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A flaw was found in Foreman. An authenticated user with viewhosts privileges can retrieve rendered provisioning template content for a host via the hosts template API endpoint, disclosing sensitive data such as the host root password. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-96659, which hardened the web UI preview path but left the API host-template render path authorized for Viewer-level users.
A flaw was found in Foreman. The remediation for CVE-2026-96659 restricted only the web UI TemplatesController#preview action to edit/create privileges. The REST API endpoint GET /api/v2/hosts/:id/template/:kind remains authorized by the low-privilege viewhosts permission and still renders the host's provisioning template in host scope. An authenticated Viewer can therefore obtain sensitive values rendered by provisioning templates, including the host root password via the rootpass helper, in the HTTP 200 JSON response.
Reported via PSIRTSUPT-25114. Credit: Sun Kimsroul (@SunKimsroul). Related: CVE-2026-96659 (UI preview path fixed; this flaw covers the remaining API host-template sink).
An incorrect authorization flaw has been found in network interface handling in the Foreman package. The domain and subnet interface API checks only that the caller holds a host permission. It does not apply the search limit on that permission, so the request is answered from every interface on the domain or subnet. A low-privileged network attacker or user must already be allowed to view some hosts and to view a domain or subnet shared with other hosts. They can request that domain or subnet's interfaces. The response includes interface records of hosts they are not allowed to view. If the attacker or user is also allowed to edit some hosts, they can submit a change to one of those interfaces. The interface is then saved with that change.
A flaw has been found in permission filters in the foreman package. The API loads a filter by its identifier and does not apply the search limit on the caller's permission. A low-privileged network attacker or user must already be allowed to delete filters for one role only. They can delete filters that belong to other unlocked roles. Those other roles then lose the access the deleted filters had granted.
The API loads a filter by id without the caller's search limit. The lookup is Api::V2::FiltersController#resourcescope, which returns every filter. The action check only asks whether the caller has the delete permission at all. Nothing checks that specific filter on delete. A filter on a locked built-in role is still rejected.
The caller must be logged in and must hold a permission to delete filters that is limited by a search, for example to one role.
Deletion of a filter on another unlocked role was demonstrated through the API. The same delete through the web interface was refused. An update that moves a filter onto a role inside the caller's search was read from the code and was not demonstrated.
Proxy::Dynflow::Core.webconsole mounts the Dynflow web console at /dynflow/console and, when consoleauth is true (the default), calls doauthorizewithsslclient only. That helper rejects an empty SSLCLIENTCERT and does not compare the certificate subject with trustedhosts or the certificate serial with acceptedcertserial. The serial is still computed in Core#initialize, with a comment that only the proxy’s own certificate should be trusted, and nothing reads it.
Before the merge, smartproxydynflowcore’s authorizewithsslclient halted unless the client serial matched the proxy certificate (added in commit 444cc84, Ivan Necas, 2016-06-20, “to avoid being able to use any valid certificate”). Commit e205e19 (2021-06-03) switched the console to the proxy-wide helper and dropped that comparison. First release carrying the drop is 0.4.0. The installer text for consoleauth says it enables trusted hosts and SSL. The code does not check trusted hosts.
The console is the Dynflow 2.x web UI (dynflow >= 1.6, < 3). Its index lists every execution plan. The step view runs YAML.dump on action input and output with no redaction. A remote-execution action input includes the script, hostname, effective user, and the secrets hash (sshpassword, keypassphrase, effectiveuserpassword) when those are set. The same before filter covers POST /:id/resume, POST /:id/cancel, POST /:id/skip/:stepid, and POST /:id/cancel/:stepid. Resume requires a paused plan. Skip requires a paused plan and a failed step. Cancel works when the plan or step is cancellable.
The proxy listens with SSLVerifyClient = VERIFYPEER and without FAILIFNOPEERCERT, so a missing certificate still completes the handshake and then fails this check. A presented certificate must chain to sslcafile. On Satellite that file is the Katello CA, which also issues content-host consumer certificates, so a registered host that is not in trustedhosts passes. consoleauth: false removes the check. The dynflow plugin listens on HTTPS by default. The proxy HTTP port is off by default (foremanproxy::http defaults to false). If HTTP is enabled, this SSL check does not run.
Current puppet default for the dynflow database is in-memory. Plans remain until the execution-plan cleaner (default 30 minutes) or a proxy restart. Secrets of in-flight and recent jobs are in the console during that window.
Hi,
A security fix has been released in Foreman Remote Execution, an open-source plugin for Foreman, an open-source lifecycle management tool for physical and virtual servers.
CVE-2026-12405: Foreman Remote Execution: command injection via effectiveuser
An authenticated user with permission to execute job templates can inject commands through the overridable effectiveuser parameter during job invocation. Improper input handling allows command execution with the execution user's privileges on managed hosts.
Affected versions: Foreman Remote Execution 0.1.2–16.6.5, 16.7.0, 17.0.0–17.2.1, and 18.0.0 CVSS: 8.8 (Important) CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fixed versions: Foreman Remote Execution 16.6.6, 17.2.2, and 18.0.1 Credit: Guilherme Suckevicz
References: - Foreman Security: https://theforeman.org/security.html#2026-12405 - Redmine: https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/39836 - Fix: https://github.com/theforeman/foremanremoteexecution/pull/1072
Thanks, Ondrej Gajdusek Foreman Release Team
Hi,
A security fix has been released in Foreman, an open-source lifecycle management tool for physical and virtual servers.
CVE-2026-12423: Foreman: provisioning token validation flaw
An unauthenticated request can reach build-host provisioning through an IP/MAC fallback when no valid provisioning token is supplied. The fallback is reachable in token-enabled Red Hat-family provisioning configurations and can expose provisioning data.
Affected versions: Foreman 1.1 through 3.19.1, and 5.0.0 CVSS: 7.5 (Important) CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Fixed versions: Foreman 3.19.2 and 5.0.1 Credit: Guilherme Suckevicz
References: - Foreman Security: https://theforeman.org/security.html#2026-12423 - Redmine: https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/39837 - Fix: https://github.com/theforeman/foreman/pull/11310
Thanks, Ondrej Gajdusek Foreman Release Team
Hi,
A security fix has been released in Foreman, an open-source lifecycle management tool for physical and virtual servers.
CVE-2026-12540: Foreman: command injection in foreman-rake errors:fetchlog
A user allowed to run the restricted foreman-rake log task can cause command execution through its request identifier parameter. Unsafe shell handling can compromise the Foreman server.
Affected versions: Foreman 2.2.0 through 3.19.1, and 5.0.0 CVSS: 8.2 (Important) CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H Fixed versions: Foreman 3.19.2 and 5.0.1 Credit: Guilherme Suckevicz
References: - Foreman Security: https://theforeman.org/security.html#2026-12540 - Redmine: https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/39838 - Fix: https://github.com/theforeman/foreman/pull/11310
Thanks, Ondrej Gajdusek Foreman Release Team
Hi,
A security fix has been released in Foreman, an open-source lifecycle management tool for physical and virtual servers.
CVE-2026-12541: Foreman: command injection in foreman-rake database tasks
A user allowed to run restricted foreman-rake database tasks can cause command execution through file path parameters. Unsafe shell handling can compromise the Foreman server and its database.
Affected versions: Foreman 1.5.0 through 3.19.1, and 5.0.0 CVSS: 8.2 (Important) CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H Fixed versions: Foreman 3.19.2 and 5.0.1 Credit: Guilherme Suckevicz
References: - Foreman Security: https://theforeman.org/security.html#2026-12541 - Redmine: https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/39839 - Fix: https://github.com/theforeman/foreman/pull/11310
Thanks, Ondrej Gajdusek Foreman Release Team
Hi,
A security fix has been released in Foreman, an open-source lifecycle management tool for physical and virtual servers.
CVE-2026-12542: Foreman: command injection in foreman-tail
A local user with access to foreman-tail can inject commands because user input is evaluated unsafely. Successful exploitation allows arbitrary command execution on the Foreman server.
Affected versions: Foreman 1.5.0 through 3.19.1, and 5.0.0 CVSS: 5.3 (Moderate) CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L Fixed versions: Foreman 3.19.2 and 5.0.1 Credit: Guilherme Suckevicz
References: - Foreman Security: https://theforeman.org/security.html#2026-12542 - Redmine: https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/39840 - Fix: https://github.com/theforeman/foreman/pull/11310
Thanks, Ondrej Gajdusek Foreman Release Team
Hi,
A security fix has been released in Foreman, an open-source lifecycle management tool for physical and virtual servers.
CVE-2026-12544: Foreman: SSTI and unsafe deserialization in configuration
An attacker who can influence Foreman configuration can trigger server-side template evaluation or unsafe deserialization during foreman-rake startup, leading to code execution in a privileged service context.
Affected versions: Foreman 1.0 through 3.19.1, and 5.0.0; the ERB execution path starts at 1.15.0 CVSS: 7.7 (Important) CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H Fixed versions: Foreman 3.19.2 and 5.0.1 Credit: Guilherme Suckevicz
References: - Foreman Security: https://theforeman.org/security.html#2026-12544 - Redmine: https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/39841 - Fix: https://github.com/theforeman/foreman/pull/11310
Thanks, Ondrej Gajdusek Foreman Release Team
Hi,
A security fix has been released in Hammer CLI, a command-line interface for Foreman.
CVE-2026-12545: Hammer CLI: editor command injection
A local attacker who can influence Hammer CLI's editor configuration can cause commands to execute when a user invokes the affected editor flow. If Hammer CLI runs with elevated privileges, this can result in privilege escalation.
Affected versions: Hammer CLI 0.15.1 through 3.19.0, and 5.0.0 CVSS: 6.7 (Moderate) CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fixed versions: Hammer CLI 3.19.1 and 5.0.1 Credit: Guilherme Suckevicz
References: - Foreman Security: https://theforeman.org/security.html#2026-12545 - Redmine: https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/39842 - Fix: https://github.com/theforeman/hammer-cli/pull/407
Thanks, Ondrej Gajdusek Foreman Release Team
Hi,
A security fix has been released in Katello, a content management plugin for Foreman.
CVE-2026-56098: Katello: Registry Proxy authorization bypass
An authenticated low-privilege user can bypass Registry Proxy authorization checks and enumerate organizations and products through response differences.
Affected versions: Katello 4.13.0 through 4.21.1.1, and 5.0.0 CVSS: 4.3 (Moderate) CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N Fixed versions: Katello 4.21.2 and 5.0.1 Credit: Guilherme Suckevicz
References: - Foreman Security: https://theforeman.org/security.html#2026-56098 - Redmine: https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/39844 - Fix: https://github.com/Katello/katello/pull/11887
Thanks, Ondrej Gajdusek Foreman Release Team
Hi,
A security fix has been released in Foreman, an open-source lifecycle management tool for physical and virtual servers.
CVE-2026-96658: Foreman: Safemode bypass leading to RCE
A low-privilege user permitted to render supplied template content can bypass Foreman's Safemode restrictions and reach Ruby code execution with Foreman service privileges.
Affected versions: Foreman releases bundling Safemode before 2.0.1, including Foreman 3.19.0, 3.19.1, and 5.0.0 CVSS: 9.9 (Critical) CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H Fixed versions: Foreman 3.19.2 and 5.0.1; Safemode 2.0.1 or later must be installed Credit: Robb Gatica
References: - Foreman Security: https://theforeman.org/security.html#2026-96658 - Redmine: https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/39845 - Fix: https://github.com/theforeman/safemode/pull/68 - Dependency update: https://github.com/theforeman/safemode/pull/69
Thanks, Ondrej Gajdusek Foreman Release Team
A flaw was found in Foreman. This vulnerability allows an authenticated user with low-level Viewer permissions to cause unauthorized information disclosure by submitting requests to template preview endpoints. By exploiting this issue, the user can access sensitive data, such as host root passwords. Furthermore, under insecure system configurations where Safemode protections are disabled, the flaw may allow the user to execute arbitrary commands as the Foreman system account.
When accessing certain API endpoints (e.g. POSTing to /template/preview) a user with the Viewer role is able to access information they should not be able to (i.e. @host.rootpass). When the system is configured insecurely (i.e. Safemode is disabled), or a Safemode bypass vulnerability exists, then the Viewer is able to perform Remote Code Execution on the system as the foreman system account.
A flaw was found in the foremanansible plugin's Ansible inventory API. The controller builds its host query using an unscoped Host.where call that does not enforce the search filter associated with the caller's viewhosts permission. An authenticated user whose host visibility is restricted by a permission filter can supply arbitrary host IDs within their organization and receive the full Ansible inventory for those hosts, including parameter values marked as hidden.
A flaw was found in Foreman. This vulnerability allows an authenticated remote attacker with low-level read permissions to achieve arbitrary code execution on the underlying server. By manipulating the permitted methods list within the template rendering engine, an attacker can bypass the safemode sandbox isolation and execute unauthorized commands directly on the host system.
A Safemode bypass attack has been identified that exposes a number of weaknesses in Foreman leading to low-privilege (i.e. minimum "view" permissions) to be able to perform limited Remote Code Execution (RCE). It appears that a copy of the delegatemethods to the local scope allows an adversary to append eval to the permitted methods list leveraged by safemode, thus permitting RCE through the templating engine.
A flaw was found in Foreman’s Api::V2::MailNotificationsController, where authorization checks on user-specific mail-notification resources are insufficient. The GET /api/v2/users/:id/mailnotifications endpoint resolves the target account using User.find(params[:id]) without verifying that the authenticated user is authorized to access that user’s notification configuration. Additionally, the POST and PUT /api/v2/users/:userid/mailnotifications paths call denyaccess when the requester is unauthorized but fail to halt execution, allowing the request to continue and persist the unauthorized change despite a 403 response or subsequent DoubleRenderError. This can allow a user to disclose another user’s mail-notification configuration, including mailquery values, and, where write permissions apply, modify or create notification settings for another user.
A flaw was found in Foreman’s Api::V2::PersonalAccessTokensController, where Foreman::Controller::UserAware#finduser resolves the target account using User.find(params[:userid]) without applying the required parent-user authorization check. An attacker with the createpersonalaccesstokens permission can therefore invoke POST /api/v2/users/:userid/personalaccesstokens with another user’s ID and create a Personal Access Token on their behalf. The resulting plaintext token is returned in the API response, while PersonalAccessToken#checkpermissionsaftersave only validates createpersonalaccesstokens on the token and does not enforce editusers authorization on the target user. The attacker can then use the forged token to authenticate as the victim, potentially resulting in complete account takeover, including administrator accounts.
A flaw was found in Foreman’s Api::V2::SshKeysController, where the target user is resolved through Foreman::Controller::UserAware#finduser using User.find(params[:userid]) without enforcing the required parent-user authorization check. An attacker with the createsshkeys permission can exploit this authorization bypass by submitting POST /api/v2/users/:userid/sshkeys with another user’s ID and injecting their own public SSH key into the targeted account. The injected key is subsequently propagated to hosts provisioned by that user, potentially allowing the attacker to authenticate to and gain SSH access to the victim’s managed hosts.
Foreman contains an authorization flaw in the mail-notification endpoints implemented by Api::V2::MailNotificationsController. The controller resolves the target user directly from the request parameter without verifying that the authenticated user is authorized to access or modify that user's mail-notification configuration.
For the read operation, GET /api/v2/users/:id/mailnotifications assigns @user = User.find(params[:id]) without an ownership or parent-user authorization check. Because the viewmailnotifications permission is included in the default Viewer role, a user with Viewer privileges can retrieve another user's mail-notification subscriptions, including configured mailquery search strings. This results in cross-user disclosure of notification configuration and potentially sensitive information about the resources or activity being monitored by the victim. The same controller also fails to correctly enforce authorization for mail-notification creation and modification through POST and PUT /api/v2/users/:userid/mailnotifications. The validateparams method invokes denyaccess when the requester is neither the target user nor an administrator, but does not halt execution after denying access. Consequently, the controller action continues and may persist the unauthorized notification configuration despite returning a 403 response or subsequently triggering a DoubleRenderError (HTTP 500).
An attacker can therefore use the affected API to read another user's mail-notification configuration and, with the required permissions for the write path, modify or create mail-notification records for that user. The underlying issue is improper authorization of the target user combined with failure to terminate request processing after an authorization denial.
Foreman contains an authorization flaw in the Foreman::Controller::UserAware#finduser handling used by Api::V2::PersonalAccessTokensController. The controller resolves the target account directly with User.find(params[:userid]) without enforcing the parent-user authorization that normally restricts access to the target user. As a result, a user who has the createpersonalaccesstokens permission can create a Personal Access Token for another user whose account is accessible by ID within the user's taxonomy scope.
The vulnerable endpoint is POST /api/v2/users/:userid/personalaccesstokens. During token creation, the controller builds the Personal Access Token from the attacker-supplied userid and returns the plaintext token value in the API response.
The PersonalAccessToken#checkpermissionsaftersave model validation does not prevent this cross-user operation: when the token belongs to another user, it verifies the createpersonalaccesstokens permission on the token itself but does not require editusers authorization on the target user.
An attacker with the required createpersonalaccesstokens permission can therefore forge a valid PAT belonging to another user and subsequently authenticate as that user using the generated token. This can result in complete account takeover, including takeover of administrator accounts that are visible within the attacker's taxonomy scope.
Foreman contains an authorization flaw in the Foreman::Controller::UserAware handling used by Api::V2::SshKeysController. The controller resolves the target user through User.find(params[:userid]) without enforcing the required parent-user authorization. Consequently, a user with the createsshkeys permission can create an SSH key associated with another user accessible within the attacker's taxonomy scope.
The vulnerable endpoint is POST /api/v2/users/:userid /sshkeys. Because the target user is not validated against the caller's authorization scope before the SSH key is created, an attacker can supply another user's ID and inject their own public SSH key into that account.
The injected key is subsequently used by Foreman when provisioning hosts associated with the victim user through the sshkey provisioning snippet. This can cause the attacker's public key to be installed for the victim's managed systems, allowing the attacker to authenticate to those hosts with the corresponding private key.
Successful exploitation therefore allows a lower-privileged user with createsshkeys permission to modify another user's SSH configuration and potentially obtain SSH access to systems managed or provisioned by that user. The vulnerability results from missing authorization of the parent user before creating the child SSH-key resource.
Hi,
Multiple security fixes have been released in Foreman, an open-source lifecycle management tool for physical and virtual servers.
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CVE-2026-5136: Foreman: Privilege escalation via usergroup role assignment manipulation
The Usergroup model does not validate whether the calling user is permitted to assign the specified roles. A user with createusergroups or editusergroups permission can attach arbitrary roles to a usergroup via the API, add themselves as a member, and inherit elevated privileges.
Affected versions: all Foreman versions CVSS: 8.8 (Important) CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fixed versions: 3.18.2, 3.19.1 Credit: Stanislav Fot (Aisle Research)
References: - Foreman Security: https://theforeman.org/security.html#2026-5136 - Redmine: https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/39478 - Fix: https://github.com/theforeman/foreman/pull/11066
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CVE-2026-5142: Foreman: Cross-tenant private SSH key disclosure via taxonomy scoping bypass
The KeyPairsController#show action is excluded from the findcomputeresource callback that enforces taxonomy scoping. An authenticated user with the viewkeypairs permission can download the full PEM private key of any compute resource by database ID, bypassing organization and location boundaries.
Affected versions: all Foreman versions since 1.15.0 CVSS: 6.5 (Moderate) CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Fixed versions: 3.18.2, 3.19.1 Credit: Stanislav Fot (Aisle Research)
References: - Foreman Security: https://theforeman.org/security.html#2026-5142 - Redmine: https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/39479 - Fix: https://github.com/theforeman/foreman/pull/11069
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CVE-2026-5135: Foreman: Unauthorized modification of host configurations via broken access control
When lookup values are submitted as nested attributes during host or hostgroup updates, the match field is permitted and applied without ownership validation. A user with host-edit rights can retarget an existing lookup value override to point at a different host, injecting configuration values into hosts they are not authorized to edit.
Affected versions: all Foreman versions CVSS: 6.5 (Moderate) CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Fixed versions: 3.18.2, 3.19.1 Credit: Stanislav Fot (Aisle Research)
References: - Foreman Security: https://theforeman.org/security.html#2026-5135 - Redmine: https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/39480 - Fix: https://github.com/theforeman/foreman/pull/11072
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CVE-2026-5138: Foreman: Information disclosure via improper validation of nested request parameters
The taxonomyscope controller method loads organization and location IDs from nested request parameters without checking the user's taxonomy membership. An authenticated user with host-edit permissions can supply a foreign organization ID in nested parameters to scope AJAX queries to a tenant they do not belong to, leaking infrastructure metadata such as domains, subnets, and IP availability.
Affected versions: all Foreman versions since 1.7.0 CVSS: 4.3 (Moderate) CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N Fixed versions: 3.18.2, 3.19.1 Credit: Stanislav Fot (Aisle Research)
References: - Foreman Security: https://theforeman.org/security.html#2026-5138 - Redmine: https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/39481 - Fix: https://github.com/theforeman/foreman/pull/11075
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Thanks, Ondrej Gajdusek Foreman Release Team
A flaw was found in Foreman. The foreman-rake initialization logic in /usr/share/foreman/config/settings.rb contains a vulnerable code pattern where configuration data is processed through two distinct executable layers. This creates a multi-stage execution chain that allows for both Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) and insecure deserialization. This vulnerability can lead to remote code execution, total infrastructure compromise and supply chain risk.
Description
The foreman-rake initialization logic in /usr/share/foreman/config/settings.rb contains a vulnerable code pattern where configuration data is processed through two distinct executable layers. This creates a Multi-Stage Execution Chain that allows for both Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) and Insecure Deserialization.
The vulnerability execution chain has two stages:
Template Injection (ERB): The first stage uses ERB.new(...).result. This evaluates the file as a Ruby template. Any code inside <%= ... %> is executed by the Ruby interpreter to generate a string. This is an SSTI that allows for direct OS command injection.
Insecure Deserialization (YAML): The second stage takes the rendered string and passes it to YAML.load. Because this is an unsafe parser, it allows for object injection. Even if an attacker cannot use ERB tags, they can craft YAML that instantiates malicious Ruby "gadget chains" to achieve code execution.
The vulnerability exists in two different application functionalities, thus it can be exploited in two different ways:
Primary config:
SETTINGS.merge! YAML.load(ERB.new(File.read(settingsfile)).result) allows an attacker to craft a malicious /etc/foreman-maintain/foremanmaintain.yml file that will be loaded and executed by foreman-rake on start.
Plugins config:
SETTINGS.merge! YAML.load(ERB.new(File.read(f)).result) allows an attacker to craft a malicious file that will be executed from /usr/share/foreman/config/settings.plugins.d/ by foreman-rake on start.
Impact
Indirect Triggering & Privileged RCE: foreman-rake exposes underlying execution primitives that higher-level orchestration tools (like foreman-maintain or foreman-installer) rely on to interact with the application. Because these tools implicitly pass commands down, the vulnerability can be triggered indirectly during routine administrative operations, resulting in Remote Code Execution (RCE) in a high-trust context (often foreman or root).
Total Infrastructure Compromise: Compromising the management plane (Satellite server) allows an attacker to pivot and execute arbitrary code across all Satellite Managed Hosts.
Supply Chain Risk: While direct local exploitation requires prior root access, this flaw presents a critical supply chain risk. An adversary could distribute malicious plugins or compromised configuration files through public repositories (e.g., RubyGems, GitHub). Note: The CVSS vector and severity are based on this supply chain attack vector.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Replace YAML.load with YAML.safeload(content, permittedclasses: [Symbol]) in both locations in settings.rb.
Remove the ERB.new().result evaluation. Configuration files must be treated as static data, never as executable templates.
A flaw was found in Foreman. The foreman-tail utility is vulnerable to OS command injection due to the unsafe use of the eval command. The script takes user-supplied arguments and incorporates them directly into a string that is then executed by eval to expand file paths. Because the input is not sanitized or quoted, a local attacker can inject shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &, |) to execute arbitrary system commands.