteresource/2 deletes / restarts shovel runtime parameters with no additional role check. A monitoring user , intended to have read-only visibility , can therefore delete or restart any shovel in any vhost they can see. A read-only monitoring user can delete or restart any dynamic shovel , a state-changing operation that the equivalent /api/parameters endpoint correctly restricts to policymaker. Preconditions include rabbitmqshovel + rabbitmqshovelmanagement plugins enabled Attacker has credentials with the monitoring tag. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, The AMQP 0-9-1 shovel calls amqpuri:removecredentials before storing its connection URI, but the AMQP 1.0 shovel stores the raw URI including the password. The stored URI is visible via GET /api/shovels and via rabbitmqctl shovelstatus. Preconditions include The Shovel plugin must be in use with AMQP 1.0 shovels configured using URI-embedded credentials. Reading the exposed status requires the monitoring tag.. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, The trust-store plugin installs a verifyfun that overrides {badcert, unknownca} / {badcert, selfsignedpeer} when the presented cert "matches" a whitelisted one. The match key is extractissuerid/1 → publickey:pkixissuerid/2 → {IssuerName, SerialNumber} , both fields are taken verbatim from the presented certificate body and contain no public-key, SKI, fingerprint or signature material. iswhitelisted/1 is a pure ets:member lookup; the stored full DER is used only for list/0 display and is never compared against the presented cert. cacerts is [], so the whitelisted cert is never used as a trust anchor for path validation either. TLS client-authentication bypass: an attacker who knows the issuer DN + serial of any whitelisted certificate can connect with a forged self-signed cert. Preconditions include rabbitmqtruststore plugin enabled and used as the TLS verifyfun Attacker knows or can guess the {Issuer, Serial} of at least one whitelisted cert (non-secret; exposed via CLI/logs/any cert copy). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, matchvalue/3 passes the user-supplied ?name= regular expression to re:run with no matchlimit option, and executes it once per resource in the result set. OTP's default 10M matchlimit caps each call at roughly 100-200ms, but the regex runs once per resource in the result set. With a large set, for example 5000 queues at 150ms each, a single request consumes 12 or more minutes of CPU. Parallel requests saturate the schedulers. The useregex=true option is a supported feature on list endpoints, so this path is reachable through normal API use. Preconditions include Any user with the management tag can exploit this.. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, The cowboy WebSocket options at line 117 set compress => true, enabling RFC 7692 permessage-deflate negotiation. The handler does not set maxframesize, so cowboy's default of infinity applies. cowlib's cowws:parsepayload/9 calls zlib:inflate/2 on the compressed payload with no output-size limit. An attacker can negotiate permessage-deflate during the WebSocket upgrade and send a frame containing a zlib bomb (e.g. 50 KB → 5 GB). Decompression occurs in the connection process before websockethandle/2 ever sees the MQTT bytes. An unauthenticated attacker can crash a RabbitMQ node running the Web-MQTT plugin by sending a single highly-compressed WebSocket frame (a few KB on the wire) that inflates to gigabytes in memory. The cowboy WebSocket handler decompresses the entire frame before the MQTT CONNECT packet is processed, so no credentials are required. Preconditions include rabbitmqwebmqtt plugin enabled (not default, but common for browser clients) Network reachability to port 15675/15676 No authentication required. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1, isauthorized/2 for the /federation-links/.../restart route uses isauthorizedmonitor (accepts the monitoring tag), while allowedmethods permits DELETE and deleteresource/2 triggers rabbitfederationlinksup:restart. There is no per-method elevation check and no comment marking it intentional. A read-only monitoring user can restart any federation link , a state-changing operation that disrupts message flow. Preconditions include rabbitmqfederation + rabbitmqfederationmanagement plugins enabled Attacker has credentials with the monitoring tag. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, addbinding/3 parses the routing key as an integer weight N and computes ring positions with lists:seq(NextN0, NextN0 + N - 1). validatebinding/2 only checks N >= 1 , no upper bound. The resulting list is stored in the exchange's Khepri record, replicated cluster-wide, and reloaded on restart. A user with write permission on a consistent-hash exchange and read on a queue can create a binding whose routing key (the hash-ring weight) is an arbitrarily large integer. The broker allocates a list of that many integers via lists:seq/2 and persists it to Khepri across all cluster nodes , a single binding with weight 100000000 allocates ~800 MB on every node and survives restarts. Preconditions include rabbitmqconsistenthashexchange plugin enabled write permission on a consistent-hash exchange + read on a queue (standard binding perms). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, The runtime-parameters lookup path coerces the URL :component segment to an atom with rabbitdatacoercion:toatom/1 in lookupcomponent/1 (deps/rabbit/src/rabbitruntimeparameters.erl), creating a new atom for any previously unseen value. A safe helper, rabbitregistry:binarytotype/1, which uses binarytoexistingatom with a catch, already exists but is not used at this call site. lookupcomponent/1 calls rabbitdatacoercion:toatom(Component) on the :component segment of the request URL, converting an attacker-supplied string into a new atom. Because the Erlang atom table is bounded and atoms are never garbage collected, an authorized policymaker issuing roughly one million requests with distinct component values can exhaust the atom table and crash the node, resulting in a denial of service. Preconditions include Exploitation requires policymaker privileges and roughly one million requests.. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15, The content-header BodySize (a uint64) was stored without validation against maxmessagesize. The size check ran only when assembly completed. By declaring bodysize = 2^63-1 and then streaming fragments, a client ensured that checkmsgsize never fired, so the accumulated body size went unbounded. A reader process accumulates memory until the memory alarm fires, degrading all publishers cluster-wide, or until the node runs out of memory. The memory alarm provides only partial mitigation, since it is reactive rather than preventive. AMQP 0-9-1 is the most widely used protocol, and any publisher can trigger this condition. Preconditions include Any authenticated AMQP 0-9-1 client with publish permission can exploit this.. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, ?LOGDEBUG("shutting down Shovel '~ts', ... Shovel state: ~tp", [Name, State]) formats the entire state map. The 'uris' field holds plaintext URIs after credentialsobfuscation:decrypt (called in rabbitshovelutil:deobfuscateduris/2). No formatstatus/1,2 callback exists in rabbitshovelworker to redact it. Triggered when an autodelete shovel (src-delete-after = N) completes. With DEBUG logging enabled, autodelete-shovel completion writes the full shovel state map , including decrypted amqp://user:password@host/ URIs , to the broker log file. Preconditions include Shovel plugin enabled with URI-embedded credentials DEBUG log level (non-default) Autodelete shovel configuration Attacker has log read access. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, addvhost/2 calls rabbitdatacoercion:atomizekeys/1 (the unsafe variant using binarytoatom) on the vhost metadata map. The 20 MB management body limit fits ~1M+ short keys. Admin-only. An administrator importing a crafted definitions file can crash the node in a single request: a vhosts entry with ~1M unique metadata keys exhausts the atom table during import. Preconditions include administrator tag. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, patterntoregex maps % -> .? and -> ., then compiles ^...$ with only [unicode]; re:run is called with only [{capture, none}] - no explicit matchlimit. A pattern like %%...%X becomes ^.?..?.....?.X$ with overlapping lazy quantifiers. The whole-expression cap is ?MAXEXPRESSIONLENGTH=4096 chars / ?MAXTOKENS=200; a LIKE string literal is one token, so ~2000 % pairs fit. SQL filters are accepted unconditionally at rabbitamqpsession.erl:3264 (no feature flag). Evaluated per-message at rabbitstreamqueue.erl:1439. OTP's default 10M matchlimit caps each match at ~100-200 ms (not seconds), and the re NIF yields to the scheduler. An authenticated AMQP 1.0 consumer with read+write on a stream queue can cause ~100-200 ms of CPU per delivered message via a crafted LIKE filter, multiplied across thousands of messages and parallel sessions - a substantial backtracking-driven CPU amplification. Preconditions include AMQP 1.0 with stream queues in use Attacker can attach a receiver with a filter (read permission) and publish messages with long property values (write permission). This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1.