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A flaw was found in the Micrometer user-event metrics listener of Keycloak, a solution for integrated identity and access management. The issue occurs when the listener is configured to include the idp tag. An unauthenticated attacker can send requests to the identity broker login endpoint using arbitrary provider aliases, causing the system to create an unlimited number of metric time series. This can lead to excessive memory consumption and degrade the performance of both the server and its monitoring tools.
A flaw was found in the user update mechanism of the Keycloak Admin REST API. When Fine-Grained Admin Permissions are enabled, the system fails to check for specific password reset authorizations during a general user profile update. This allows a delegated administrator, who should be restricted from resetting passwords, to change a user's credentials and take over their account.
A flaw was found in Keycloaks Pushed Authorization Request PAR implementation. The single-use enforcement for PAR request URIs, as required by RFC 9126 section 4, is bypassed when using the silent authentication path prompt=none. When an existing SSO session is present, the authorization endpoint short-circuits directly to the successful-flow redirect handler. In this specific code path, the PAR consumption logic is never triggered, meaning the pushed request object is not removed from storage after use. Exploitation requires that the realm has PAR enabled, the attacker has valid client credentials to push an authorization request, and an active SSO session exists for the target user. A successful attacker can replay the requesturi multiple times to mint distinct, fully redeemable authorization codes for the same user without requiring the resource owner to re-authenticate. This allows for unauthorized token generation and violates the single-use guarantee required for FAPI-2 and RFC 9126 compliant deployments.
A flaw was found in the authentication session management of Keycloak, an identity and access management solution. The issue occurs when an administrator enforces a stronger authentication flow, such as mandatory two-factor authentication (2FA) setup, through a client policy. A user can bypass this requirement by manually visiting a specific session restart web link during the login process. This action clears the internal markers that track the required security steps, allowing the user to log in with only a password and gain access without completing the mandated 2FA setup.
A flaw was found in the Keycloak authorization token endpoint. The vulnerability is a logic error in how UMA permission tickets are processed when multiple resources share the same name across different owners. When a requester submits a permission ticket, the endpoint performs a lookup based on the resource name and the requester identity. However, it fails to properly isolate resources by their specific owner, leading to a scope merge where permissions from all matching resource names are aggregated into a single Requesting Party Token (RPT). An authenticated attacker with low privileges can exploit this by creating a resource with the same name as a victim's resource and sharing it with themselves. This triggers the merge mechanism, allowing the attacker to obtain an RPT containing scopes belonging to the victim's resource. This bypasses the standard policy engine evaluation for the victim's resource. Successful exploitation requires that the victim has previously shared their resource.
A flaw was found in the Keycloak authorization token endpoint. The vulnerability is a logic error in how UMA permission tickets are processed when multiple resources share the same name across different owners. When a requester submits a permission ticket, the endpoint performs a lookup based on the resource name and the requester identity. However, it fails to properly isolate resources by their specific owner, leading to a scope merge where permissions from all matching resource names are aggregated into a single Requesting Party Token (RPT). An authenticated attacker with low privileges can exploit this by creating a resource with the same name as a victim's resource and sharing it with themselves. This triggers the merge mechanism, allowing the attacker to obtain an RPT containing scopes belonging to the victim's resource. This bypasses the standard policy engine evaluation for the victim's resource. Successful exploitation requires that the victim has previously shared their resource.
A flaw was found in the Admin REST API of Keycloak, an open-source identity and access management solution. The issue occurs because the API uses a per-request in-memory cache to resolve clients by their unique identifier without verifying if the client belongs to the realm specified in the request path. This allows an administrator with limited privileges to read or modify sensitive client configurations in the master realm by accessing them through a realm they control. Successful exploitation could lead to the exposure of client credentials or the redirection of administrative login attempts to malicious sites.
A Missing Authorization vulnerability was discovered in Keycloaks Admin REST API. The flaw exists in the way the API resolves client resources using the per-request in-memory cache in the org.keycloak.models.cache.infinispan component. The cache is keyed by client UUID alone and does not perform a realm ownership validation when a resource is retrieved. An authenticated attacker with the create-realm role in the master realm can exploit this by creating a new realm and then addressing a master realm client using its UUID through the attacker-controlled realms API path. If the master realm client is present in the per-request cache, the system returns or updates the master client instead of enforcing realm boundaries. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to: Read client details, including credentials of confidential clients in the master realm.
Overwrite client configurations, such as injecting arbitrary redirect URIs into built-in master clients like admin-cli or security-admin-console.
Turn the master authorization endpoint into an open redirect.
Potentially affect other resource types that utilize the same per-request cache pattern.
A flaw was found in the Authorization Services component of Keycloak, an open-source identity and access management solution. The issue occurs in the policy evaluation endpoint, which is used by administrators to test how access policies apply to specific users. Due to missing authorization checks, a delegated administrator with limited viewing privileges can access the full profile and role information of any user in the realm, even if they are not permitted to view user details. This could lead to the exposure of sensitive information such as email addresses and assigned security roles.
An information disclosure vulnerability was discovered in Keycloak within the Authorization Services policy evaluation endpoint. The flaw exists in the org.keycloak.services.resources.admin.fgap package, specifically where the endpoint processes policy evaluation requests. The root cause is a failure to verify the callers permissions before resolving a user identity. When a delegated administrator with authorization viewing privileges (such as the view-authorization role) sends a request to the policy evaluation endpoint with a specific userId, the system constructs an identity token (RPT) for that user. This token, which includes the users email, full name, and effective role mappings, is returned in the response field. Exploitation requires the attacker to have administrative access to a resource server but lacks the view-users permission. A successful attack allows the administrator to bypass intended access controls to read sensitive profile data and role assignments for any user within the target realm.
A flaw was found in the Admin REST API of Keycloak, an open-source identity and access management solution. The endpoint used for deleting user credentials does not correctly check for fine-grained reset-password permissions. This allows a delegated administrator, who should be restricted from resetting passwords, to delete a user's password credentials, resulting in the user being unable to log in.
A Missing Authorization flaw was found in the Keycloak Admin REST API. The endpoint for deleting user credentials (DELETE /admin/realms/{realm}/users/{id}/credentials/{credentialId}) only verifies generic user management permissions (requireManage) and fails to enforce fine-grained reset-password authorization (requireResetPassword). This issue affects deployments where Fine-Grained Admin Permissions (FGAP) are enabled. An attacker with delegated administrator privileges, who is granted manage permissions but explicitly denied reset-password authority via a negative policy, can bypass this restriction. By invoking the credential deletion endpoint, the attacker can successfully delete stored password credentials for managed users. The concrete impact includes: Deleting a user's primary authentication credentials.
Causing account lockout for the victim user.
Performing a targeted denial of service against managed users.
A flaw was found in the Admin REST API of Keycloak, an open-source identity and access management solution. The issue occurs in the group-membership endpoints where the system fails to check if a group grants administrative privileges before allowing a user to be added. This allows a delegated administrator with limited permissions to add themselves to a high-privilege group, potentially gaining full control over the entire realm.
A flaw was found in the OIDC protocol implementation of Keycloak, an open-source identity and access management solution. The issue occurs during the token refresh process when the server restores requested audiences from stored client IDs. Keycloak fails to verify if the target audience client is still enabled before issuing a new access token. This allows an application with an existing refresh token to continue obtaining valid access tokens for a disabled client, potentially bypassing administrative access controls for resource servers that rely on offline JWT validation.
A flaw was found in the first broker login flow of Keycloak. When a user confirms an account-linking request from a different browser, a temporary proof is created to validate the link. However, this proof is not properly cleared after the link is established or when the user later manually removes the link. An attacker who controls the external identity can exploit this leftover proof to silently re-establish the link and gain unauthorized access to the victims account without any further confirmation.
A flaw was found in the Dynamic Client Registration service of Keycloak, an open-source identity and access management solution. The issue occurs when a user with the view-clients role accesses the client registration endpoint to retrieve client details. Due to a failure to mask sensitive information, the service returns the client's confidential secret in cleartext. This could allow a read-only administrator to obtain full access to the affected client's account and potentially escalate their privileges within the realm.
A flaw was found in the org.keycloak.services.clientregistration Java package in Keycloak. The Dynamic Client Registration GET endpoint at /realms/{realm}/clients-registrations/default/{clientId} fails to mask the client secret in its response. While a similar issue was previously fixed for the Admin REST API, this specific endpoint was overlooked. An authenticated attacker with the view-clients role can exploit this to retrieve the cleartext secret of any confidential client in the realm. With this secret, the attacker can perform actions such as obtaining access tokens via the client credentials grant, potentially leading to full realm compromise if the client's service account has elevated permissions.
A flaw was found in Keycloak's Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628) flow. The token redemption path in the DeviceGrantType class verifies the user.isEnabled status but fails to consult the BruteForceProtector to check for temporary lockouts. Because Keycloak's brute-force mechanism does not set the enabled flag to false during a temporary lockout, a locked user successfully passes the check. An attacker who possesses a surviving SSO browser session for a target account (established before the lockout) can complete the device verification and consent flow without being prompted for re-authentication. Consequently, the token endpoint issues a valid access token and refresh token while the account remains in a brute-force-locked state. This vulnerability represents a failure to include the Device Authorization Grant path in the fixes previously implemented for CIBA (CVE-2026-9798 and CVE-2026-16103).
A flaw was found in Keycloak's Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628) flow. The token redemption path in the DeviceGrantType class verifies the user.isEnabled status but fails to consult the BruteForceProtector to check for temporary lockouts. Because Keycloak's brute-force mechanism does not set the enabled flag to false during a temporary lockout, a locked user successfully passes the check. An attacker who possesses a surviving SSO browser session for a target account (established before the lockout) can complete the device verification and consent flow without being prompted for re-authentication. Consequently, the token endpoint issues a valid access token and refresh token while the account remains in a brute-force-locked state. This vulnerability represents a failure to include the Device Authorization Grant path in the fixes previously implemented for CIBA (CVE-2026-9798 and CVE-2026-16103).
A flaw was found in the first-broker-login flow of the Keycloak identity management service. When a user links a social identity provider account to their local account, the verification proof generated is not strictly bound to the specific upstream identity being verified. This allows an attacker with a different account on the same social provider to intercept the process and link their own account to the victim's local profile, gaining unauthorized access.
A Missing Authorization flaw (CWE-862) was identified in the JWT Bearer authorization grant (urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer) in Keycloak. The vulnerability exists in the JWTAuthorizationGrantType.process function, which fails to verify the client.isConsentRequired flag or check for a stored UserConsentModel before issuing an access token. While other user-facing grants like Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) explicitly refuse consent-required clients, and interactive grants verify stored consent, the JWT Bearer grant bypasses these checks entirely. To exploit this flaw, an attacker must have access to a confidential client credentials and a valid JWT assertion for a target user signed by an allow-listed Identity Provider (IdP). Successful exploitation allows an attacker to: Obtain a valid access token for a target user without their consent.
Access protected resources and APIs on behalf of the user.
Bypass administrative security policies intended to gate client access behind explicit user approval.
A flaw was found in Keycloak where the theme localization endpoints (/resources/master/common/{locale} and /admin/{realm}/console/messages.json) fail to validate or limit the locale tags provided in the request. Each unique locale tag results in a new entry being created in an unbounded in-memory cache within the theme message system. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this by sending a high volume of HTTP GET requests containing unique BCP 47 locale tags. Because the cache is permanent and has no size limit, this leads to continuous heap memory consumption. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to exhaust the JVM heap memory, leading to an OutOfMemoryError and causing the Keycloak service to terminate, resulting in a complete denial of service.
A flaw was found in Keycloak where the theme localization endpoints (/resources/master/common/{locale} and /admin/{realm}/console/messages.json) fail to validate or limit the locale tags provided in the request. Each unique locale tag results in a new entry being created in an unbounded in-memory cache within the theme message system. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this by sending a high volume of HTTP GET requests containing unique BCP 47 locale tags. Because the cache is permanent and has no size limit, this leads to continuous heap memory consumption. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to exhaust the JVM heap memory, leading to an OutOfMemoryError and causing the Keycloak service to terminate, resulting in a complete denial of service.
A flaw was found in the group policy provider of Keycloak authorization services, which is used to manage fine-grained access control to resources. The issue occurs when the system evaluates group-based policies using tokens that only contain group names rather than full paths. If two groups in different parts of the organization share the same name, a user in the unauthorized group can be mistaken for a member of the authorized group. This can allow a user to gain unauthorized access to protected resources they should not be able to reach.
An incomplete fix for CVE-2026-15573 in Keycloak PathMatcher allows an authenticated attacker to bypass authorization policies. The original fix introduced URI normalization to strip matrix parameters and resolve dot segments, but this cleanup occurs before percent-decoding. Consequently, percent-encoded semicolons (percent-3B) and percent-encoded dot segments (percent-2Epercent-2E) bypass the normalization logic. When the Keycloak policy enforcer is used with a servlet container that decodes these characters during routing (such as Tomcat or WildFly), the enforcer matches the request against a permissive catch-all resource while the container routes the request to a restricted endpoint. This allows a low-privilege user to access protected resources that should be denied by the configured policy.
A flaw was found in the SAML broker component of Keycloak, an identity and access management solution. When configured as a SAML broker using the IdP-Initiated flow, Keycloak fails to enforce the OneTimeUse condition in SAML assertions. This allows an attacker who captures a valid, unused assertion to replay it multiple times. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to hijack a user's session and gain unauthorized access to the system as that user.
A state-based policy bypass vulnerability was discovered in Keycloak's client policy engine. The flaw exists in the way the access-type condition evaluates UPDATE operations. Specifically, the condition checks the old client state instead of the proposed new state during an update. An attacker with low privileges, such as delegated client management permissions or a valid dynamic registration token, can exploit this by creating a public client and subsequently updating it to a confidential client. Because the policy engine still perceives the client as public during the update process, it fails to trigger the confidential-client policy profile. This allows the attacker to configure a confidential client with weak authentication (e.g., client-secret) even when the realm policy mandates stronger methods like client-jwt. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to persist non-compliant confidential clients, undermining realm-level security hardening.
A vulnerability was found in Keycloak where authenticated users can bypass authorization services time policies. When requesting a User-Managed Access (UMA) permission, a caller can supply a claim token containing forged kc.time.datetime values. Keycloak merges these caller-supplied claims after the server-generated time attributes, allowing the forged values to overwrite the server clock during policy evaluation. This allows an attacker to obtain Resource Permission Tokens (RPTs) outside of the time windows configured by administrators, effectively defeating temporal access controls such as maintenance windows or off-hours access denials.
A vulnerability was found in Keycloak where authenticated users can bypass authorization services time policies. When requesting a User-Managed Access (UMA) permission, a caller can supply a claim token containing forged kc.time.datetime values. Keycloak merges these caller-supplied claims after the server-generated time attributes, allowing the forged values to overwrite the server clock during policy evaluation. This allows an attacker to obtain Resource Permission Tokens (RPTs) outside of the time windows configured by administrators, effectively defeating temporal access controls such as maintenance windows or off-hours access denials.
A Broken Access Control vulnerability was identified in Keycloaks Fine-Grained Admin Permissions V2 (FGAP V2) implementation. The flaw exists in the POST /admin/realms/{realm}/users endpoint, where the server fails to validate group membership permissions within the user creation payload. While Keycloak correctly enforces manage-membership scopes for existing users, it misses this check during the initial user creation process. A sub-administrator with user create scope but restricted group manage-membership scope can successfully assign a new user to unauthorized groups by including them in the creation request. Concrete impact: An attacker with sub-admin privileges can elevate the permissions of new users, grant them access to restricted data by placing them in sensitive groups, and bypass the security boundaries established by FGAP V2.