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A flaw was found in Katello where the Content View Filter Rules API does not properly enforce authorization on the parent Content View Filter. An authenticated, low-privileged user with Content View permissions in one organization may be able to access and modify filter rules belonging to a Content View Filter in another organization by supplying that filter's identifier. This can result in unauthorized disclosure of filter-rule information and unauthorized changes to unpublished Content View filter configuration.
A flaw was found in Katello. The Docker Tags repositories API endpoint resolves a DockerMetaTag with an unscoped find and returns associated repositories without intersecting Repository.readable. An authenticated user with viewproducts permission in one organization can enumerate repository metadata (names, product associations, content types, upstream URLs) for Docker tags belonging to other organizations by supplying the tag identifier and omitting the optional organization filter. Reported via PSIRTSUPT-25120.
Hi,
A security fix has been released in Katello, a content management plugin for Foreman.
CVE-2026-56097: Katello: SQL injection in Registry Proxy labels
An authenticated low-privilege user can inject SQL through Katello Registry Proxy label parameters because input is interpolated into database queries without sufficient sanitization. This can expose data across authorization boundaries.
Affected versions: Katello 4.13.0 through 4.21.1.1, and 5.0.0 CVSS: 6.5 (Moderate) CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Fixed versions: Katello 4.21.2 and 5.0.1 Credit: Guilherme Suckevicz
References: - Foreman Security: https://theforeman.org/security.html#2026-56097 - Redmine: https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/39843 - Fix: https://github.com/Katello/katello/pull/11887
Thanks, Ondrej Gajdusek Foreman Release Team
Dominic Cleal reports:
/etc/pki/tls/private/katello-node.key is created in the apache::certs class in node-installer when a child Pulp node is deployed.
It contains the private key for the node, that's normally kept in files with 0600 permissions.
A potential XSS issue within Foreman / Katello has been reported. It is possible to inject JavaScript code into the Description field of a User and save it. This code is then executed when opening certain pages (e.g., Host Collections).
Hi, From [2]: #### CVE-2024-7923: Authentication bypass in Pulpcore An authentication bypass vulnerability has been identified in Pulpcore when deployed by the Foreman Installer with Gunicorn versions prior to 22.0. This issue arises from the way Apache is configured to do certificate authentication and pass this information to the Gunicorn backend, without unsetting all headers coming from a possibly malicious client. Affects Katello 4.0.0 and higher Fix released in Foreman 3.10.1, 3.11.2, 3.12.0 GitHub PR puppet-pulpcore#357 #### CVE-2024-7012: Authentication bypass in Foreman An authentication bypass vulnerability has been identified in Foreman when deployed by the Foreman Installer with External Authentication. This issue arises from the way Apache is configured to do certificate authentication and pass this information to the Puma backend, without unsetting all headers coming from a possibly malicious client. Affects Foreman 2.2.0 and higher Fix released in Foreman 3.10.1, 3.11.2, 3.12.0 GitHub PR puppet-foreman#1181 Further References: [1] https://community.theforeman.org/t/foreman-3-11-2-is-now-available/39370 [2] https://theforeman.org/security.html#2024-7923 [3] https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-7012 [4] https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-7923 https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/37786?tab=changesets https://projects.theforeman.org/issues/37787?tab=changesets
Kind regards, Christian
modules/certs/manifests/config.pp in katello-configure before 1.3.3.pulpv2 in Katello uses weak permissions (666) for the Candlepin bootstrap RPM, which allows local users to modify the Candlepin CA certificate by writing to this file.
Aaron Weitekamp (aweiteka) reports:
Description of problem: /etc/katello/secure/passphrase is world readable. File and directory should be secured. [root@qeblade40 ~]# ls -la /etc/katello/secure total 12 drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Nov 13 09:11 . drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Nov 14 11:22 .. -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 65 Nov 13 09:11 passphrase [root@qeblade40 ~]# rpm -qf /etc/katello/secure katello-selinux-1.1.1-2.el6cf.noarch [root@qeblade40 ~]# rpm -qf /etc/katello/secure/passphrase file /etc/katello/secure/passphrase is not owned by any package
Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable): 1.1 [root@qeblade40 ~]# rpm -qa |grep katello katello-cli-1.1.8-12.el6cf.noarch katello-1.1.12-22.el6cf.noarch katello-qpid-broker-key-pair-1.0-1.noarch katello-certs-tools-1.1.8-1.el6cf.noarch katello-candlepin-cert-key-pair-1.0-1.noarch katello-glue-pulp-1.1.12-22.el6cf.noarch katello-all-1.1.12-22.el6cf.noarch katello-cli-common-1.1.8-12.el6cf.noarch katello-glue-candlepin-1.1.12-22.el6cf.noarch katello-selinux-1.1.1-2.el6cf.noarch katello-qpid-client-key-pair-1.0-1.noarch katello-common-1.1.12-22.el6cf.noarch katello-configure-1.1.9-12.el6cf.noarch
Steps to Reproduce: 1. ls -la /etc/katello/secure 2. rpm -qf /etc/katello/secure Actual results: File and directory are world readable
The installation script in Katello 1.0 and earlier does not properly generate the Application.config.secrettoken value, which causes each default installation to have the same secret token, and allows remote attackers to authenticate to the CloudForms System Engine web interface as an arbitrary user by creating a cookie using the default secrettoken.
Hayk Hovsepyan hhovsepy reports:
When user without remove system permissions calls CLI command "system removedeletion", it finishes successfully without any warning.
Jan Rusnacko of Red Hat reports:
Katello code exposes potential tosym Denial of Service attack vector from user input parameters. The two places identified are:
https://github.com/Katello/katello/blob/9231e24f93fa804e557fc95637cfa2c5bb92f6a7/app/controllers/katello/contentsearchcontroller.rb#L617
https://github.com/Katello/katello/blob/9231e24f93fa804e557fc95637cfa2c5bb92f6a7/app/controllers/katello/api/apicontroller.rb#L87
This type of attack is documented here - http://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/FedoraSecurityTeam/1/html/SecureRubyDevelopmentGuide/RubySymbols.html
This has been confirmed in testing by Eric Helms of Red Hat.
Description of problem:
The foreman & Katello projects received an upstream notification about the discovery of an authenticated sql injection vulnerability within katello:
Dear Katello/Foreman Team,
During an internal test it was discovered that the scoped search parameters sortby and sortorder are vulnerable to an authenticated SQL injection.
If we access: https://x.x.x.x/katello/api/v2/organizations/1/syncplans/1/products?availablefor=syncplan&fullresult=true&page=1&search=&sortby=name&sortorder=ASC'
we will see the following error:
{"displayMessage":"PG::Error: ERROR: unterminated quoted string at or near \"', katelloproducts.id <http://katelloproducts.id> DESC\"\nLINE 1: ...nid IS NULL)) ORDER BY katelloproducts.name <http://katelloproducts.name> ASC', katello...\n ^\n: SELECT \"katelloproducts\". FROM \"katelloproducts\" WHERE \"katelloproducts\".\"id\" IN (SELECT DISTINCT \"katelloproducts\".\"id\" FROM \"katelloproducts\" WHERE \"katelloproducts\".\"organizationid\" = 1 AND (katelloproducts.id <http://katelloproducts.id> in (NULL) or katelloproducts.id <http://katelloproducts.id> in (6,5,4,2,3,1)) AND (syncplanid != '1' OR syncplanid IS NULL)) ORDER BY katelloproducts.name <http://katelloproducts.name> ASC', katelloproducts.id <http://katelloproducts.id> DESC","errors":["PG::Error: ERROR: unterminated quoted string at or near \"', katelloproducts.id <http://katelloproducts.id> DESC\"\nLINE 1: ...nid IS NULL)) ORDER BY katelloproducts.name <http://katelloproducts.name> ASC', katello...\n
The injection can be exploited as a blind time based injection.
Best Regards Oliver
External reference: The line of code in question here is: https://github.com/Katello/katello/blob/KATELLO-3.0/app/controllers/katello/api/v2/apicontroller.rb#L67
Aaron Weitekamp (aweiteka) reports:
Description of problem: /etc/katello/secure/passphrase is world readable. File and directory should be secured. [root@qeblade40 ~]# ls -la /etc/katello/secure total 12 drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Nov 13 09:11 . drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Nov 14 11:22 .. -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 65 Nov 13 09:11 passphrase [root@qeblade40 ~]# rpm -qf /etc/katello/secure katello-selinux-1.1.1-2.el6cf.noarch [root@qeblade40 ~]# rpm -qf /etc/katello/secure/passphrase file /etc/katello/secure/passphrase is not owned by any package
Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable): 1.1 [root@qeblade40 ~]# rpm -qa |grep katello katello-cli-1.1.8-12.el6cf.noarch katello-1.1.12-22.el6cf.noarch katello-qpid-broker-key-pair-1.0-1.noarch katello-certs-tools-1.1.8-1.el6cf.noarch katello-candlepin-cert-key-pair-1.0-1.noarch katello-glue-pulp-1.1.12-22.el6cf.noarch katello-all-1.1.12-22.el6cf.noarch katello-cli-common-1.1.8-12.el6cf.noarch katello-glue-candlepin-1.1.12-22.el6cf.noarch katello-selinux-1.1.1-2.el6cf.noarch katello-qpid-client-key-pair-1.0-1.noarch katello-common-1.1.12-22.el6cf.noarch katello-configure-1.1.9-12.el6cf.noarch
Steps to Reproduce: 1. ls -la /etc/katello/secure 2. rpm -qf /etc/katello/secure Actual results: File and directory are world readable
Katello - up to current version - is vulnerable to a SQL injection vulnerability. When a request is made to the katello/api/v2/errata path, it's possible to send carefully-crafted data through the sortby parameter which are reflected in the vulnerable SQL statement. An attacker can use this vulnerability to generate a malformed SQL query, which, when executed, leaks internal ids from the katelloerrata table.
Eric Helms (ehelms) reports:
I have identified a number of areas and entities within Katello that are vulnerable to a cross-site scripting attack.
Reproducible: Always
Steps to Reproduce: 1. Log in 2. Navigate to Changeset/Repository/System/Distributor/Filter 3. Create a new entity from above giving it the name <a href="http://www.google.com">Entity 1</a> 4. Submit Actual Results: - Notification pops up saying success with a clickable link - Users can navigate to 'Notices' page and see clickable link from successful creation of the entity - If creating a Changeset, the changeset name will appear clickable inside the right hand list on the Changeset Management page
Expected Results: The name should appear fully escaped everywhere that it is used.
This is a two fold issue:
1. This issue is not present with some entities due to model validation on the backend that prevents the use of HTML <,>,/ characters. The entities defined above in the steps do not have this validation on their name property.
2. There are a few places where user input is not escaped on output. These locations are: - notices displayed to the user are marked as htmlsafe to account for the application putting links for the user into some notices, this has the downside of presenting all notices unescaped to the user and opening this XSS hole - in some areas of the application, JavaScript is used to construct templates and concatenate user input data from the server, since this data is not escaped when input to the JavaScript, the result comes out with an XSS hole