countly-server is the server-side part of Countly, a product analytics solution. Prior to 24.05.50 and 25.03.44, plugins/star-rating/api/api.js allows a non-global application administrator to use uploadFeedbackFile to store attacker-controlled active content while trusting the supplied MIME type. plugins/star-rating/frontend/app.js publicly serves the stored content from feedback/preview/ with the attacker-influenced Content-Type, so a global administrator who opens the preview executes the payload in the Countly origin and exposes authenticated session capabilities, including authtoken and csrftoken values. This issue is fixed in versions 24.05.50 and 25.03.44.

countly-server is the server-side part of Countly, a product analytics solution. Prior to 24.05.50 and 25.03.44, the authenticated data-migration deletion route in plugins/datamigration/api/api.js passes the user-controlled exportid to cleanupdata without path validation. plugins/datamigration/api/datamigrationhelper.js concatenates that identifier into a path resolved outside the intended import directory and calls remove recursively, allowing an application administrator or user with migration permission to delete writable files or directory trees and cause data loss or service disruption. This issue is fixed in versions 24.05.50 and 25.03.44.

countly-server is the server-side part of Countly, a product analytics solution. Prior to 24.05.50 and 25.03.44, public image and screenshot routes implemented in frontend/express/app.js, plugins/star-rating/frontend/app.js, and plugins/dashboards/frontend/app.js concatenate attacker-controlled wildcard paths without containment validation. On deployments using the local filesystem backend, an unauthenticated request can traverse outside the intended asset directories and reach getStats or getStream in api/utils/countlyFs.js, allowing arbitrary readable server files to be disclosed. The affected routes include /appimages/, /memberimages/, /screenshots/, /star-rating/images/, and /dashboards/images/screenshots/. This issue is fixed in versions 24.05.50 and 25.03.44.

countly-server is the server-side part of Countly, a product analytics solution. Prior to 24.05.50 and 25.03.44, star-rating/images/ and dashboards/images/screenshots/ are among public image and screenshot routes using the local fs storage backend that call getStream and pipe filesystem streams to HTTP responses without an error listener. An unauthenticated request containing a URL-encoded dot can make createReadStream open a directory, emit an asynchronous EISDIR error, and terminate the Node.js process as an unhandled exception, allowing repeated requests to keep the analytics API unavailable. The affected routes also include /appimages/, /memberimages/, and /screenshots/. This issue is fixed in versions 24.05.50 and 25.03.44.

An authorization bypass vulnerability exists in the Countly Server DBViewer due to flawed sub-pipeline detection in the aggregation stage sanitizer. The /o/db aggregation endpoint parses user-controlled aggregation JSON and passes it through a stage sanitizer that determines whether a nested array is a sub-pipeline by checking if every element contains a key present in a hardcoded KNOWNSTAGEOPERATORS set. If any element contains an unrecognized stage key, such as the undocumented MongoDB-internal $internalInhibitOptimization, the sanitizer misclassifies the entire branch as a generic array and skips stage-level stripping for all sibling stages. This allows a non-admin user with DBViewer read permission to inject forbidden operators like $lookup inside $facet sub-pipelines, performing cross-collection joins into restricted collections. This leads to unauthorized read access to sensitive data including password-reset tokens (prid), enabling account takeover.

Cross-site scripting in https://github.com/Countly/countly-server