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Severity
9.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Kiwi TCMS, an open source test management system, does not impose rate limits in versions prior to 12.0. This makes it easier to attempt brute-force attacks against the login page. Users should upgrade to v12.0 or later to receive a patch. As a workaround, users may install and configure a rate-limiting proxy in front of Kiwi TCMS.

First published (updated )
Severity
9
Malicious File Upload, XSS
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Impact Kiwi TCMS allows users to upload attachments to test plans, test cases, etc. In earlier versions there is no control over what kinds of files can be uploaded. Thus a malicious actor may upload an .exe file or a file containing embedded JavaScript and trick others into clicking on these files causing vulnerable browsers to execute malicious code on another computer or attempting XSS attacks.

Stored XSS attacks via file uploads have been fixed in earlier versions of Kiwi TCMS, see GHSA-2wcr-87wf-cf9j. This advisory deals with prohibiting users to upload potentially compromised files in the first place.

Patches Kiwi TCMS v12.2 comes with functionality that allows administrators to configure additional upload validator functions which give them more control over what file types are accepted for upload. By default .exe are denied. Other files containing the <script> tag, regardless of their type are also denied b/c they are a path to XSS attacks.

Workarounds Upgrade to version 12.2 or later.

References Originally reported by Ahmed Rabeaa Mosaa.

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Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Kiwi TCMS is an open source test management system. In version 11.6 and prior, when users register new accounts and/or change passwords, there is no validation in place which would prevent them from picking an easy to guess password. This issue is resolved by providing defaults for the AUTHPASSWORDVALIDATORS configuration setting. As of version 11.7, the password can’t be too similar to other personal information, must contain at least 10 characters, can’t be a commonly used password, and can’t be entirely numeric. As a workaround, an administrator may reset all passwords in Kiwi TCMS if they think a weak password may have been chosen.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
OS Command Injection, Command Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Kiwi TCMS is an open source test management system. In kiwitcms/Kiwi v12.2 and prior and kiwitcms/enterprise v12.2 and prior, the changelog.yml workflow is vulnerable to command injection attacks because of using an untrusted github.headref field. The github.headref value is an attacker-controlled value. Assigning the value to zzz";echo${IFS}"hello";# can lead to command injection. Since the permission is not restricted, the attacker has a write-access to the repository. Commit 834c86dfd1b2492ccad7ebbfd6304bfec895fed2 of the kiwitcms/Kiwi repository and commit e39f7e156fdaf6fec09a15ea6f4e8fec8cdbf751 of the kiwitcms/enterprise repository contain a fix for this issue.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.1
XSS, Malicious File Upload
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

Impact Kiwi TCMS allows users to upload attachments to test plans, test cases, etc. Earlier versions of Kiwi TCMS had introduced upload validators in order to prevent potentially dangerous files from being uploaded, see GHSA-fwcf-753v-fgcj and Content-Security-Policy definition to prevent cross-site-scripting attacks, see GHSA-2wcr-87wf-cf9j.

The upload validation checks were not robust enough which left the possibility of an attacker to circumvent them and upload a potentially dangerous file. Exploting this flaw a combination of files could be uploaded so that they work together to circumvent the existing Content-Security-Policy and allow execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the browser.

Patches - File upload validation code has been improved - Kiwi TCMS will now force Content-Type: text/plain when serving uploaded files

Workarounds

1) Force the Content-Type header via a custom Django middleware, see ExtraHeadersMiddleware in https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/blob/master/tcms/core/middleware.py#L23 and/or 2) Force the Content-Type header via Nginx overrides, see location /uploads/ in https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/blob/master/etc/nginx.conf

References Disclosed by Antonio Spataro and ek1ng. Additional credits to Ahmed Rabeaa Mosa.

1 / 2
First published (updated )
Severity
8.1
XSS
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Impact

Kiwi TCMS allows users to upload attachments to test plans, test cases, etc. Earlier versions of Kiwi TCMS had introduced upload validators in order to prevent potentially dangerous files from being uploaded and Content-Security-Policy definition to prevent cross-site-scripting attacks.

The upload validation checks were not 100% robust which left the possibility to circumvent them and upload a potentially dangerous file which allows execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the browser. Additionally we've discovered that Nginx's proxypass directive will strip some headers negating protections built into Kiwi TCMS when served behind a reverse proxy.

Patches

- Improved file upload validation code - Updated Nginx reverse proxy configuration for .tenant.kiwitcms.org

Workarounds

If serving Kiwi TCMS behind a reverse proxy make sure that additional header values are still passed to the client browser. If they aren't redefine them inside the proxy configuration. See etc/nginx.conf#L66-L68 and etc/nginx.conf#L87

References

Disclosed by M Nadeem Qazi.

1 / 2
First published (updated )
Severity
8.1
XSS, Malicious File Upload
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Impact

Kiwi TCMS allows users to upload attachments to test plans, test cases, etc. Earlier versions of Kiwi TCMS had introduced changes which were meant to serve all uploaded files as plain text in order to prevent browsers from executing potentially dangerous files when such files are accessed directly!

The previous Nginx configuration was incorrect allowing certain browsers like Firefox to ignore the Content-Type: text/plain header on some occasions thus allowing potentially dangerous scripts to be executed.

Additionally file upload validators and parts of the HTML rendering code have been found to require additional sanitation and improvements.

Patches

- Updated Nginx content type configuration - Improved file upload validation code to prevent more potentially dangerous uploads - Sanitization of test plan names used in the treeviewhtml() function

References

Disclosed by M Nadeem Qazi and Mahshooq Zubair.

1 / 2
First published (updated )
Severity
7.6
XSS
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

Kiwi TCMS is an open source test management system for both manual and automated testing. Kiwi TCMS accepts SVG files uploaded by users which could potentially contain JavaScript code. If SVG images are viewed directly, i.e. not rendered in an HTML page, this JavaScript code could execute. This vulnerability has been fixed by configuring Kiwi TCMS to serve with the Content-Security-Policy HTTP header which blocks inline JavaScript in all modern browsers. This configuration change is provided in version 12.1 and users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may set their Content-Security-Policy HTTP header manually.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.5
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Kiwi TCMS, an open source test management system, does not impose rate limits in versions prior to 12.0. This makes it easier to attempt denial-of-service attacks against the Password reset page. An attacker could potentially send a large number of emails if they know the email addresses of users in Kiwi TCMS. Additionally that may strain SMTP resources. Users should upgrade to v12.0 or later to receive a patch. As potential workarounds, users may install and configure a rate-limiting proxy in front of Kiwi TCMS and/or configure rate limits on their email server when possible.

First published (updated )
Severity
5.4
XSS
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

A stored XSS in a kiwi Test Plan can run malicious javascript which could be chained with an HTML injection to perform a UI redressing attack (clickjacking) and an HTML injection which disables the use of the history page.

First published (updated )
Severity
4.3
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Kiwi TCMS is an open source test management system. In versions of Kiwi TCMS prior to 12.2, users were able to update their email addresses via the My profile admin page. This page allowed them to change the email address registered with their account without the ownership verification performed during account registration. Operators of Kiwi TCMS should upgrade to v12.2 or later to receive a patch. No known workarounds exist.

First published (updated )

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