Gitea's web attachment handler skips its cross-repository ownership check for attachments created before 16 January 2026 and checks permissions against the repository named in the request URL instead. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a private attachment's UUID can request it through a public repository's attachment path and retrieve its contents. This can expose issue and pull request attachments or release assets; the random attachment UUID must already be known to the attacker.

When OpenID sign-in is enabled, Gitea processes unauthenticated assertion parameters and sends an HTTP POST request to the caller-supplied OpenID provider endpoint during verification. An attacker controls the destination and much of the form body, allowing interaction with internal HTTP services reachable from the Gitea server. The response is not returned to the attacker, so the issue is blind SSRF; its impact depends on the services and network addresses the server can reach.

Gitea's collaboration access-mode endpoint accepts the Owner access mode from an authenticated repository collaborator with Admin access. The collaborator can promote their effective permissions from Admin to Owner and then perform owner-only operations, including transferring the repository to their own account. This bypasses the intended boundary between repository administration and ownership.

Gitea allows a token with write:user scope to register an attacker-controlled SSH public key on the token owner's account. API requests signed with the corresponding private key authenticate as that account through HTTP Signature without API token scope information, causing route-level token scope checks to be skipped. This converts a user-scoped token into an unscoped API authentication method while retaining the account's normal role and repository permissions.

Gitea resolves local reusable workflow files from a fork's head commit when a trusted base-branch workflow runs for a pullrequesttarget event. A fork author can modify a referenced reusable workflow so attacker-controlled code executes with the repository and organization secrets available to that event. Exploitation requires a base workflow that calls a local reusable workflow, and bypasses the intended separation between trusted base code and untrusted fork code.

Gitea substitutes a URL derived from the markup Context field into external renderer command templates without escaping the reference path before shell-style argument splitting. A crafted Context can inject additional renderer arguments, including options that load executable filter files. On deployments using a susceptible external renderer such as pandoc, a user who can place a filter file at an accessible path can cause it to execute as the Gitea service account; the public repository markup endpoint itself can be reachable without authentication.

Gitea's OpenID connect handler accepts a user's password without enforcing enrolled TOTP or WebAuthn verification before completing sign-in and linking an OpenID identifier. When OpenID sign-in is enabled, an attacker who knows the victim's password can obtain a session and link an attacker-controlled identifier. The attacker can then sign in through that identifier without the victim's password or second factor, and a password change does not remove the link.

Gitea's Maven upload handler reads checksum uploads entirely into memory and returns before enforcing package-size quotas. An authenticated user with package-publish permission can submit an oversized body to a checksum endpoint despite legitimate checksum values being at most 128 bytes. This bypasses the upload quota on that path and can exhaust server memory.

Gitea uses inconsistent repository visibility predicates, and the condition used by some repository-listing endpoints admits repositories whose owners are hidden from the viewer. Those listings disclose repository metadata even though direct routes correctly deny access with a 404 response. The issue exposes repository existence and listing information across the intended owner-visibility boundary.

Gitea does not limit the length of the gitignores field accepted by repository-creation forms and the API. Repository initialization splits the field into template names, repeatedly reads the referenced templates, and buffers their contents in memory. An attacker who can create repositories can submit an oversized value to amplify template reads and memory use, impairing availability.

Gitea's Actions workflow status badge endpoint does not enforce repository-read scope or the public-only restriction on the token authenticating the request. A token lacking read:repository, or restricted to public repositories, can retrieve the latest workflow status of a private repository accessible to its owner. This discloses private workflow status beyond the token's intended delegated permissions.

Gitea's repository markup endpoint resolves same-repository pull request references without enforcing the viewer's Pull Requests permission. A member with only Wiki access to a private repository can submit a markup preview request and retrieve a private pull request's title and state icon despite lacking Issues and Pull Requests access. This exposes pull request metadata across repository unit permissions.

Gitea's pull request review notifier does not attach the pull request to the Actions notification, so the fork workflow approval gate does not recognize the run as originating from a fork. Review comment and review approval or rejection events can consequently load workflow code from the fork head and run it on the base repository's runners without the required maintainer approval. This allows execution of fork-controlled workflow code across the intended approval boundary.

Gitea's organization-list API does not enforce the read:organization token scope. A token limited to another category, such as read:misc, can retrieve organization metadata visible to its owner. For a site administrator's token, the response can include Limited and private organizations, bypassing the intended restriction on the token's delegated access.

Gitea's shared comparison helper omits the token repository-access check used when updating pull requests. A public-only token with read:repository scope can route a comparison or pull request creation through a public base repository and retrieve commit history and diffs from a private head repository accessible to the token owner. This bypasses the token's public-only restriction; it does not remove the account's underlying repository permission checks.

Gitea creates server-side Git hook directories and scripts with mode 0777 and relies on the process umask to restrict access. With a permissive umask such as 0000 or 0002, another local user who can reach the repository storage may modify a hook or add an executable to a writable hook directory. A later Git operation can execute that file as the Gitea service account.

Gitea's repository migration API accepts a public-only token when the request specifies creation of a private repository. A delegated token intended to operate only on public resources can create a private repository and migration task under the authorizing account or an organization where that user has the necessary permissions. The ordinary private repository-creation route rejects the same token, but the migration path omits that restriction.

Gitea's organization repository-creation API requires write:organization but omits the write:repository token scope enforced by other repository-creation routes. A personal access token or OAuth application token without repository-write scope can therefore create organization-owned repositories if the authorizing user has permission to do so. This bypasses the token's delegated scope boundary while remaining subject to the user's organization permissions.

Gitea's user SSH and GPG key-list API endpoints omit the profile visibility check applied by their web equivalents. A restricted account can retrieve public keys, key titles, fingerprints, and GPG-embedded email addresses belonging to Limited-visibility users. The disclosure concerns public key material and associated metadata, not private cryptographic keys.

Gitea's API and web issue-search paths do not treat restricted accounts as anonymous viewers when evaluating Limited-visibility repository owners. A restricted user can search and retrieve issue titles and bodies that should be hidden by the owner's visibility policy. Keyword matching can also reveal that hidden issue content or comments contain a supplied term.

Gitea's activity-feed and contribution-heatmap API handlers do not apply the profile visibility check for restricted accounts viewing Limited-visibility users. A restricted user can retrieve activity records and contribution timestamps that the corresponding profile routes deny. Exposed activity can include repository names, commit messages, and issue or pull request events associated with qualifying public-repository activity.

Gitea enforces first-time fork contributor approval by blocking jobs, but some job transition and dispatch paths do not re-check the run's approval requirement. A separate run sharing a job-level concurrency group can cancel a pending job and cause its blocked sibling jobs to be re-emitted and dispatched without approval. This allows unreviewed workflow code to execute on self-hosted runners; fork secrets remain withheld and the run token remains read-only.

For pull request events, Gitea reads workflow definitions from the pull request head and posts a synthetic skipped status when workflow branch or path filters exclude execution. A fork pull request author can supply a workflow matching a required status context but deliberately prevent it from running. Because skipped statuses count as success, branch protection or organization-required workflow checks can appear satisfied without the mandated workflow executing; no runner or maintainer approval is required for this path.

Gitea's user organization-list API includes Limited-visibility organizations for authenticated restricted accounts without applying the visibility restriction enforced by the single-organization endpoint. A restricted user can list a known user's public organization memberships and retrieve limited organizations' names, descriptions, and avatars. This exposes organization metadata that should be hidden from the requesting account.

Gitea's package registry grants authenticated users read access to packages owned by Limited-visibility users without excluding restricted accounts. A restricted user can enumerate and download those packages despite the visibility policy that should prevent this access. The issue affects user-owned package registries and exposes package contents across the intended authorization boundary.

Gitea's collaborative-owner authorization path for reading cross-repository reusable workflows does not exclude fork pull request runs. An approved fork workflow targeting a private repository can read workflow files from another private repository that trusts the base repository's owner through collaborative-owner configuration. The issue exposes private reusable workflow contents at caller-selected Git refs; it does not itself grant write access or code execution in the other repository.

Gitea's Swift package parser limits each manifest to 128 KiB but does not limit the number of manifests or their aggregate size before reading them into memory. An authenticated user with package-publish permission can upload a highly compressed archive containing many manifests, causing allocations far larger than the uploaded archive. This can exhaust memory, terminate the process, or cause request failures.

Gitea parses Alpine package uploads before enforcing package-size quotas and does not bound the decompressed .PKGINFO data or its dependency and provides entry counts. An authenticated user with package-publish permission can upload a small, highly compressed archive that causes disproportionately large memory allocations during parsing and metadata generation. On memory-constrained deployments, this can terminate the process or otherwise disrupt availability.

Gitea's initial GitLab migration version probe uses an HTTP client without a timeout and does not attach the migration task's cancellation context. An authenticated user who can start migrations can target an attacker-controlled server that keeps the response open indefinitely. The request continues after task cancellation and can exhaust the migration worker pool, preventing other migrations from progressing.

Gitea's OneDev migration downloader reads the entire remote version response into memory without a size limit and uses a client without a timeout. An authenticated user who can start a repository migration can direct it to an attacker-controlled OneDev-compatible server returning an oversized or never-ending response. This can consume memory and hold migration workers, impairing service availability.