The Debian initrd script for the cryptsetup package 2:1.7.3-2 and earlier allows physically proximate attackers to gain shell access via many log in attempts with an invalid password.

A vulnerability was found in upstream release cryptsetup-2.2.0 where, there's a bug in LUKS2 format validation code, that is effectively invoked on every device/image presenting itself as LUKS2 container. The bug is in segments validation code in file 'lib/luks2/luks2jsonmetadata.c' in function hdrvalidatesegments(struct cryptdevice cd, jsonobject hdrjobj) where the code does not check for possible overflow on memory allocation used for intervals array (see statement "intervals = malloc(firstbackup sizeof(intervals));"). Due to the bug, library can be tricked to expect such allocation was successful but for far less memory then originally expected. Later it may read data FROM image crafted by an attacker and actually write such data BEYOND allocated memory.

It was found that a specially crafted LUKS header could trick cryptsetup into disabling encryption during the recovery of the device. An attacker with physical access to the medium, such as a flash disk, could use this flaw to force a user into permanently disabling the encryption layer of that medium.