EDK2 contains a vulnerability in BIOS where an attacker may cause “ Improper Input Validation” by local access. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could alter control flow in unexpected ways, potentially allowing arbitrary command execution and impacting Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in BIOS where an attacker may cause “Protection Mechanism Failure” by local access. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability will lead to arbitrary code execution and impact Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the PeCoffLoaderRelocateImage(). An Attacker may cause memory corruption due to an overflow via an adjacent network. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Confidentiality, Integrity, and/or Availability.

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in the HashPeImageByType(). A user may cause a read out of bounds when a corrupted data pointer and length are sent via an adjecent network. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of Integrity and/or Availability.

Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in BIOS where a user may cause an Integer Overflow or Wraparound by network means. A successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to denial of service.

In the case of these OVMF/AAVMF images I believe the only other built-in application accessible is the firmware setup utility and boot selector. These obviously provide many capabilities, but require a user present at the console to access, and to the best of my knowledge not vulnerable to this attack. For firmware images provided by other vendors or distributors, I have no idea.

On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 3:52 PM Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac () debian org> wrote: On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 03:47:23PM +0000, Mate Kukri wrote: That is correct in the general case, but here the issue comes from the fact that a copy of the Shell was included in the firmware image itself, and as a built-in application was implicitly trusted. Ah, thanks for the clarification, I didn't know about the implicit trust on "built-in applications". Out of curiosity, are there other such applications, which could be abused?

Regards, -- Yves-Alexis Perez