Dokploy before 0.31.1 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in getComposeContainerCommand() that allows authenticated organization members to execute shell commands via the serviceName parameter. Attackers can store serviceName values with shell metacharacters through backup.create or backup.update tRPC procedures, executing commands as root when scheduled backups run and taking over the host via the mounted Docker socket.

Dokploy 0.28.0 before 0.31.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows authenticated organization members to read arbitrary files by supplying ../ sequences in the filePath of patch.readRepoFile. Attackers with service read permission can read /etc/shadow, SSH private keys, and secret environment files on the Dokploy host or managed remote servers.

Dokploy 0.28.0 before 0.31.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows authenticated organization members to read arbitrary files by supplying ../ sequences in the filePath of patch.readRepoFile. Attackers with service read permission can read /etc/shadow, SSH private keys, and secret environment files on the Dokploy host or managed remote servers.

Dokploy before 0.31.1 contains a missing ownership check vulnerability in the readAppMonitoring tRPC procedure that allows authenticated attackers to access container metrics belonging to other organizations by supplying an arbitrary appName. Attackers can query getApplicationStats with any application name, including the fixed "dokploy" control-plane service name, to read CPU, memory, network I/O, and block I/O metrics for containers they do not own on self-hosted multi-tenant instances.

Dokploy before 0.31.1 contains a missing ownership check vulnerability in the readAppMonitoring tRPC procedure that allows authenticated attackers to access container metrics belonging to other organizations by supplying an arbitrary appName. Attackers can query getApplicationStats with any application name, including the fixed "dokploy" control-plane service name, to read CPU, memory, network I/O, and block I/O metrics for containers they do not own on self-hosted multi-tenant instances.

Dokploy 0.28.0 before 0.31.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows authenticated organization members to list tracked files of any git repository by supplying an arbitrary repoPath to patch.readRepoDirectories. Attackers with read access to one service can enumerate file and directory names of other tenants' application and compose source trees on the host or managed servers.

Dokploy 0.28.0 before 0.31.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows authenticated organization members to list tracked files of any git repository by supplying an arbitrary repoPath to patch.readRepoDirectories. Attackers with read access to one service can enumerate file and directory names of other tenants' application and compose source trees on the host or managed servers.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). Prior to 0.29.13, apps/dokploy/server/api/routers/destination.ts interpolates the accessKey, secretAccessKey, region, endpoint, provider, and bucket fields from destination.testConnection into an rclone ls command executed through childprocess.exec. The withPermission("destination", "create") path permits a low-privileged organization member to reach the mutation, close a quoted argument with a crafted field, and execute arbitrary commands in the root Dokploy container, which has access to the host Docker socket. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.13.

Dokploy's pitch is a self-hosted panel that holds the keys to everything it manages: root on every server in the fleet, the Docker socket, and the credentials of every database and application it deploys. 38,000 stars, 514 official templates. The panel is, by design, the most trusted process on the host.

The validator allows the backtick. Tested against dokploy/dokploy v0.31.0 (official image, digest sha256:f836f0ab…0953):

1. The database password validator (DATABASEPASSWORDREGEX, packages/server/src/db/schema/utils.ts:51-52, in the code since v0.29.0) bans $, !, both quotes, backslash, slash and space. It allows the backtick — and ; | & ( ) > with it.

2. In the Postgres and MySQL changePassword procedures the new password is placed in single quotes nested inside a double-quoted shell argument, where bash still performs command substitution. A password consisting of a backtick command and a redirect — no slash, no space, no banned character — executes as the Dokploy server process: uid=0(root) in the container that holds the host's Docker socket.

3. databaseUser carries no validator at all (z.string().min(1)) and reaches Postgres unquoted. A semicolon in the username is a complete command sequence — no substitution trick required — and the field is settable both at creation and through update on a deployed service.

4. The MariaDB and Mongo changePassword sinks are source-identical in shape to the fired pair; they are claimed at source-level confidence and were not separately fired. The Redis sibling does not fire: its password sits in top-level single quotes, and that control is what proves the mechanism.

Live proof, against our own rig only (official v0.31.0 image, localhost-bound): a benign password changed cleanly (200); a $(id) password was rejected by the validator (400) — the control showing the guard alive and incomplete; the backtick password returned 200 and left a canary file reading uid=0(root) gid=0(root) inside the server container. Replicated once from a clean container state. The backtick and semicolon usernames fired the same way, and the MySQL password sink fired as a second, distinct sink.

Scope, stated plainly: this is not unauthenticated, and it is not a cross-organization failure. Every changePassword procedure first checks checkServicePermissionAndAccess with the service: ["create"] permission; the attacker is an organization member who holds that permission and access to the service — in practice, the member who deployed the database. In a single-admin install there is no boundary to cross. Dokploy's product is multi-tenant hosting, and the vendor scored this same precondition class 9.9 (CVE-2026-72868): the tenant who can deploy a database should not thereby own the host and every other tenant's secrets on it.

What held is credited at the same weight: a suspected cross-organization rollback path was tested and did not fire — the service functions throw before any effect, and the state is unreachable through product flows. The validator's author clearly enumerated the dangerous characters; the class that executes is the one the enumeration missed.

Canary, for the record: on 2026-11-09, after this measurement, the vendor rebuilt all five changePassword commands on the canary branch using shell-quote argv arrays. No release contains that rewrite; v0.31.0 — the current release and the installed base — is the vulnerable code, and the validator is unchanged on every branch.

Paper: https://archive.org/details/knell-the-seventh-site

Key: 133883AB9F6EDE5B9BA6B82E27BEDAF0CE152F25 (knell)

Verify: gpg --import knell-public.asc, then gpg --verify paper-dokploy-FINAL-2026-11-09.md.asc

— knell

More, signed and timestamped: https://github.com/the-knell

Dokploy through 0.30.10 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows owners or admins of any organization to control other tenants' applications by supplying foreign applicationId values. Attackers can call procedures like saveEnvironment, updateTraefikConfig, deploy, or stop to overwrite environment variables and build secrets, repoint sources, and disrupt other tenants' applications.

Dokploy is a self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS) that simplifies the deployment and management of applications and databases. An authenticated attacker can read any file that the Traefik process user can access (e.g., /etc/passwd, application source, environment variable files containing credentials and secrets). This may lead to full compromise of other services or lateral movement. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.23.7.

Dokploy through 0.30.8 contains a cross-organization authorization bypass in the port tRPC router that allows authenticated owners or admins of any organization to manage other tenants' ports because the target application's organization is never verified. Attackers supplying a known portId or applicationId to port.create, port.one, port.update, or port.delete can read, modify, delete, or add port mappings, disrupting how victim services are published.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). Versions 0.26.6 and below have OS command injection through the appName parameter. 3 chained issues cause this problem: inadequate input sanitization, lack of schema validation and direct shell interpolation. User-controlled application names are passed through inadequate sanitization (cleanAppName function only replaces spaces and converts to lowercase) before being interpolated directly into shell commands executed via execAsync() and execAsyncRemote(). An authenticated attacker can inject shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, $(), backticks, |, &) in the appName field during application creation, which are then executed with server-level privileges when service operations (start, stop, remove, scale) are triggered. This issue has been resolved in version 0.26.7.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). In 0.29.0 and earlier, the deleteRegistry function in Dokploy (packages/server/src/services/registry.ts) executes docker logout ${response.registryUrl} without shell escaping. In the same file, the docker login command correctly uses shEscape() to prevent command injection. This inconsistency creates a command injection vulnerability when deleting a registry with a crafted registryUrl.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). In 0.29.1 and earlier, a command injection vulnerability exists in the Docker file upload functionality. When an authenticated user uploads a file to a container, the destinationPath parameter is not properly sanitized and is directly interpolated into a shell command string. By including shell metacharacters such as ; or ", an attacker can escape the intended docker cp command and execute arbitrary OS commands on the Dokploy host.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). In 0.26.5 and earlier, a critical path traversal vulnerability exists in Dokploy v0.26.5 that allows authenticated users to write arbitrary files to the filesystem during application deployment. When combined with Dokploy's remote server deployment feature, this vulnerability enables arbitrary file write to remote server filesystems, automatic remote code execution via cron jobs, complete server compromise, data exfiltration without user interaction, and persistent backdoor installation. This vulnerability bypasses all container isolation on remote server deployments.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). In 0.28.8 and earlier, authenticated OS command injection in the application.updateTraefikConfig tRPC endpoint allows admin/owner users to execute arbitrary system commands on remote servers via unsanitized echo shell interpolation.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). In 0.19.0 and earlier, the protectedProcedure middleware only verifies the user is authenticated - it does NOT enforce organization scoping. Each endpoint must individually verify the resource's org matches the session's activeOrganizationId. This affects the following endpoints: allByType, killProcess, and removeDeployment in deployment.ts; delete in rollbacks.ts; create, one, update, remove, manualBackupPostgres, MySql, Mariadb, Mongo, Compose, WebServer, and listBackupFiles in backup.ts; list, one, delete, update, runManually, and restoreVolumeBackupWithLogs in volume-backups.ts; getNodes, removeWorker, addWorker, and addManager in cluster.ts; and create in mount.ts.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). From 0.27.0 to before 0.29.3, a hardcoded BETTERAUTHSECRET fallback ("better-auth-secret-123456789") lets an unauthenticated attacker forge email verification JWTs, trigger auto-sign-in as admin, and execute commands on the host via the built-in SSH terminal. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.29.3.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). In 0.29.2 and earlier, Dokploy constructs shell commands using JavaScript template literals and executes them via childprocess.exec() (which runs through /bin/sh -c). User-supplied branch names, repository URLs, and Docker credentials are interpolated directly into these commands without escaping. This requires an authenticated user with application create/edit privileges.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). In 0.26.6 and earlier, Dokploy contains a command injection vulnerability in the /docker-container-logs WebSocket endpoint. The tail and since parameters are not validated and are directly concatenated into shell commands, allowing authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). In 0.28.8 and earlier, authenticated OS command injection in the /listen-deployment WebSocket endpoint allows any organization member to execute arbitrary system commands on remote servers managed by Dokploy, leading to full server compromise.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). In 0.26.7 and earlier, the schedule router does not enforce organization/role checks. As a result, any authenticated user can create, update, run, or delete schedules belonging to other organizations if they know the scheduleId/serverId. Schedule types server and dokploy-server write and execute scripts on the host or remote servers, enabling RCE on the Dokploy host or a target server.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). Prior to 0.29.13, the patch.readRepoDirectories tRPC procedure passes the user-controlled repoPath value from apps/dokploy/server/api/routers/patch.ts into a shell command in packages/server/src/services/patch-repo.ts without safe argument quoting. An authenticated organization member with service:read permission can inject shell metacharacters into repoPath and execute arbitrary commands through childprocess.exec as root in the Dokploy container. The supplied service identifier is used only to resolve the server and does not constrain repoPath. Because the standard deployment mounts /var/run/docker.sock, container-root command execution can be used to control Docker and compromise the host and its managed applications. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.13.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). Prior to 0.29.13, Dokploy organization members without Git provider access can retrieve plaintext provider credentials through github.one, gitlab.one, gitea.one, and bitbucket.one because those protected procedures return full provider rows without applying getAccessibleGitProviderIds or an organization check. The application.one route also returns nested GitHub, GitLab, Gitea, and Bitbucket relations from findApplicationById with GitHub App private keys, OAuth tokens, client secrets, webhook secrets, and app passwords even when hasGitProviderAccess is false. A member with application read access or a provider identifier can therefore bypass per-member provider assignment and use the exposed credentials to access private repositories or manipulate external workflows. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.13.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). Prior to 0.29.13, the backup.restoreBackupWithLogs tRPC subscription builds database restore shell pipelines from the user-controlled databaseName and backupFile fields without safely separating them from shell syntax. packages/server/src/utils/restore/utils.ts interpolates databaseName into database-specific restore commands, while packages/server/src/utils/restore/postgres.ts and the analogous restore modules interpolate backupFile into rclone paths. An authenticated member with backup-restore permission can inject operating-system commands that execute in the Dokploy host context through execAsync or execAsyncRemote, even when no valid database container or backup file exists. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.13.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). In 0.29.8 and earlier, backup.create, backup.update, and backup.restoreBackupWithLogs in apps/dokploy/server/api/routers/backup.ts accept a client-controlled destinationId and use the referenced destination without verifying that destination.organizationId equals ctx.session.activeOrganizationId. An authenticated member with backup permissions for a service in one organization can cause another organization's S3 accessKey and secretAccessKey to be materialized by packages/server/src/utils/backups/utils.ts getS3Credentials on the attacker's service host, read that organization's backup objects, or redirect and poison backups across tenant boundaries.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). From 0.28.7 until 0.29.13, the server.remove tRPC mutation in apps/dokploy/server/api/routers/server.ts accepts a caller-controlled serverId and calls haveActiveServices, findServerById, removeDeploymentsByServerId, and deleteServer without verifying that currentServer.organizationId equals ctx.session.activeOrganizationId. An authenticated owner or administrator with server:delete in one organization who previously observed another organization's serverId can delete that organization's server registration and deployment records, interrupt Dokploy management, and receive the associated plaintext SSH private key even though server.one denies the same cross-organization read. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.13.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). Prior to 0.29.13, packages/server/src/utils/providers/git.ts parses the user-controlled customGitUrl with sanitizeRepoPathSSH and interpolates its domain into the ssh-keyscan command from addHostToKnownHostsCommand without shell quoting, allowing an authenticated member with service deployment permission and an attached SSH key to execute arbitrary commands on the Dokploy host during deployment. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.13.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). Prior to 0.29.13, the mariadb.ts, mongo.ts, mysql.ts, postgres.ts, redis.ts, and libsql.ts Dokploy database service deployment functions pass user-controlled dockerImage fields unquoted into docker pull ${dockerImage} shell commands on the remote-server code path. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.29.13.