BIND may accept incorrect child-zone NSEC3 records as valid, allowing forged authenticated NXDOMAIN responses for sibling zones. AC:H (high complexity) keeps severity at Medium despite S:C.
If a provably insecure domain is covered by both NSEC and NSEC3 at the parent, with an RRSIG for only one type, BIND exits with an assertion during validation.
On 5/22/26 00:31, ROI AI wrote: I understand the costs, but simply hanging all the dirty laundry out is counter productive. Working a change in public without going into sensitive details is reasonable, but pushing vuln reports to public is careless.
[...]
As a further data point backing up this theory: We’re seeing duplicate reports of the same issue found by multiple independent groups that use LLMs, within the embargo period.
-- Jacob From: Jacob Bachmeyer <jcb62281 () gmail com> To: <oss-security () lists openwall com> Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 21:02:51 -0700 Subject: Re: [oss-security] Coordinated Disclosure in the LLM Age
On 5/21/26 01:51, ROI AI wrote: Also the entire nonsense about making the found issues public - this is absurd and just exacerbates the asymmetry problem.
By keeping the reports private, the OSS teams can deal with the issues more on their timeline.
By making them public, they add timeline pressure and enable attackers.
Why are you making it harder on yourself? It is the opposite of what you want to do. security issues private rather seriously---and that itself has costs. any benefit when the issue was found using a tool to search for issues, due to the risk of someone else using the same tool and finding the same issue. If that other person is another whitehat, you get a duplicate report. If that other person is a blackhat, you get an in-the-wild exploit while you were carefully maintaining an embargo. [...]
From: ROI AI < mailto:sales () roiai ca > To: "oss-security"< mailto:oss-security () lists openwall com > Date: Wed, 20 May 2026 22:26:21 -0700 Subject: Re: [oss-security] Coordinated Disclosure in the LLM Age
People are shooting the messengers here. The fact is - we are going through a generational security event due to the advancement of LLMs. amount of "AI" slop that has buried maintainers of major packages. Have you forgotten already that curl had to cancel their bug bounty due to excessive "AI" slop submissions? It is also both trivial and extremely effective to use Agentic analysis to filter security reports. be incapable of precise analysis. I understand talking your own book, but there are serious externalities here and I cannot let this go unanswered. genuine issue? Now the issue does not get fixed... "AI" hallucinations? Remember that the same hallucination-prone model might be doing the analysis as made the bogus report. How, exactly, is a model supposed to recognize its own hallucinations? As for 'duplicates', people are claiming this when I have seen little evidence. I reported a dozen or so to one major project and no one has yet claimed invalid or duplicate. manages inserting them into a bug tracker. I am inclined to trust their experience over your hand-waving dismissal. in many projects, sent straight to the bit bucket, especially if found to be invalid. You should not expect a response informing you that your report is invalid, as most maintainers have likely stopped bothering to send those. Moreover, if 'duplicates' are found, then that is a good signal for prioritization. issue may be "low-hanging fruit" and therefore already quasi-public. In other words, duplicate reports could be a signal to dump the embargo and move faster to fix the issue. (Remember that working under embargo has costs? Those costs can extend the time to patch.) Let's stop talking about how the vulns are found and start fixing them with urgency. (< mailto:sales () roiai ca >) and realize that I am probably debating a slop machine tasked with promoting a product. I will send this anyway, for the benefit of my fellow humans who will read this discussion and who might---just might---recognize your marketing efforts as the slop they are. ROI AI -- Jacob From: Alan Coopersmith < mailto: mailto:alan.coopersmith () oracle com > To: < mailto: mailto:oss-security () lists openwall com > Date: Wed, 20 May 2026 10:52:37 -0700 Subject: Re: [oss-security] Coordinated Disclosure in the LLM Age
On 4/28/26 07:58, Jeremy Stanley wrote: I'm sorely tempted, both due to the increased volume and the risk of premature disclosure, to just assume that any vulnerability reported as a result of research using an LLM is trivially discoverable by others, and give up trying to pretend there's any point to working it under embargo. Other maintainers under similar floods seem to agree:
Linux kernel: - https://lkml.org/lkml/2026/5/17/896 - https://docs.kernel.org/process/security-bugs.html
DNS servers (BIND, Unbound, PowerDNS): - https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/56/contributions/1233/ - https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/56/contributions/1233/attachments/1180/2539/presentation.pdf Confidential communication. No warranties or commitments unless in a signed agreement. If received in error, notify sender and delete. Unauthorized use prohibited.
On 4/28/26 07:58, Jeremy Stanley wrote: Other maintainers under similar floods seem to agree:
Linux kernel: - https://lkml.org/lkml/2026/5/17/896 - https://docs.kernel.org/process/security-bugs.html
DNS servers (BIND, Unbound, PowerDNS): - https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/56/contributions/1233/ - https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/56/contributions/1233/attachments/1180/2539/presentation.pdf
-- -Alan Coopersmith- alan.coopersmith () oracle com Oracle Solaris Engineering - https://blogs.oracle.com/solaris
An unbounded resend loop vulnerability exists in the BIND 9 resolver state machine during bad-server handling, enabling a remote unauthenticated attacker to cause severe resource exhaustion by sending queries that trigger specific retry conditions. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.18.36 through 9.18.48, 9.20.8 through 9.20.22, 9.21.7 through 9.21.21, 9.18.36-S1 through 9.18.48-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.22-S1.
BIND resolvers are vulnerable to an amplified resource consumption/exhaustion attack. If a victim resolver makes a query to a specially crafted zone, the resolver will consume disproportionate resources. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.16.50, 9.18.0 through 9.18.48, 9.20.0 through 9.20.22, 9.21.0 through 9.21.21, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.16.50-S1, 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.48-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.22-S1.
Last updated 22 May 2026
Undefined behavior may result due to a race condition leading to a use-after-free violation. If BIND receives an incoming DNS message signed with SIG(0), it begins work to validate that signature. If, during that validation, the "recursive-clients" limit is reached (as would occur during a query flood), and that same DNS message is discarded per the limit, there is a brief window of time while the SIG(0) validation may attempt to read the now-discarded DNS message.
Invalid handling of CLASS != IN
A use-after-free vulnerability exists within the DNS-over-HTTPS implementation. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.20.0 through 9.20.22, 9.21.0 through 9.21.21, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.22-S1. BIND 9 versions 9.18.0 through 9.18.48 and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.48-S1 are NOT affected.
BIND 9 server memory exhaustion during GSS-API TKEY negotiation
BIND servers that are configured to use TKEY-based authentication via GSS-API tokens are vulnerable to excessive memory consumption when receiving and processing maliciously-constructed packets. Typically these servers will be found in Active Directory integrated DNS deployments and/or Kerberos-secured DNS environments.
An RPZ sent by a malicious authoritative server can result in a null pointer dereference, caused by a missing consistency check and leading to a denial of service.
A stack use-after-return flaw in SIG(0) handling code may enable ACL bypass
Authenticated query containing a TKEY record may cause named to terminate unexpectedly
A specially crafted domain can be used to cause a memory leak in a BIND resolver simply by querying this domain. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.20.0 through 9.20.20, 9.21.0 through 9.21.19, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.20-S1. BIND 9 versions 9.18.0 through 9.18.46 and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.46-S1 are NOT affected.
Excessive NSEC3 iterations cause high CPU load during insecure delegation validation
Querying for records within a specially crafted zone containing certain malformed DNSKEY records can lead to CPU exhaustion.
In specific circumstances, due to a weakness in the Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) that is used, it is possible for an attacker to predict the source port and query ID that BIND will use.
Cache poisoning attacks with unsolicited RRs
Under certain circumstances, BIND is too lenient when accepting records from answers, allowing an attacker to inject forged data into the cache.
DNS message with invalid TSIG causes an assertion failure
Description: Clients using DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) can exhaust a DNS resolver's CPU and/or memory by flooding it with crafted valid or invalid HTTP/2 traffic.
Impact: By flooding a target resolver with HTTP/2 traffic and exploiting this flaw, an attacker could overwhelm the server, causing high CPU and/or memory usage and preventing other clients from establishing DoH connections. This would significantly impair the resolver's performance and effectively deny legitimate clients access to the DNS resolution service.
Authoritative servers are affected by this vulnerability. Resolvers are affected by this vulnerability.
Versions affected: 9.18.0 -> 9.18.32 9.20.0 -> 9.20.4 9.21.0 -> 9.21.3
(Versions prior to 9.18.27 were not assessed.)
Resolver caches and authoritative zone databases that hold significant numbers of RRs for the same hostname (of any RTYPE) can suffer from degraded performance as content is being added or updated, and also when handling client queries for this name. This vulnerability affects the following bind versions: 9.11.0 -> 9.11.37 9.16.0 -> 9.16.50 9.18.0 -> 9.18.27 9.19.0 -> 9.19.24
ISC BIND is vulnerable to a denial of service, caused by an error when preparing an NSEC3 closest encloser proof. By flooding the target resolver with queries, a remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause CPU exhaustion on a DNSSEC-validating resolver.
Last updated 24 July 2024
A stack exhaustion flaw in control channel code may cause named to terminate unexpectedly
A flaw was found in the Bind package, where the resolver can crash when stale cache and stale answers are enabled, option stale-answer-client-timeout is set to 0 and there is a stale CNAME in the cache for an incoming query. By sending specific queries to the resolver, an attacker can cause named to crash.
A flaw was found in the Bind package, where the DNSSEC verification code for the EdDSA algorithm leaks memory when there is a signature length mismatch. By spoofing the target resolver with responses that have a malformed EdDSA signature, an attacker can trigger a small memory leak, resulting in crashing the program.
A flaw was found in the Bind package. By spoofing the target resolver with responses that have a malformed ECDSA signature, an attacker can trigger a small memory leak, resulting in crashing the program.