Flyte 2.0.1 through 2.0.51 contains a cleartext secret storage vulnerability that allows users with Pod read access to obtain secrets by reading init container environment variables. The embedded secret manager webhook writes base64-encoded FILE-mounted secret values into the SECRETS environment variable, letting principals without Secret store access decode them from the Pod spec.

Impact List endpoints on Flyte Admin has a SQL vulnerability where a malicious user can send a REST requests with custom SQL statements as list filters.

Workarounds The attacker needs to have access to the flyteadmin installation (typically either behind a VPN or authentication).

References https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/SQLInjection#

Impact Users who enable the default Flyte’s authorization server without changing the default clientid hashes will be exposed to the public internet.

In an effort to make enabling authentication easier for Flyte administrators, the default configuration for Flyte Admin allows access for Flyte Propeller even after turning on authentication via a hardcoded hashed password. This password is also set on the default Flyte Propeller configmap in the various Flyte Helm charts. Users who enable auth but do not override this setting in Flyte Admin’s configuration may unknowingly allow public traffic in by way of this default password with attackers effectively impersonating propeller. This only applies to users who have not specified the ExternalAuthorizationServer setting. Using an external auth server automatically turns off this default configuration is not susceptible to this vulnerability.

Patches 1.1.44

Workarounds Users should manually set the staticClients in the selfAuthServer section of their configuration if they intend to rely on Admin’s internal auth server.

References https://github.com/flyteorg/flyteadmin/pull/478 https://docs.flyte.org/en/latest/deployment/clusterconfig/authsetup.html#oauth2-authorization-server

For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Flyte Email us here

FlyteAdmin is the control plane for Flyte responsible for managing entities and administering workflow executions. In versions 1.1.30 and prior, authenticated users using an external identity provider can continue to use Access Tokens and ID Tokens even after they expire. Users who use FlyteAdmin as the OAuth2 Authorization Server are unaffected by this issue. A patch is available on the master branch of the repository. As a workaround, rotating signing keys immediately will invalidate all open sessions and force all users to attempt to obtain new tokens. Those who use this workaround should continue to rotate keys until FlyteAdmin has been upgraded and hide FlyteAdmin deployment ingress URL from the internet.

FlyteConsole is the web user interface for the Flyte platform. FlyteConsole prior to version 0.52.0 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF) when FlyteConsole is open to the general internet. An attacker can exploit any user of a vulnerable instance to access the internal metadata server or other unauthenticated URLs. Passing of headers to an unauthorized actor may occur. The patch for this issue deletes the entire corsproxy, as this is not required for console anymore. A patch is available in FlyteConsole version 0.52.0. Disable FlyteConsole availability on the internet as a workaround.