See how fzf compares to other vendors in security performance
fzf is a command-line fuzzy finder. Prior to 0.74.5, trigger-driven zsh completion in shell/completion.zsh uses fzffeedfifo to create a FIFO at the predictable shared path ${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/fzf-complete-fifo-$$ and continues after removal or creation errors. On a multi-user host, a local attacker can pre-create that path as a symlink so the victim's completion stream overwrites a victim-writable file, potentially enabling code execution when that file is later sourced. A pre-created FIFO can instead disclose a bounded stream of completion candidates or block completion. On default modern hosts, fs.protectedsymlinks blocks the overwrite variant, and protectedfifos and protectedregular further limit the FIFO disclosure and blocking variants, so exploitation depends on the relevant kernel protections being disabled and on the victim invoking the affected completion. This issue is fixed in version 0.74.5.
fzf is a command-line fuzzy finder. Prior to 0.74.5, bin/fzf-tmux validates separately supplied layout sizes but does not validate attached -l and -u layout values before Bash arithmetic expansion, allowing command substitution in a crafted operand to execute as the invoking user during option parsing. The same validation failure lets space-bearing popup geometry options -x, -y, -w, -h, and -p reach an unquoted tmux popup option string and inject additional tmux flags. Exploitation requires less-trusted project configuration, a wrapper, or a plugin to supply the poisoned value and requires the victim to invoke fzf-tmux; normal values are usually trusted, and the script has been superseded by built-in tmux options. This issue is fixed in version 0.74.5.