A flaw was found in evolution-data-server. Calendar events containing a file:// URI in their ATTACH property automatically read the targeted local file, base64-encode its contents and upload it back to the server when the event is saved. There are no file path restrictions or checks to verify whether the attachment originally came from the server or was added locally. This allows an attacker with access to a shared CalDAV calendar to exfiltrate arbitrary files the user has access to when interacting with malicious calendar events. This vulnerability affects evolution-data-server versions 3.26 through 3.62.0 and is fixed in version 3.62.1.

It was discovered that camel's NTLM SASL authentication mechanism did not properly validate server's challenge packets (NTLM authentication type 2 packets, [1]). In the ntlmchallenge() in camel/camel-sasl-ntlm.c, length of the domain string that was copied from type 2 to type 3 packet (client's reply to server's challenge) was not properly validated against the rest of the data received from the server.

127 ntlmsetstring (ret, NTLMRESPONSEDOMAINOFFSET, 128 token->data + NTLMCHALLENGEDOMAINOFFSET, 129 atoi (token->data + NTLMCHALLENGEDOMAINLENOFFSET));

Server could specify larger length than the actual data sent in the packet, causing the client to disclose portion of its memory, or crash.

Note: length value was not properly extracted from the packet too, as it is not passed as string, rather as 16-bit LE value.

[1] http://curl.haxx.se/rfc/ntlm.html#theType2Message